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The thesis focuses on the relationship between Hungarian environmental NGOs and the 
EEA and Norway Grants. The study describes and analyses how foreign civil society 
assistance enabled green organizations to pursue their agendas in order to understand how 
foreign assistance can potentially contribute to democratic processes. Since Hungary's 
transition to democracy and market economy in the 1980s, external assistance (especially 
American foundations and EU funds) has played an important role in the development of 
the Hungarian non-profit sector. Recent developments, however, endangered the 
consolidation of Hungarian civil society. Amidst the apathy among civil society actors, the 
EEA and Norway – the second biggest supporter of civil society today – has meant a ray of 
hope and offered opportunities for improving the quality of democracy in Hungary. How 
have environmental NGOs made use of foreign assistance and what have they achieved?  
The study offers an analysis by applying Keane's and Habermas's civil society theories in 
two case studies and also touches upon the foreign policy relevance of the grants.
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It takes six months to create new political institutions, to write a constitution and 
electoral laws. It may take six years to create a half-way viable economy. It will 
probably take sixty years to create a civil society. (Ralf Dahrendorf 1990:42)
1.1. Civil Society and International Assistance
The literature on Hungarian civil society often starts with the political and economical 
changes of 1989 and the decades preceding it. In the course of the 1970s and 1980, the 
concept of “civil society” was reinvented in Eastern Europe – first in Poland and then 
elsewhere – and rapidly inspired others in the West (Cohen & Arato 1992:487, Howell & 
Pearce 2001:15, Keane 2004:1, Celichowski 2004:71, Edwards 2011:11). This reinvention 
was initiated as people rejected the cruelty and corruption of their governments and the 
concept became a weapon in resisting the oppressive state. Civil society represented the 
right of self-organization in societies where the totalitarian state denied the very principle 
(Howell & Pearce 2001:15). As Ernest Gellner argues:
Soviets and Eastern Europeans turned to this notion (...) because it did convey, in a concise 
and very suggestive manner, precisely that which they most lacked and most desired. The 
aspiration for civil society was born of the social conditions of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet world. (Gellner 1994:54)
Civil society meant the possibility of human emancipation and held out the promise of a 
liberal, pluralist democracy. Although these were not Eastern Europeans' only objectives: it 
was also a prominent desire to transform the conditions of material life and to gain freedom 
to economic self-management. However, most value was given to democratization and the 
development of a liberal political sphere (Howell & Pearce 2001:15). With the increasing 
2recognition of political and economic crises in the late 1980s, the culture of silence was 
gradually replaced with more open dialogue among formerly isolated citizens. A new public 
arena emerged where social, environmental, cultural and – for the first time – political 
issues could be openly and critically discussed. In the 1980s a modern, critical dialogue was 
born in Hungary. (Miszlivetz 2008:98)
After the transition to democracy and market economy, numerous studies showed 
that in most countries civil society played a role in overcoming authoritarian regimes and 
establishing democratic structures (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:5). Inspired by the democratic 
opposition movements in Eastern Europe, donors increasingly focused on the potential role 
of civil society. “It is only the rediscovery of this ideal in Eastern Europe (...) that has 
reminded the inhabitants of liberal states on either shore of the northern Atlantic of just what 
it is that they possess and ought to hold dear” (Gellner 1994:13). The rediscovery of the 
ideal of civil society paved the way for Western financial institutions, foundations and 
multilateral development agencies to sponsor civil society in the former communist states of 
Eastern Europe (Císař 2010:738). They all started out with the implicit assumption that civil 
society was an important democratic check on the state and this led donors – mainly 
American foundations and institutions – to begin a serious program of “democracy 
building” in Eastern Europe.1 Funding citizen activism held out the promise that a lively 
civil society would strengthen democratic institutions, protect the rule of law, legitimate a 
peaceful opposition and the expression of dissent in acceptable ways. In these American 
approaches the main task assigned to civil society was the protection of citizens from the 
state (Howell & Pearce 2001:59). A strong normative element is present in such 
understandings since they reflect the belief that civil society is essentially a 'good' thing. The 
implications of such views on civil society has been significant since foreign donors who 
provided assistance to Eastern European transition countries included civil society under the 
category of  “democracy assistance” and mainly focused on advocacy NGOs above other 
civil society organizations (Celichowski 2004:75).
More than twenty years after the historical changes of 1989, Hungary is an 
unquestionable market economy with a liberal democratic political system and citizens no 
1 Dahrendorf's use of words in the motto (i.e. the “creation” of civil society) also suggests an understanding 
of civil society's nature as externally revived and imported rather than emphasizing it endogenous and 
organic development.
3longer have to be protected from the state.2 Accordingly, the role of civil society has shifted: 
it is increasingly considered to be a natural counterpart of the privatized market and the 
democratic political institutions rather than a force against authoritarianism. Although major 
international donors which used to support civil society have left the region when most 
Eastern European countries joined the EU (Börzel 2010:6), strengthening civil society is 
still considered to be a relevant objective for Iceland, Norway, and Liechtenstein – the donor 
countries behind the EEA and Norway Grants. The EEA and Norway Grants is a financial 
mechanism which is part of the EEA Agreement between the three EFTA states and the EU. 
Norway provides 97% of the assistance (EEA and Norway Grants 2011:2). The funding 
scheme was set up in 2004 in order to reduce economic and social disparities within the 
twelve newest EU member states in Eastern Europe, as well as Greece Portugal and Spain. 
Although the assistance is targeted at several areas, the development and invigoration of 
civil society were key areas of support. By setting up the Hungarian NGO Fund3, Norway 
became the second biggest financial contributor to Hungarian civil society during the first 
five-year funding period between 2004 and 2009 (EEA and Norway Grants 2011:15). The 
NGO Fund was received with enormous interest and enthusiasm by civil society 
organizations, since international organizations providing such support have turned their 
attention to other regions and the financial crisis left civil society chronically underfunded 
and even more vulnerable than before.
Most discussions of development assistance tend to go one way: while much is said 
about the 'effects' and 'results' of assistance in the beneficiary countries the wider context of 
international relations which produces the raison d'être of assistance is often left out of the 
picture. It is a widely accepted view in international relations that aid and development 
assistance are elemental parts of donors' foreign policies (Moravcsik & Haggard 1993, Van 
Rooy & Robinson 2000:45, Hopkins 2000:338, Stokke 2005:33, Encarnación 2011:4). 
Moravcsik and Haggard argue for example that the US foreign aid assistance streaming into 
Eastern Europe in the 1980s was determined by foreign political considerations. The US, 
most engaged in the Cold War struggle, disbursed substantial amounts of official 
development aid in eastern-bloc countries before and after the transition as a reward for 
good political behavior. Aid was more of a political symbolism than a functional necessity. 
2 Recent political trends, however, have given reason to be concerned over the health of democracy and the 
rule of law in Hungary. I will briefly refer to these events below.
3 In twelve beneficiary countries 19 NGO Funds were set up.
4(Moravcsik & Haggard 1993) Can we assume that the EEA and Norway Grants is part of 
donor countries' foreign policies? And if the answer is yes, then what role does it play in 
Norway's foreign policy? Does this type of assistance serve altruistic purposes or other, 
economic and political interests? Is the EEA and Norway Grants a voluntary interstate 
cooperation based on solidarity as the donors claim or were there more instrumental 
considerations in the background? In order to place the grants into a wider context and 
understand the factors that determine its presence and future we cannot spare looking at this 
aspect of the grants. Trying to find the answer to these questions is an important pillar in 
Chapter Two. 
If we consider the Eastern European anti-authoritarian movements, the environmental 
movements – such as the Danube movement in Hungary or The Rainbow movement in the 
Czech Republic – preceded and in some ways precipitated the political changes of 1989 
(Lipschutz &Mayer 1996:129, Harper 2004:8, Pearce 2009, Fagan 2010:692). The struggle 
for a healthy environment was often a symbolic protest against the political regime and the 
green movement played an important role in overcoming authoritarian regimes and in 
establishing democratic structures. In Hungary, the Danube movement – a green movement 
against a state socialist infrastructural mega-project on the Danube – had an especially 
central role in shaking the foundations of the communist regime (Lipschutz & Mayer 
1996:129, Harper 2004:8). Members of the movement presented themselves to be as a 
Western-European type, one-issue, 'new social movement' and insisted on the non-political 
and 'professional' character of their activity, even in moments when their political role was 
obvious (Miszlivetz 2000:74). Foreign assistance played a central role in the development 
of this section of civil society since the mid-1980s until today and contributed to different 
aspects of civil society development. The Danube movement's main organizations had the 
broadest range of international contacts in Hungarian civil sphere in the 1980s and early 
1990s and had access to American and Western European funding, publishing opportunities 
and training trips abroad. The establishment of research and monitoring facilities was 
essential for activists to have access to, and be able to produce accurate and independent 
scientific information about the condition of the environment. (Persányi 1992:91-92) 
The main impact of foreign philanthropy this time was the professionalization of civil 
society organizations (Jenkins in Císař 2010:741). Since the second half of the 1990s, EU 
funds have assumed a much more prominent role amongst the available foreign resources. 
5Although the impact of EU funding is often interpreted by activists in terms of 
professionalization, organizational capacity building, human resources development, and 
bureaucratization (Císař 2010:745), it also contributed to a great extent to the globalizing 
outlook of environmental organizations and the internationalization of their agenda. By 
being connected to the European networks through workshops, twinning programs, etc. not 
only financial but other resources followed as well such as deepened international 
cooperation between various national groups, the exchange of effective organizational 
models and know-how, and new opportunities to participate in policy-making (Císař 
2010:749). Being the second biggest sponsor of Hungarian civil society, what role does the 
EEA and Norway Grants play in the environmental work of civil society organizations? 
How do these organizations use foreign resources to achieve maximum effect? What 
strategies do they employ and what functions do they fulfill through their activities? The 
case studies in Chapter Three and Four will shed light on these questions.
1.2. Definition Matters: Who is Civil, who is Non-Profit?
Since the 1980s, civil society has established itself as a paradigmatic concept in the field of 
development policy and practice (Edwards 2011:2). Since the late 1980s, multilateral 
development agencies, international financial institutions, NGOs, environmentalists, neo-
capitalists and social democrats have all in their own and distinct ways appropriated the 
language of civil society. Its appeal to such a wide institutional and political spectrum lies in 
the intellectual and political space it opens up about the relationship of state, market and 
society. Although some critics disparage the theoretical and practical usefulness of civil 
society because of the ambiguity and empirical diffuseness of the concept, civil society has 
proved far more persistent than many other buzzwords in discourses on development and 
democracy. While some critics have denounced the term a “conceptual portmanteau” (Van 
Rooy 2000:28) and a “dustbin category” (Keane 2004:9) or abandoned the concept 
altogether; others – politicians, academics, activists, development theorists and practitioners 
– enthusiastically embraced it and have used it as a potential tool in the critical exploration 
of social change. Ironically, the diffuseness of the term has also been the secret if its 
6success, enabling it to be legitimately claimed by everyone. (Howell & Pearce 2001:1) 
As a consequence, the definition of civil society has been notoriously elusive and 
there is no commonly agreed definition. Its various historical roots – ranging from Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers, through de Tocqueville to Marx and Gramsci – and its usage by 
different trends of contemporary political philosophy and development theory renders the 
concept one of the most difficult social science concepts to define, similar to an attempt to 
“nail a pudding to the wall” (Heinrich 2004:11). However, no discussion on civil society can 
avoid adopting some kind of definition. The notion of civil society as a sphere of voluntary, 
collective action around shared interests and values is not controversial (Paffenholz 2006:2). 
Beyond this basic observation there exists a broad and a narrow definition of civil society.
 The broad definition is more theoretical since it emphasizes the abstract qualities of 
civil society. Authors committed to the broad definition believe that civil society is, first and 
foremost, a sociological space where collective action becomes possible. They also rule out 
the possibility that civil society, due to its complexity and dynamics can ever be empirically 
measured. The narrow definition is more practically oriented and aims to define civil society 
as an empirical, measurable manifestation of social life. Authors of this approach often refer 
to civil society as 'non-profit' organizations and take only legally registered civil society 
organizations into consideration. Although these definitions are used interchangeably in 
Hungary, considerable differences exist between the two and makes it necessary to explain 
the differing content behind them. 
The spread of the narrow definition in Hungary originates from the 1980s when the  
country began adapting to developed liberal democracies and took over Western institutions 
and use of definitions. It became necessary from administrative and taxation reasons to 
differentiate the non-profit sector from the state and business sectors in the accounts of the 
national economy. The influential international research program, the John Hopkins 
International Nonprofit Sector Project, also contributed to the spreading of the term “non-
profit sector” to denote those institutionalized associations which lied outside the realm of 
the state and the market. (Bíró 2002:5, Kuti 2008:10) The project was an attempt to collect 
systematic and comprehensive data on the sector's employees, incomes and expenses. It 
made it possible for the first time to make empirically valid observations about the structural 
and financial characteristics of the non-profit sector and to measure its contribution to the 
economy. This narrow definition is informed by a pragmatic, organizational focus and 
7economic orientation and takes only legally registered organizations into consideration. The 
emphasis on civil society organization's economic and organizational characteristics make it 
easier to delineate the concept and collect data on it – and as a consequence all the empirical 
(statistical) knowledge which is available about the sector is based on this definition. (Kuti 
2008:10)
For many, the narrow definition will not suffice. What about those less 
institutionalized forms of civic initiatives which are not legally registered? Informal 
alliances, ad hoc or spontaneous actions, boycotts and protest movements – are these not 
part of civil society? Are not these important channels to express popular will? On the other 
hand, what about the many registered non-profit organizations which are dependent on 
central budget support and only supply services which they take over from the state? These 
cannot be called purely 'non-governmental' by any means.4 If we want to take into account a 
wider spectrum of civil society, a wider definition is needed. This conception was born in 
the 1980s, when dissident Eastern European intellectuals (such as Andrew Arato, Václav 
Havel, and Adam Michnik) resurrected the idea of civil society both in academic and 
practitioner circles. The ideological foundations of the concept rest on the realization of 
human and civil rights, the rule of law and the pluralization of interests (Bíró 2002:1).  
According to this definition, civil society is a sphere of social interaction between the 
economy and the state, composed of the intimate sphere (family), the sphere of voluntary 
associations, social movements and a number of other forms of public communications. 
This does not mean, however, that civil society encompasses all phenomena of society that 
cannot be connected to the state or to the business sphere. Civil society is only one 
dimension of the sociological world; the dimension of conscious associations, self-
organization and organized communications. Although different from the state and the 
economy, civil society is not in opposition to them by default. Antagonistic relations only 
occur when the institutions of economic and political society insulate decision-making from 
social organizations and public discussion. (Cohen & Arato 1992:ix-x) Civil society is a 
heterogenous and dynamic public arena which is “built on the autonomous and voluntary 
will of individuals taking part in social and political affairs. (...) The uninterrupted social 
4 Another example shows how legal status is not indicative of a virulent civil society: in oppressive states 
civil society can be strong – if there is a strong underground opposition; while the non-profit sector weak 
– if democratic organizations are banned by the state. A strong non-profit sector can only become a strong 
civil society if it exists in a stable democracy (Bíró 2002:2).
8need for civil society throughout the world in turn stems from democratic deficiencies: the 
whole project of civil society is, therefore, an intensely political one.” (Miszlivetz 2000:76) 
This broad definition of civil society soon became a stock phrase in Hungarian 
political discourse after the transition since it held out the promise of a feasible social plan 
which made transition to liberal democracy possible. Gradually, the concept of civil society 
encroached upon and squeezed out the narrower, statistical concept of non-profit sector 
(Kuti 2008:11). To sum up, civil society is both a wider and a more restrictive term at the 
same time. But rather than seeing these definitions as mutually exclusive, it is more useful 
to explore how they relate to each other in different contexts and approaches (Edwards 
2011:6).
The working definition of the EEA and Norway Grants defines eligible organizations 
as legally established, voluntary, self-governing organizations which are independent of 
political control (e.g. foundations, associations, trusts, etc.); social partners (employers' 
organizations and trade unions); and certain independent organizations enjoying a specific 
legal status (e.g. the national Red Cross societies). Political parties, religious institutions or 
for-profit organizations are excluded. (NGO Grants Guideline 2007:3) Accordingly, the 
intermediary grant-making foundations which manage the Hungarian NGO Fund only 
granted funds to “classical civil society organizations” i.e. associations and foundations. 
They excluded quasi non-profit organizations (QUANGOs), such as public foundations and 
nonprofit enterprises, because these are semi-governmental organizations which are 
established and sustained by state institutions and as such cannot be considered totally 
independent from the state. (Móra interview:08.10.2012)5
Although the EFTA donors refer to eligible organizations as NGOs, I prefer using the 
term civil society organization (CSO) in the following discussion – even if I often refer to 
environmental civil society organizations as ENGOs. The reason for this is that while 
Western donors often conflated civil society with service providing and program 
implementing NGOs (Van Rooy & Robinson 2000:34), these are often not those free 
associations and independent power centers of Hungarian civil society that István Bibó 
described as “little circles of freedom” (Kuti 2008:12, Miro-Kiss 1992:51). NGO also often 
5 According to the definitions of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office the non-profit sector incorporates 
classical civil society organizations (i.e. private foundations and associations), social organizations (i.e. 
trade unions, employers' and professional alliances) and QUANGOs (i.e. public foundations, public 
enterprises) (Kákai & Sebestény 2012:116). This is a much wider definition than the one the grant-
making foundations use when they disburse funding.
9refers to those formalized and professionalized advocacy organizations which were 
predominantly supported during the 1990s and which were recognized and favored by 
donors as the legitimate manifestation of civic associations (Císař 2010:739). The term CSO 
emphasizes more the political role civic organizations play in the process of improving the 
quality of democracy (Van Rooy & Robinson 2000:35). It is important to clarify the 
differences, for the sake of the the following discussion and also because the way we speak 
about civil society also impacts the way foreign assistance is apprehended (Tvedt 1998:2). 
Ideas about civil society matter because they shape our analyses of the problems we see in 
our and other societies and those analyses are later followed up by programs, projects and 
financial assistance. In the meaning of civil society lie inspiration for action in supporting 
social change (Van Rooy & Robinson 2000:31).
Although today's discourses of civil society continue to draw on themes that were 
first articulated in the early stages of capitalist development, “the world-historical impetus 
to revive the category, in theory and action, comes first and foremost from the state-socialist 
countries” (Cohen & Arato 1992:487). While the term was revived in former socialist 
countries in the 1980s, it coincided with a resurgence of interest in civil society in the West. 
Over the past three decades, the number of civil society actors at local, national and global 
levels has grown significantly together with their influence in public life. Many scholars and 
policy-makers now see civil society as an important factor in consolidating and sustaining 
democracy, fostering pro-poor development policies, achieving gender equality and in 
fighting environmental challenges (Heinrich 2004:1). 
The discourse on civil society often varies according to the conceptions on what it is 
supposed to do. From the vantage point of foreign contributors, civil society is supposed to 
do mainly two things: on the one hand, it is supposed to improve development and on the 
other hand, it is supposed to improve the quality of democracy (Van Rooy & Robinson 
2000:31). As a consequence, democracy theory and development theory are the two main 
approaches which are inherent in the discourse on civil society. Donors often use 'civil 
society' as a normative concept (what they would like civil society to be, what it ought to be) 
instead of taking civil society for what it is in a given context. The constant slippage 
between the normative and empirically observable concepts in the literature and in practice 
has led to a depoliticized approach to civil society, which assumes that the relationship of 
civil society to democracy and development is unproblematic (Pearce cited in Miszlivetz 
10
2008:93). However, it is important to see that the language we use to conceptualize civil 
society carries practical implications: it has, for instance, mostly favored the vision of 
Western donor agencies and turned civil society into a project rather than a process (Van 
Rooy 2000:1). To sum it up, a discussion on what civil society is supposed to do, highlights 
the diverse normative assumptions donors make about the relationship among civil society, 
development and democratization and predicate how these assumptions are translated into 
the practice of civil society strengthening programs. (Howell & Pearce 2001:2, Edwards 
2011:7)  
While many donors assert the importance of collective citizen action and its 
contribution to democracy or development, empirically grounded studies about the nature of 
this contribution of civil society are rare. Despite the century-long obsession with the shape 
and development of civil society, we have only a limited understanding of how civil society 
works and what it can offer. (Heinrich 2004:2) The large body of writing on civil society has 
not always helped clarify why civil society is essential for development and the causative 
links between civil society and democracy has not proved straightforward either (Howell & 
Pearce 2001:40). Bracketing for a moment what donors expect civil society to achieve, the 
question I turn to rather is how civil society organizations are involved in the “change work” 
often attributed to them (Van Rooy 2000:15). In what ways can civil society activists bring 
improvements about? How are they agents of democratic ideas, how do they keep the state 
in check, and how do they give voice to the oppressed and marginalized? How does donor 
assistance help them in their efforts? What are their strategies and what is the guarantee 
these will work? Sadly, the practitioner and scientific communities know too little about the 
precise answers to these questions. This thesis is a modest contribution to the debate as it 
attempts to fathom how environmental CSOs can bring change about with the help of the 
EEA and Norway grants.
1.3. Theoretical Overview
Theoretical approaches have much to offer but it is the achievements of civil society which 
are most important (Edwards 2011:11). How does the dynamic of associational life 
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contribute to (or hinder) the achievement of “good society”? How can these achievements 
be understood in a particular setting? Most scholars struggle with these questions. In order 
to tackle this analytical impasse, I sharpen my focus and analyze those concrete actions and 
functions of civil society actors' which are likely to deepen democracy. Exploring the main 
functions ascribed to civil society is illuminating in understanding its achievements. What 
are civil society actors engaged in? What are their strategies and activities? What are the 
consequences of these? One way to interpret civil society roles is to use Paffenholz's and 
Spurk's model. They derive an analytical model from democracy and developmental theory 
which is useful in relating civil society functions to democracy independently of cultural 
contexts. (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:13) They assign seven essential functions to civil 
society, which have the potential to contribute to improved democracy: protection of 
citizens; monitoring for accountability; advocacy and public communication; socialization; 
community-building; intermediation and facilitation between citizens and the state; and 
finally, service delivery. The functional approach is essentially action-oriented as it seeks to 
identify the types of activities CSOs pursue. From these seven functions I highlight the 
functions of 'monitoring for accountability' and 'advocacy and public communication' which 
are the main functions of the environmental organizations whose activities I analyze below. 
Several other sources in the literature highlight monitoring and advocacy as one of 
the main functions of civil society organizations or classify them along these functions. 
Civicus's Civil Society Index also identifies similar functions as inherent to CSOs activities. 
'Influencing public policy' and 'Holding states and corporations accountable' are two of the 
five main types of “impact areas” that civil society actors have on other people's lives and 
on society as a whole (Heinrich 2004:21-22). Similarly to Civicus, USAID's NGO 
Sustainability Index also gauges the strength and viability of civil societies along certain 
dimensions. The 'Advocacy' dimension looks at the formation of coalitions and networks 
among civil society actors, the means they use to communicate their messages to the 
broader public, the way they articulate their demands to the government and conditions of 
influencing policy-making. They also include monitory activities in this dimension such as 
monitoring government performance. (USAID NGOSI 2009:224) These dimensions are 
primarily set up to serve the practical purpose of assessing the state of civil society in a 
given country and “render the abstract civil society concept useful” for empirical research 
(Heinrich 2004:17). These functions are also identified by an external evaluation of the EEA 
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and Norway Grants' NGO Fund (Pitija 2010:6).
Before, during and after transition, these functions have been especially important in 
the activities of environmental activists. The function of “monitoring for accountability” 
mainly means monitoring the activities of the state apparatus and the government. This is 
also a way of controlling public authorities and holding them to account – this function 
earned civil society the “watchdog” nickname. Monitoring can refer to various issues from 
monitoring GMO policies to measuring pollutant content in the air. The other function of 
civil society is “advocacy and public communication.” This refers to civil society's 
important task in articulating various interests, especially of marginalized interests, and in 
creating channels of communication in order to put these interests on the political agenda. 
This way advocacy groups raise public awareness to a neglected problem and initiate a 
public debate about it. In the case of environmental NGOs, advocacy activities can range 
from organizing anti-GMO campaigns in the public sphere or lobbying the government to 
increase tax on diesel fuel in order to prevent air pollution. (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:13)
The questions I am most interested in are as follows: how can civil society actors 
make big business and state more accountable? How does 'civil control' work in real life 
situations? On the other hand, to what extent are environmental CSOs able to open up 
channels of communication between the public and policy makers? What are their strategies 
to influence public policy? How do they gain support for various causes? How does the 
government cooperate with CSOs? And most importantly, what role does foreign assistance 
play in realizing these functions? In what ways does it facilitate monitory and advocacy 
activities? 
In order to analyze the way these functions materialize in reality, a theoretical 
background is necessary to put flesh on the analytical model. Attempts to conceptualize civil 
society are profuse and the debate on it stems from several roots. The idea of civil society 
was born in a particular time and space in Western philosophy, during the period of the 
Enlightenment. The origins of the term can be found in the writings of John Locke who was 
the first in modern times to conceptualize civil society as an entity on its own right which 
existed separately from the state. In his view of social relations the main task of civil society 
was to limit authority and protect the individual from the arbitrary interventions of the state 
(Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:4). The French philosopher Montesquieu was particularly 
interested in the differences among types of societies from barbarian to monarchical, 
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despotic to republican. His insight was that “savages” enjoy freedom because they are not 
subjected to absolute power. Modern liberty, however, guarantees security through the 
regulatory framework of law. Therefore, civil society makes conceptual sense only if 
relations are regulated between citizens. The rule of law and the countervailing power of 
civil society also control the central authorities (monarchy). (Howell & Pearce 2001:20) 
Another Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, set out to understand American democracy 
when it was not yet considered an ideal form of governance in Europe. His main 
conclusions were that free human association around mutual interests protects individuals 
from despotism; preserves their individuality from the pressure of conformity to the 'will of 
the masses' (meaning, democracy); and fosters democratic culture and active civic 
engagement (Howell & Pearce 2001:43). A century later, the Italian Marxist Antonio 
Gramsci came up with radical conceptions about civil society. He underlined the crucial role 
of civil society as the vehicle of bourgeois hegemony. In his view civil society is an arena 
where the state attempts to persuade the exploited classes to accept that the way society 
develops under capitalism is “natural”. However, Gramsci also saw civil society as a room 
for problem-solving, a an arena where the exploited could challenge the ideological 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie. (Howell & Pearce 2001:34, Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:4) 
These earlier notions of civil society were based on purely Western concepts and 
were historically tied to the emancipation of citizens from feudalistic ties, monarchy and the 
state of the 18th and 19th centuries (Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:5). Modern debates are much 
richer in approaches as well as in participants. Contributors to the debate have come up with 
various theories in order to develop a conceptual framework of civil society which is 
adequate to contemporary conditions. Cohen and Arato argue that post-modern debates on 
civil society have been the most influential in understanding contemporary civil societies 
(Cohen & Arato 1992:3). It is widely acknowledged that the post-modern debate was 
resurrected in the 1980-90s in order to answer modern problems such as political change in 
the post-Cold War era and the dismay over the quality of industrialized societies (Van Rooy 
2000:5). 
The discourse forks accordingly, with a distinctively American approach to civil 
society on the one hand, and an alternative continental European tradition. The American 
approach is greatly influenced by de Tocqueville and Robert Putnam and this approach 
ultimately considers the task of civil society as “system maintenance” (Howell & 2001:59). 
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Civil society's main contribution is political stability since a plurality of voices check the 
excess of governments, they defend the individual against the mass and preserve civic 
culture. On the contrary, in the continental European tradition the plurality of voices can 
preserve particular interests against collective interests and prevent citizens from 
conforming to the general will; and autonomous social action can be a source of social and 
political change (Howell & 2001:60). This is of course not an exhaustive review of civil 
society literature, only an indication of the wide historical, ideological and geographical 
span of it.
In order to explore the capacities of environmental NGOs to function as monitors or 
advocates, I chose John Keane's and Jürgen Habermas's theories to provide the grounds for 
the discussion. In contrast to other civil society theories, Keane's and Habermas's theories 
corresponded perfectly to the two functions of monitoring and advocacy. Keane's theory on 
'monitory democracy' directs our attention to all those power scrutinizing mechanisms 
which exist beyond the confines of the institutions of representative democracy (Keane 
2013). These mechanisms contribute to a more substantial form of democracy since they 
give a voice to the concerns of those who feel left out of official politics. Keane's theory 
provides the grounds to discuss the monitory activities of the NGO which I present in the 
first case. In the second case, Habermas's theory on the public space and rational-critical 
debate will be instrumental in understanding the importance of another ENGO's activities. 
Although Habermas traces the decline of the bourgeois political life of the seventeenth 
through the mid-twentieth centuries, his theory reaches beyond the eventual decay and 
recovers important insights into the potentials of civil society today. Rational-critical 
discourse is especially illuminating in studying the advocacy activities of CSOs. In order to 
understand how Hungarian environmental CSOs function, what strategies they use and how 
the Norway Grants helped them further their aims, I studied two CSOs to find the answer to 
my questions. I further elaborate and apply these theories in each of the cases. 
In the first case, I introduce a relatively small, grassroots organization which 
represents the interests of the residents of Rákoshegy, a neighborhood in the close vicinity 
of Budapest Airport. Due to a mistake in the 1980s, one of the runways was built too close 
to the residential areas of Rákoshegy and with the continuous growth of passenger traffic, 
the noise has become unbearable. The organization stood up for the rights of the locals and 
when negotiations with the airport's management broke down, it sued the airport. With the 
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help of the grants the CSO was able to monitor the noise levels in the area and produce 
independent, scientific data and find out that the methodology of noise measurement is 
flawed. Another key monitory activity of the organization was to participate in several 
consultative forums, this way making decision-makers publicly accountable. Keane's theory, 
which focuses on the monitory functions of civil society, highlights how these functions 
contribute to the improvement of democracy.
In the second case, I analyze the activities of a strong and visible advocacy NGO, 
Energiaklub, which promotes sustainable energy solutions. The NGO's main target have 
been policy-makers since its main aim has been to influence a range of energy policies. The 
organization is engaged in successful and high profile advocacy and it is a widely cited 
reference in national media on energy issues. With the help of the Norway grants, the NGO 
organized a series of conferences on sustainable energy solutions where key representatives 
of business, public and civil sphere were invited. The conferences proved very successful 
and lead to the professional development and wider recognition of the organization. 
Habermas's theory on the public sphere and rational-critical debate sets the NGO's policy 
improving strategies in high relief.
1.4. Rationale
The study aims to contribute to the discourse on civil society and its relation with foreign 
assistance via the exploration of the ways the EEA and Norway Grants facilitated Hungarian 
environmental NGOs carry out their monitory and advocacy activities and the ways it 
helped them to reach their aims. The study gives a nuanced analysis of this by applying civil 
society theories. These theories provide a framework and help understand how NGOs' 
activities contribute to the improvement of democratic practices. Since we have limited 
knowledge of how civil society contributes to democracy – if at all – the case studies 
provide an insight into these mechanisms. While the effects of foreign donor funding of 
Eastern European civil society in the 1980s and 1990s are well-documented in the literature, 
I have no knowledge of any academic writing on the relationship of CSOs and the EEA and 
Norway Grants apart from another up-coming thesis at the University of Oslo. The thesis is 
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thus a contribution to the literature and perhaps the first in the line of future academic 
attempts to analyze Hungarian civil society's and the EEA and Norway Grant's relationship.
The academic silence is all the more surprising given the relevance of the topic. The 
first phase of funding has just been over (2010) and the application process for the next 
phase of NGO Funds started in spring 2013. The interim period between the two phases 
offers a good opportunity to look back and review what the grants have meant for 
Hungarian civil society and to draw conclusions which are relevant for the future. On the 
other hand, the topic has relevance from a foreign relations point of view as well. Since 
2004 the EEA and Norway Grants has represented by far the most important diplomatic 
connection between Norway and Hungary (Polgár interview:16.11.2012). As long as 
Norway is part of the EEA, the grants in one way or other will define the relationship 
between the two countries and as a consequence studying any aspect of this relationship is 
an important undertaking.
Although this study is neither a policy paper nor a comprehensive evaluation of the 
results of the Hungarian NGO Fund, a better understanding of how foreign assistance 
potentially boosts civil society organizations' capacities is relevant for donors and 
Hungarian decision-makers. The analysis might be informative for donors since it provides 
a peek into a specific slice of Hungarian civil society and the ways their money is put to use 
on the ground – these important details often get lost in commissioned evaluations which 
focus more on procedural aspects of grant disbursement. More importantly, the study is 
relevant for domestic power holders and public officials responsible making decisions 
regarding aspects of civil society: the following discussion might spark some thoughts about 
the naturalness of the present situation, when a foreign state is the second biggest funder of 
Hungarian civil society. Whose role is it to sustain civil society? The state's? The EU's? 
Individual philanthropists' or Hungarian society's? What does external civil society 
strengthening programs tell us about the condition of Hungarian democracy? Decision-
makers might come to terms with the role of civil society, whether and to what extent it 
should be supported by the state, and ultimately better understand society-state relations. 
Last but not least, the analysis is a useful reading for members of civil society organizations 
as well since most of the discussion is about them. Hopefully, the thesis is an encouraging 
reading and helps them and realize their own potential. The aim of this thesis is to open up 
windows, spark a debate and offer a critical peek into these processes and to contribute to a 
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better understanding of the role of foreign assistance and civil society.
1.5. Research Methods
The methodology of the thesis is predominantly constructivist i.e. during my investigations I 
filled social contexts with meaning. As I tried to understand the actions of donors and civil 
society organizations I constructed patterns which were products of my own making. 
(Moses & Knutsen 2007:10) Consequently, the object of my study might have been 
analyzed differently by someone else but my account of the situation and events reflects 
how I made most sense of what I studied, based on my readings, experience, culture, age, 
etc. For constructivists “truth lies in the eyes of the observer” and in the constellation of 
data, theories and arguments which support this truth (Moses & Knutsen 2007:12). The 
account I share in this study seeks to capture the meaning of social actions for the people 
performing it, as well as for myself studying it (Moses & Knutsen 2007:11). I blend 
descriptive elements with disciplined interpretation, which makes my approach descriptive-
analytical when I study contemporary environmental NGOs from a social theoretical 
perspective. My analysis and the way I constructed the cases reflect my own perceptions. 
Since the description of the events might not be free from biases, I cannot claim that any 
part of my account corresponds to a singular, absolute truth. Instead, I try to establish 
relevant factors that explain why one view of the world becomes 'true' at the expense of 
others. (Moses & Knutsen 2007:12)
In each qualitative case study I studied a particular NGO and tried to focus on the 
main function that underscored the organization's activities. I also selected and applied a 
civil society theory in each case which I found relevant for analyzing these activities and the 
role of the funding. The project-based activities of the NGOs made it an obvious choice to 
use the case study format both as a process of inquiry and as the outcome of the inquiry 
(Stake 1994:436). The objects of study – the two grant-winning projects – were such 
unique, integrated and bounded systems, which in their own specificity perfectly served the 
basis of the cases. The case studies are limited to the time frame of the projects in order to 
keep their integrity. The projects were carried out between late 2008 and middle of 2010 and 
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I rigorously tried to avoid any follow-up on later events in relation to the issues the NGOs 
were focusing on. However, it was not always easy because in the case of the association at 
Rákoshegy, a new NGO took on the issue and went on litigating the airport. I included 
information about the new NGO because it had relevance to the conclusions that I drew 
from the case. On the other hand, it was not always easy to see where a case ends and where 
its environment begins since NGOs are generally caught up in a rich net of relations and 
contexts. In order to focus on the most relevant features of the organizations' activities, I had 
to filter out a range of possible aspects which were not strictly connected to the “bounded 
system” of the case e.g. CSOs' legal regulation. (Stake 1994:435)
I tried to understand the complexities of the individual cases but while I concentrated 
on the particulars in each case, by way of the theoretical analysis I inevitably opened up 
room for generalization and connected the single organizations under discussion to other 
environmental NGOs and Hungarian civil society at large. I was interested in illustrating a 
grander issue through these particular cases, that is why the two cases are more instrumental 
case studies than intrinsic ones (Stake 1994:437). Understanding the complexities of the 
cases in itself was very important but I chose the two particular cases in order to advance 
my understanding of another interest: how the grants helped the ENGOs to fulfill their 
functions? Both cases are looked at in depth and their contexts are closely scrutinized but 
they are more illustrative of a greater phenomenon. The case studies both draw attention to 
what especially can be learnt from the single case and how it advances the understanding of 
a more general, abstract phenomenon. (Stake 1994:435) 
The cases under scrutiny were also illustrating a theory in order to improve my 
understanding of the case. The cases are organized around the following conceptual 
structure: what was the situation the NGOs wanted to change? What did they do in order to 
change the situation for the better? What was their function in shaping the events? How can 
this be better understood by using a civil society theory? How was the organization's 
activities facilitated by the grants? And finally, what was the impact of their activities? 
Correspondingly, in the first case I introduce a community which is disturbed by the noise 
coming from the neighboring airport. A local NGO gets organized around this issue to 
represent the locals and stand up for their interests. They hire a professional expert who 
monitors the noise level in the area; at the same time the CSO members attend stakeholder 
consultations to further the locals interests. These activities constitute the monitory 
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functions of the CSO which potentially improve the authorities' democratic practices. 
Without the grants the grassroots organization would not have been able to represent the 
locals effectively, produce independent data on the noise level and they would not have been 
able to litigate the airport successfully.
1.5.1. Choosing the Cases
The reasons why I studied the two particular cases of Rákoshegy Airspace Association and 
Energiaklub can be put down to practical and methodological considerations. Among the 
total of 240 grant-winning projects of the Hungarian NGO Fund, there were 71 projects 
which targeted environmental protection or sustainable development. Out of these I focused 
on those projects which were logistically accessible for me, i.e. the ones concentrated in 
Budapest. There were 25 of such projects. I contacted approximately half of the CSOs in 
order to interview their members who took part in the project. I soon realized that getting in 
contact with my subjects was not as easy as I had imagined. Unfortunately, many I 
contacted either did not respond or left the organization or were on maternity leave. This 
brought home to me the oft-mentioned “dynamic” and “liquid” qualities of the sector. 
Despite these difficulties I interviewed leading members of eight organizations. Initially I 
planned to make a case out of four-five of the projects but I realized that it is better to study 
only a few and prepare a more in-depth analysis of them. Thus, I chose two of the cases 
which had the potential to bring out the dominant theme. I was wondering how the grants 
benefitted a local, grassroots and a bigger, professional organization, so I selected the 
projects of Rákoshegy Airspace Association and Energiaklub.
1.5.2. Sources of Data
One of the main sources of information for the case studies were those qualitative 
interviews which I conducted during my field trip in Budapest from mid-August until 
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December in 2012 with key informants. This type of primary data was very useful in going 
beyond the literature and in obtaining information about certain aspects of the projects 
which I would not have been able obtain otherwise. The interviews provided useful insight 
into the personal observations and experiences and put more flesh on the “raw data.” In 
order to reduce the risk of misinterpretation of the data and to obtain a greater completeness 
I employed triangulation. (Stake 1993:443, Arksey & Knight 1999:21) Rather than just 
gathering data from one particular group I sought out the views of several sets of 
stakeholders. In the first case, for example, I interviewed both CSO members and the 
spokesman of the airport who saw the 'noise-issue' from a very different perspective than the 
locals. Throughout the case I tried to indicate alternative ways the situation can be seen in 
order to give depth and breadth to the analysis. 
In order to give more validity to my communication and to clarify my understanding 
of the environmental movement, the EEA and Norway Grants and state-civil society 
relations, I also consulted others than civil society members. My conversation with the 
representatives of the National Development Agency was especially useful to understand 
NGO's role in the partnership system of the EU Structural Funds and how state financing 
might compromise NGO's autonomy. The Norwegian Embassy's political and economic 
advisor provided valuable insight into donor-EU relations and how the grants contribute to 
Norway's image abroad. Veronika Móra, the director of the leading foundation which 
manages the Hungarian NGO Fund, gave me a good sense of the challenges environmental 
and other NGOs face today. Although I do not draw on all the interviews I had made, these 
conversations influenced my view on civil society and the grants to a large extent.
All the interviews were semi-structured, in the sense that the main questions were 
fixed and covered the relevant topic areas and themes (Arksey & Knight 1999:7). The 
interviews were structured around an interview guide which can be found in the Appendix. 
After establishing contact with the interviewees, I sent them the interview questions a few 
days ahead so they had time to think about the answers before the interview took place. I 
based most of the questions on the literature and tried to elicit replies which helped answer 
my research questions. I slightly altered the design of the questions along the way as new 
topics emerged. I interviewed my subjects once and each interview lasted an hour on the 
average. The interviews with the civil society activists focused on their projects, their 
feelings about success and failure, the importance of the financial assistance and more 
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general questions. The interview questions for non-civil society members was more tailor-
made. I recorded the conversations with an audiotape and transcribed most of them 
afterwards. I took notes of the rest, summarizing the key points. The interviews were 
conducted in Hungarian but whenever someone is quoted in the study it is translated into 
English as closely as possible.
Looking back, perhaps I should have focused my questions more since I obtained lots 
of information which I did not use later at all e.g. which media NGOs use to reach their 
audience. On the other hand, follow-up interviews might have been useful but given the 
temporal confines of the field trip this was not feasible. Instead, I asked follow-up questions 
later on via e-mail if something turned out to be unclear during writing the cases. 
Forgetfulness of the subjects was another issue. Most of the projects were over in 2010 and I 
interviewed the CSO members during the autumn of 2012. My informants often did not 
remember all the project details but I filled these 'gaps' from the final projects report, which 
was sent to the grant-making foundation after the project was completed and summarized all 
their activities and results. Another challenge in analyzing the data was that many civil 
society members put their results in the best light. They wanted to win me for their cause 
but this “halo effect” often resulted in a biassed portrayal of the 'real' situation (Arksey & 
Knight 1999:152). I did not confront them on this but dealt with the information critically 
and checked it against other sources.
I started analyzing and interpreting the data after the field trip. In order to get a 
purchase on the huge amounts of data that I ended up with, I set up analytical categories 
according to Paffenholz and Spurk's main civil society functions: monitoring, advocacy and 
communication, etc. I categorized NGOs according to their main functions and looked at 
how the grants were helpful in realizing these functions. I chose those two NGOs for the 
case studies whose projects offered the most to learn from. I rendered two civil society 
theories to these functions: in the first case, Keane's theory corresponds to the monitory 
functions of the grassroots organization and in the second case advocacy and public 
communication corresponds with Habermas' theory on the public sphere and critical-rational 
debate. This way, the particular and empirically observable activities of the organizations 
could be elevated to and analyzed on a more general, theoretical level. The case studies thus 
bridge the gap between theory and practice and render often abstract and general 
observations about civil society and foreign assistance more factual and context-based.
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The cases draw on multiple sources of data. Apart from the interviews my main 
sources were academic articles and books on various aspects of civil society and foreign 
assistance, newspaper articles, publicly available official information about the EEA and 
Norway Grants such as information booklets, guidelines, evaluations of certain program 
areas, white papers to the Storting, etc. Methodology books have guided me a lot from 
finding sources, through interviewing, until building up my text. The analysis in case one 
relies on multiple sources of data, such as the primary sources of interviews with key actors, 
participation in a community meeting, legal texts (judicial expert opinion and court verdict) 
and correspondence between the CSO and the airport and various state authorities. I also 
relied on secondary data such as literature on the theory and the homepage of the 
association. In case two I drew on an interview, the final project report of the NGO and 
secondary data such as literature on civil society theory, expert studies on Hungarian 
energetic challenges and information found on the homepage of the NGO.
I have to admit that the literature I read influenced the meaning I saw in the cases. 
Most literature was not without bias. I agree with Terje Tvedt who says that “Much of the 
published output in this field are (sic!) written either by reflective practitioners or by 
engaged academics wearing an activist or consultancy 'hat'.” (Tvedt 2007:12) In many cases 
this leads to normative assumptions about characteristics of NGOs which they not 
necessarily have. There is a tendency to assign 'good' characteristics to NGOs: they are 
progressive, autonomous, they create engagement and they are able to deliver development 
and democratization objectives. (Tvedt 2007:13) I also met similar oversimplified views, 
often in donor-written texts as well.
During my fieldwork in Budapest I also attended conferences related to the topic. 
One of the conferences was organized by an NGO (Védegylet Protect the Future) on 
“Money, ethics and responsibility.” Another one was an open day at a university where civil 
organizations held conferences on the recently passed legal regulations on the terms of 
employing volunteers and they also recruited applicants for their programs. A third one was 
an “Eco-day” organized by National Geographic where I attended a presentation held by a 
future informant. These conferences were decisive as I had the possibility to speak to 
activists personally and they gave me a good sense of what civil society actors are engaged 
in and what their challenges are. I attended another conference online which focused on 
Norway's image abroad and whose title was “Norway: Cold, Peaceful, Boring?” This 
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conference was very inspiring and gave me the idea to look into the background of the 
grants more thoroughly.
1.6. The Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured in five chapters. The goal of Chapter One was to introduce the main 
themes of the thesis, the EEA and Norway Grants, Hungarian civil society and the 
environmental movement. It presents two theoretical frameworks (Habermas, Keane), 
which will explore the relationship between these main themes in the case studies. It also 
discusses the definition of civil society and non-profit sector in order to clarify the use of 
these terms in the successive analysis. The chapter also contains the methods of research 
which detail the ways I obtained data in the specific cases, the sources I consulted and how I 
reached my conclusions.
Chapter Two presents the most relevant background information. Earlier foreign support to 
civil society and its met and unmet expectations serve as a backdrop to the EEA and 
Norway Grants. I introduce the EEA and Norway Grants, its foreign policy relevance and 
general effects on Hungarian civil society. Finally, I present the Hungarian environmental 
movement, its role in the democratization process and its changing roles and strategies after 
the transition. Although I focus on one sector of civil society – environmental NGOs – my 
study reflects the general challenges of the whole sector. The background is not purely 
descriptive, since the story of the environmental movement incorporates often recurring 
topics in the academic discourse on civil society, such as movement's role in the 
democratization process, the globalization of civil society, civil society's relationship with 
the state and the role of foreign assistance. The section on the foreign policy relevance of 
the grants and donor motivations is also analytical.
In Chapter Three, I introduce the first case about a grassroots organization which stood up 
for the interests of a community which suffers from the noise of the neighboring 
international airport of Budapest. When negotiations with the airport's management broke 
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down the NGO (together with another NGO) sued the airport. The grants contributed to the 
CSO's ability to monitor the noise levels in the area and to produce independent data that  
that challenged the airport's methods of noise measurement. I analyze the NGO's actions 
from the perspective of “monitory democracy”, a concept borrowed from Keane (Keane 
2013). His theory highlights how these functions contribute to the improvement of 
democracy. 
The second case constitutes Chapter Four. I analyze the activities of an advocacy NGO, 
which promotes sustainable energy solutions among policy-makers. With the help of the 
Norway grants, the NGO organized a series of conferences on sustainable energy solutions, 
where key representatives of business, public and civil sphere were present. The 
conferences lead to the professional development and wider recognition of the organization. 
Habermas's theory on the public sphere and rational-critical debate will set the NGO's 
policy improving strategies in high relief. 
Chapter Five – the last part of the thesis – summarizes the conclusions drawn from the 
cases.
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2. The “Regime of Goodness” and Civil Society in 
Eastern Europe
This chapter hinges on two main pillars. Firstly, the EEA and Norway Grants and the role 
the grants play in Norway's foreign policy. The focus is only on Norway since it provided 
the overwhelming majority of the grants. On the other hand, donor's assumptions about civil 
society's role in democratization is portrayed. Secondly, the trajectory of the Hungarian 
environmental movement's evolution will be sketched, its role in the democratization 
processes and its present situation. This background information is relevant for 
contextualizing and understanding the precedents of the impact of the grants.
2.1. The EEA and Norway Grants
The EEA and Norway Grants is a state-to-state developmental assistance, a contribution of 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway “to reducing economic and social disparities and to 
strengthening bilateral relations between 15 EU countries in Central and Southern Europe” 
(EEA and Norway Grants 2012).6 The EEA and Norway Grants was set up in 2004, as part 
of the EEA Agreement, which brings together the 27 EU member states and the three EFTA 
states in the EU's internal market.7 The EEA Agreement is the most important economic 
alliance between Norway and the EU and it is a cornerstone in determining Norway's 
relationship with the European Union (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:8, 
Polgár interview:16.11.2012). Since the European Commission belittled the financial 
contribution linked to the EEA Agreement the European Commission and the EFTA 
countries agreed that Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway would contribute more to the 
6 The fifteen EU states are as follows: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Portugal and Greece. Bulgaria and 
Romania joined the EU in 2009.
7 The EEA Agreement, which was signed in 1994, also covers cooperation in other areas than economic 
relations, such as education, justice,  tourism, social and environmental policy. (EFTA 2013)
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budget available for development projects within the EU. As a result, the EEA and Norway 
Grants was set up (Værnes 2010:15). According to the official standpoint, the EFTA states 
had no legal obligation to establish such a financial mechanism and donors stick to the 
interpretation of the grants as a voluntary contribution to the common good (Polgár 
interview:16.11.2012). However, many consider the grants to be a de facto membership fee 
for being part of the internal market and which also constitutes the financial basis of the 
grants (Værnes 2006:15).8  
The EEA Agreement goes beyond strengthening economic relations since it also 
reflects the EFTA states' commitment to take a responsible and an active role in creating 
Europe's common future. Since the expansion of the EU in 2004 and 2009 brought a 20% 
increase in the EU's population but only a 5% increase in its GDP, Norway, Liechtenstein, 
and Iceland felt responsible for alleviating the disparities in Europe through the 
establishment of the grants (EEA and Norway Grants 2012). It was not difficult to find areas 
where there was a clear need for funding in the newest member states. Although all of the 
former state socialist countries are fully fledged democracies now with functioning market 
economies, transition in other areas was much slower. In many aspects, Eastern Europe still 
lags behind Western Europe, let alone Scandinavia. Environmental protection and 
sustainable development were the dominant priority areas of the grants in the first 
programming phase (2004-2009): substantial amount of funding was targeted at projects of 
energy efficiency, renewable energy use, green industry innovation, wastewater 
management and the protection of biodiversity. The protection of European cultural heritage 
was another major area of funding and the two priority areas together accounted for half of 
the support in Hungary. (EEA and Norway Grants 2012) The grants contributed to such 
large-scale projects as the renovation of unique historical buildings like the Basilica in Pécs 
and the Matthias Church in Budapest. Within the environmental sector, the establishment of 
a zero-emissions conference centre was among the major achievements.
These “hard” (infrastructural) projects were accompanied by “soft” (non-
infrastructural) projects as well. Health- and childcare, and research and scholarship were 
also prominent areas, the latter for example provided opportunity for 400 students to study 
in Iceland, Liechtenstein or Norway. Fostering Roma inclusion was payed special attention 
8 The benefits of setting up an individual financial mechanism is that it makes donor countries' contribution 
much more visible than paying the same amount into the common EU budget. They can also vindicate 
their development priorities more within the grants.
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to and the establishment of the European Roma Special College of Music aimed to reach 
this objective. (EEA and Norway Grants 30.11.2012) The allocation of funds to these 
programs was negotiated bilaterally between the donor states and the beneficiary states so 
they reflect both Hungary's needs and the donor countries' interests – for example, the 
donor's pronounced emphasis on fighting climate change. Partnership was specifically 
encouraged in carrying out the projects in order to strengthen contact and cooperation 
between the donor and beneficiary countries. In the first period (2004-2009), almost 30% of 
the projects were implemented in cooperation with EEA partners, mainly from Norway, 
especially in the field of academic research and human resources development. 
Strengthening bilateral partnerships is even more emphasized in the second five-year period, 
where the programs will be agreed upon by taking the scope for cooperation into 
consideration (EEA and Norway Grants 11.04.2012).
The priority areas are also harmonized with wider European goals: the size and the 
distribution of the grants through the five-year periods have been agreed between the three 
EFTA states and the EU. However, donor states aimed to fill those 'gaps' that other EU 
funds have not covered before in order to be able pursue their own strategic aims and to 
avoid double-financing the same area. The management of the programs was designed in a 
similar way to the regulations set for the EU funds, so that application would not require 
setting up a new system and pose new challenges to applicants and beneficiary state's 
institutions (Polgár interview:16.11.2012, Pitija 2010:34). The grants were hugely popular 
in all beneficiary countries since it was available to a wide range of applicants for whom EU 
sources were not (EEA and Norway Grants 2011:5). The application process was reported to 
be much less bureaucratic and more flexible than that of the EU funds which also made the 
grants widely popular and accessible.9 
9  As far as the grant's organization is regarded, the donor states and Hungary closely cooperate on all 
levels: from choosing the project until its implementation. At the highest level, the National Development 
Agency represents Hungary and has the overall responsibility for reaching the objectives of the grants. 
The task of awarding funds to projects and to follow up on their implementation is given to so-called 
'program operators' within each program area. These are usually public institutions and they often 
cooperate with the donor partners. The decision-making authority for the grants is the Financial 
Mechanism Committee, which consists of the representatives of the donor's ministries of foreign affairs. 
The decision-making authority for the Norway Grants is the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
Financial Mechanism Office – seated in Brussels – is the secretariat of the EEA and it manages the day-
to-day operation of the grants and reports to the foreign ministries of the donors. (EEA and Norway 
Grants 23.05.2012)
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2.2. Support to Hungarian Civil Society
Between 2004 and 2009, 97% of the total amount of the EEA and Norway Grants, €1.3 
billion, was provided by Norway. The funds were divided between the beneficiary countries 
according to their population and GDP per capita making Poland the largest beneficiary 
state followed by Hungary where €135 million was distributed. (EEA and Norway Grants 
2011:15) The donors specifically targeted those areas that slipped under the radar of EU 
funding and where there were still “demonstrable needs” for support (EEA and Norway 
Grants 11.04.2012). Strengthening civil society and the development of NGOs was payed 
special attention to all over the region. In Hungary, the NGO funds were enormously 
popular since the whole non-profit sector is critically underfunded and most civil society 
organizations are forced to operate with shoe-string budgets. The financial situation of 
NGOs has never been particularly strong, but recently – especially in 2011 – they 
experienced unprecedented financial difficulties: there was a decrease in state funding as the 
state reduced its support and cancelled contracts with major service provision NGOs; the 
deteriorating economic conditions further hindered NGOs self-financing efforts and 
philanthropic donations; and international funds have long been ebbing as major donors 
either stopped operating in the area or gradually phased out (such as the Soros Foundation 
or USAID which left the region when the EU started to increase its funding in the mid-
1990s). The EU had very few calls for proposals which were available for civil society 
organizations and the allocation of funds was repeatedly delayed, causing downsizing and 
even bankruptcy among previously well-established organizations. (Oriniaková 2009:26, 
USAID CSOSI 2011:88) A large number of CSOs are still dependent on government 
funding despite the fact that many began using fundraising tools besides proposal writing 
(USAID NGOSI 2009:113). The NGO Fund was also very popular since it had a very high 
funding intensity – NGOs only had to cover 10% of the project expenses (Pitija 2010:30).
Although the volume of support dedicated to the non-profit sector was relatively 
small considered to state funding, surprisingly it still meant the second biggest financial 
source for Hungarian NGOs (EEA and Norway Grants 2011:15). €6.5 million was 
channelled to civil society projects through the Hungarian NGO Fund in order to strengthen 
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civil society's development.10 The funds supported four areas: social cohesion and youth 
protection, capacity-building, cultural heritage and sustainable development. The NGO 
Fund, which encompassed 'mini' projects of €5-25.000 to €25-80.000 'mega' projects, was 
one of the most visible contributions of the donors and it was evaluated as one of the most 
successful as well (Pitija 2010:16-17). Another aspect of the NGO Fund which made it 
efficient, was that it was (and still is) managed by a consortium of four NGOs and not state 
institutions as in most program areas. This contributed to a more flexible fund management, 
as the foundations were not bogged down with cumbersome bureaucracy that characterizes 
state institutions (Pitija 2010:34). The leader of the consortium was an long-established 
American-initiated ENGO, called Hungarian Environmental Partnership Foundation.11 
Through its defining role in the Hungarian environmental movement and long experience in 
grant-making, the foundation was familiar with CSOs challenges and could effectively 
support them. Distributing grants through local CSOs fits into a wider trend: as donors 
increasingly recognize the limited contextual knowledge on civil society in beneficiary 
countries, they prefer channeling money through local NGOs in order to increase 
effectiveness (Heinrich 2004:2). As it turns out form the feedback of grant-winning ENGOs, 
they very much appreciated the grant-making foundations professionalism, helpfulness, 
flexibility and prompt responsiveness during the whole project cycle (Pitija 2010:37).
2.3. Development Assistance and Foreign Policy
There is abundant literature on development assistance written from the perspective of the 
beneficiaries. While much is said about the 'effects' and 'results' of assistance in the 
beneficiary countries, the wider context of international relations which produces the raison 
d'être of assistance is often left out of the picture. What relevance does development 
assistance have from the perspective of the donors? What are the driving forces of 
10 The fact that the NGO Fund represented only 6% of the total budget is not indicative of its significance. 
Unlike large-scale infrastructural projects, civil society projects do not require huge inputs of capital in 
order to achieve important goals.
11  The Environmental Partnership program for CEE was funded and coordinated by a consortium of donors 
led by the German Marshall Fund, US government-funded Regional Environmental Center and the 
Rockefeller Brothers Foundation (Ertsey 2000:85).
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international development assistance policy? Are the objectives altruistic or subject to 
economic and political interests? What do donors want to achieve and why? Are decisions 
on development policy rooted in domestic politics or are they internationally driven 
processes? In this section, I will try to put the EEA and Norway Grants into context by 
examining the main motivations behind it. The focus is on Norway since this country 
provides a great bulk of the assistance. 
It is a widely accepted view in international relations that aid and development 
assistance are elemental parts of donors' foreign policies (Moravcsik & Haggard 1993, Van 
Rooy & Robinson 2000:45, Hopkins 2000:338, Stokke 2005:33, Encarnación 2011:4). 
Questions about donors' motivations have traditionally been approached from two main 
perspectives in international relations theory: realism and humane internationalism. These 
competing paradigms explain development assistance as part of a nation's foreign policy in 
different ways (Stokke 2005:38).
The realist school of thought dominated the analysis of international relations during 
the post-WWII era when aid was seen primarily as a means of pursuing the national 
interests of the donor country. Security and economic interests rank highest in the 
motivation to give aid but ideology may also be an important factor, such as fighting 
communism (Stokke 2005:38-39). For example, US foreign aid streaming into Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s and 1990s was determined by foreign political considerations since aid 
was considered to be another weapon in the global ideological clash (Moravcsik & Haggard 
1993, Hopkins 2000:331, Stokke 2005:40). The realist theory, however, was found to be a 
limiting explanation primarily because it placed an unduly focus on individual states and 
ignored interactions between them. Today an increasing role is played by international 
organizations in defining development aid policy. There are no doubt altruistic motives that 
underly aid packages as well (Stokke 2005:39). Humane internationalism (a concept  
attributed to Cranford Pratt) thus proposes that the main determinant of development policy 
has been fundamentally altruistic values which often stem from donors' domestic norms 
(Stokke 2005:40). This paradigm supposes that citizens of industrialized countries have a 
moral obligation towards people beyond their borders. The aim is an international society 
which is based on equitable economic relations, provides basic subsistence for every human 
being12 and where the respect of human rights prevails. Such ethical obligations are also 
12 Accordingly, Norway's main objective in its aid policy in the global south has been poverty eradication 
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considered to be long-term interests for most donor countries since they contribute to 
international common goods such as enhanced equality, social justice, stability and peace, 
improved health and environment (Stokke 2005:42). Humane internationalism is especially 
prevalent in Western European and Scandinavian aid and development policies. In these 
countries the ethics of solidarity – which is the heart of social democratic thinking and the 
ideological basis of the welfare sate – sets the agenda. Several of the most generous 
providers of development assistance (especially Scandinavian countries) had governments 
based on a Christian and social democratic tradition.13 (Stokke 2005:41) Thus realist 
paradigms fail to capture these altruistic features of development cooperation, which is an 
integral part of donors' foreign policy (Stokke 2005:41).
2.3.1. The EEA and Norway Grants – Realist Theory
If we want to place the EEA and Norway Grants into this ideological context we find that 
the processes and justifications for setting up the grants were characterized by a blend of 
altruism and self-interested realpolitik. A look into the negotiation processes which 
preceded the EEA and Norway Grants gives us a clearer picture of what practical and 
material factors contributed to founding the grants.
Although Norway is not a member state of the EU, it is closely associated with it 
through its membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) in the context of being an 
EFTA member. The EEA Agreement grants Norway access to the EU's internal market 
while the country is to adopt most EU legislation related to that market. The EEA 
Agreement, which was established in 1994, brought together the member states of the EU 
and the three EEA EFTA states of Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein in a single market 
where the free movement of goods, services, people and capital is guaranteed. (EFTA 2013) 
The EEA EFTA countries thus enjoy free trade with the EU but in exchange they provide a 
through the 'basic needs strategy' (Tvedt 1998:46).
13  Many program areas of the EEA and Norway Grants can be associated with prominent elements in the 
Scandinavian welfare state. For example the program named “Decent work and tripartite dialogue” is a 
very prominent area of Scandinavian welfare policies. The program is carried out together with a 
Norwegian partner institution and its pronounced aim is to transplant such practices in Hungary (Polgár 
interview:16.11.2012).
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certain negotiated sum to the EU. Since 1994 until 2003, Norway's contribution has been 
relatively modest compared to the benefits of being part of the internal market (Værnes 
2006:15). In 2003, one year before the ten newest member states joined the EU – and thus 
the internal market – fierce negotiations began between the EU and the EFTA countries on 
the conditions of the extension of the EEA: Iceland's, Liechtenstein's and Norway's share of 
contribution was the main issue. Since these countries do not bear all the financial burdens 
of EU membership to the same extent as EU member states, the European Commission put 
pressure on them to contribute to reducing the economic and social disparities in Central 
and Eastern Europe. (Værnes 2006:15) Interpretations of the yearly contribution differ: 
while the EFTA states stick to the interpretation of the grants as a voluntary interstate 
contribution to the common good – and not a binding yearly fee (Polgár 
interview:16.11.2012) – this de facto membership fee does constitute the basis of the grants 
(Værnes 2006:15).
Norway's trade is highly dominated by the EU, primarily in terms of energy supplies 
and seafood export (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2009:2). After Baltic and 
Central-European countries joined the EU, export to these countries grew more than export 
to the EU as a whole (UD 2012:13). Although fish exports to accession countries amounted 
only to a fraction of total exports in the early 2000s, these markets have a big growth 
potential and there are important fish processing industries in these countries. Trade 
between Norway and the EU in fish and seafood is regulated in a separate protocol to the 
EEA Agreement and Norway had had lucrative agreements with the accession countries 
before 2004. As a consequence, the main aim of Norway during the negotiations on the 
extension of the EEA was to secure as good fish exporting conditions which it had enjoyed 
before. Norway even offered to pay more into the grants, in order to improve its export 
conditions. Norway's main demand was to ensure that it can export fish to the EU markets 
free of customs – arguing that a new customs barrier on fish would be against the WTO 
regulations. (Værnes 2006:18) 
But Norway's demands were crushed in Brussels. The EU – a tough and unrelenting 
negotiation partner – was not willing to consider money and fish issues as related and it 
argued that the benefits of reaching new markets was a considerable advantage in itself for 
the EFTA countries. The EU's standpoint was that it was high time EFTA countries took a 
share in the EU's efforts in filling up socio-economic gaps between Western and Eastern 
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Europe and contributed on par with the 'old' member states. (Værnes 2006:10) The EU 
wanted the EFTA countries to dig deeper in their pockets because the advantages of taking 
part in the internal market became bigger with the EU's expansion than their usual 
contribution (Værnes 2006:31). The EU was playing out the card that the rule of 
“contribution according to capability” (betaling etter evne in Norwegian) should apply for 
everyone. This argument resonated well with Norway's fundamentally social-democratic 
conscience. Some pointed out that the size of Norway's pension fund – amounting to a 
double of the total EU budget in 2006 – and the fact that it had no sovereign debt made it 
difficult for Norway to evoke sympathy about its demands of custom free fish (Værnes 
2006:51).
Norway went along with the EU demands and showed willingness to pay since it did 
not want to be perceived as a free-rider in its Europe policy (Europapolitikk). It is very 
likely that Norway also wanted to demonstrate that it could use its oil revenues on building 
democracy and welfare in the poorer countries of Eastern Europe (Værnes 2006:28). 
However, Norway refused the sum to be calculated as other EU states' contribution to the 
Structural and Cohesion funds or with the moneys being directly transferred into the 
Structural funds budget. The reason for this move was Norway's aim not lose its own supply 
partners – e.g. Norwegian firms, state institutions – in the partnership projects which are 
based on cooperation between Norway and Eastern European countries. (Værnes 2006:46) 
The importance of partnerships is increasingly emphasized within all the program areas 
(EEA and Norway Grants 2011:8). Partnership does not only buttress closer foreign 
relations between the donor and beneficiary countries but provides business opportunities 
for Norwegian state institutions and business organizations as well. Viewed through neo-
Keynesian glasses, one could argue that the 'partnership principle' is a donor strategy to 
generate demand in their own economies and to subsidize the contract of national firms and 
businesses through the partnership projects. Hopkins argues that virtually all donors link aid 
to domestic exports either for commodities or for services such as technical assistance 
(Hopkins 2000:340). He also identifies powerful domestic coalitions, firms and sectors as 
one of the main shapers of foreign assistance, who see foreign assistance as a way to expand 
their incomes. Consequently, these powerful groups in the donor states lobby and influence 
assistance policy in order to favor them (e.g. farm sector support of food aid which is most 
evident in the United States). I will not speculate on whether the grants have been 
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manipulated for such strategic and commercial purposes; I only point to the fact that it was 
an outcome of bargaining between the EU and the donor states.
Due to time pressure – the parallel expansion of the EU and the EEA was important 
for Norway in order to avoid technical hiccups in trade – and fierce demands of the EU, 
Norway had to go along with increasing the amount (Værnes 2006:45). Although a rather 
unrealistic scenario, the EU even threatened Norway to dissolve the EEA if it does not agree 
with the amount (Værnes 2006:41).14  Since Norway was unsuccessful in trying to convince 
the other EFTA countries to go along with the increased amount it decided to set up its own 
grant alongside the common EFTA grants. This way Norway could raise the amount without 
engaging in financial conflicts with Iceland and Liechtenstein. The result of this emergency 
solution was that two grants were established: the EEA and the Norway Grants – both 
similar in size and aims (Værnes 2006:38).15  This was a clever move was well, because the 
Norway Grants made Norway's image more visible in Central Eastern Europe and 
contributed to its good reputation.
Summing up, the nature of the negotiations seems to suggest that the grants are not a 
direct result of Norway's overbrimming solidarity with Eastern Europe. It highlights the fact 
that assistance is rarely set up for purely altruistic motivations. True, there was goodwill at 
the beginning but mere goodwill does not explain the tenfold increase in the final amount. 
Some observe that the EEA Agreement finally put Norway in place after having had 
enormous benefits from a community it had no intention to be part of and that it finally 
struck a balance in the accounts between the EU and Norway. (Værnes 2006:43)
2.3.2. Enter Humane Internationalism
14  There are several reasons why Norway ended up paying ten times more than before. First, 'old' member 
states were unified in supporting the European Commission's sky-high demands for Norwegian 
contribution since this lessened their own burdens. Second, the negotiations were characterized unbalance 
power relations, since the three EEA countries were outnumbered by the 27 EU countries (“The EFTA is 
like a mouse meeting and elephant that suffers form growth pains” – Hans Kr. Amundsen cited in Værnes 
2006:24). Third, there was a misunderstanding about the aims of the negotiations: while Norway wanted 
to secure good fish agreements, the EU was more focused on the financial aspects. This led to the fact that 
the EU called the tunes and almost unilaterally dictated the conditions. (Værnes 2006:23-27)
15 The Norway Grants correspond more with Norway's geopolitically strategic areas such as border control, 
environmental protection and legal protection.
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It would be unjust to interpret the EEA and Norway Grants as the outcome of political 
bargaining based primarily on power and material factors. Assisting in the consolidation of 
democracy and evening out economic differences is one of the noblest deeds a country can 
do for another. However lofty donors' rhetoric about European solidarity might be, it should 
not be underestimated. Cynical realist explanations always suppose a self-interested 
intention that justifies international behavior and suggest that altruism has only been a 
second motivation at best. But even if the Norway Grants were an outcome of international 
obligations or necessities, it cannot be denied that the money was put to a good purpose. 
Norway – similarly to the Nordic aid regime of the group of like-minded countries – 
has always aimed to improve global welfare. Being a small but wealthy country the 
development assistance it offers to less fortunate nations is seldom viewed as pursuing a 
self-serving national agenda. Norway is well-anchored in the North American and European 
political structures and has a positive attitude towards international cooperation and is 
committed to following up its international participation with a fair share of financial 
contribution. Norway has a strong tradition of independence and national sovereignty and 
thus international law, the rule of law and global solidarity play an important role in its 
international policies. The same applies to promoting and protecting human rights 
obligations and the rights of national minorities. (Kothbauer-Lichtenstein & Kongshem 
2005:90) Norwegians have a long-established record as consensus builders, problems 
solvers, peace facilitators (eg. Sri Lanka, Columbia, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Etiopia, Somalia, 
Guatemala, Palestine) and Norway is amongst the largest per capita contributors of 
development assistance, humanitarian aid and poverty reduction programs even in times 
when other countries significantly cut their own aid budgets (Tvedt 1998:112). In 1973, the 
Norwegian Parliament set 1% of the country's GNP as the target of official development 
assistance and this amount has been over-performed many times afterwards (Stokke 
2005:452). Development assistance has a great importance in national politics as well and it 
stands high on the political agenda. As has been pointed out by Nina Witoszek, the 
“Norwegian regime of goodness” is not just a “regime”: it is part of national identity and 
national mythology. There is a long tradition of virtuous and adventurous deeds which 
supports it, stretching from Wergeland, through Bjørnson and Nansen and on to Thor 
Heyerdahl and Arne Næss (Witoszek 2012).
The donors are well aware of the economic and political challenges that post-
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communist countries are facing today. The financial crisis hit CEE especially badly and 
resulted in harsh austerity measures, reduced welfare, slow economic growth and 
unemployment. These especially affected already vulnerable layers of society: youth, 
minorities and those without any safety nets. Cuts in the state welfare created differences 
and contributed to social marginalization. This, in turn, weakened people's trust in 
democratic institutions and created a hotbed for xenophobia and extreme nationalistic 
agitation. (UD 2012:5) Symptoms of social and economic troubles included a series of 
racially motivated, organized attacks on Roma people in the northeastern region of Hungary 
which resulted in six Roma being murdered in 2008 and 2009. In the 2010 elections, an 
anti-Semitic and anti-Roma right-wing party won 16% of the votes as it skillfully exploited 
rising social tensions. (The Economist 08.04.2011)
There has been a growing alarm about the centralization of power under the ultra-
conservative populist party Fidesz. Since it won an unprecedented two-thirds majority in 
Parliament in 2010, it has embarked on a power grab taking over almost every independent 
institution. Fidesz allies have been appointed to various prominent posts, such as the 
presidency, the State Audit Office, the State Prosecutor, the new fiscal council, and the new 
National Courts Authority among others. (The Economist 19.12.2011) The legislation on 
media regulation drew the ire of international observers as party nominees have been 
elected to all seats in a new powerful media council, threatening the independence of the 
media and the principle of pluralism. A report made by Freedom House on the freedom of 
the press in 2012 singles out Hungary as a country whose performance sharply deteriorated 
in 2010 and for the first time classified press as “Partly Free” after a long period (Freedom 
House 2012). Markets have also been rattled by the government's erratic economic policies 
as it imposed crisis taxes on big business, fought and turned down IMF alarming foreign 
investors. (The Economist 30.06.2010) The government has raided and nationalized private 
pension funds and scrapped the fiscal council which provided independent oversight of the 
budget. 
Until now, the only body that has kept Orbán at bay was the central bank but the 
bank's governor has recently been replaced by the former economics minister, a close ally of 
Orbán. Rewriting the constitution also caused widespread outrage. Its content has been a 
subject of controversy, since it curbs the Constitutional Court's judges authority to rule on 
matters of substance – from now on it can only rule on procedural grounds. These measures 
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opened the door for the government to use the constitution to pass new laws that the 
Constitutional Court otherwise might have rejected such as provisions that allow local 
governments to penalize the homeless or to force state funded university graduates to work 
in Hungary after graduation. For now, the disapproval of the international community is of 
little concern to Orbán since he knows that the EU can do little but to suspend Hungary's 
voting rights or fine the country. (The Economist 16.03.2013) All these events left a bitter 
mark on civil society which showed little capacity to deal with the challenges (USAID 
NGOSI 2010:111).
As many other foreign donors which channelled resources to Eastern-European civil 
society before and after the fall of the communist regimes, Norway also recognized the need 
to address the danger of these anti-democratic polices. It was an important aim for Norway 
to support civil society and to 'feed' watchdog organizations which act as guardians of 
democratic norms in order to counterbalance political life (Polgár interview:16.11.2012, UD 
2011:11). For Norway “an obvious challenge is the development of an active civil society 
which is a measure of democratic standards, a corrective to parliamentary democracy and an 
arena for a wider popular participation in political processes” (UD 2012:11). In the light of 
these deteriorating trends it is not questionable why 'solidarity' became the main slogan, the 
epitheton ornans of the EEA and Norway Grants. “Solidaritet og samarbeid i Europa” 
(Solidarity and cooperation in Europe) expresses the donors' empathy and idealistic 
commitment to support the less developed countries of Europe (UD 2012:5).
Norway – contrary to Hungary – has a long tradition of cooperation and mutual trust 
between the state and civil organizations (Tvedt 1998, Sivesind et al. 2002, Csaba 2007) 
which explains why Norway is so sensitive about the “health” of civil society in Hungary.16 
This symbiotic relationship is often referred to as the 'Scandinavian model': the 
institutionalized system of negotiation and collaboration between the state and organized 
interests. Norwegian voluntary organizations (stiftelse, forening) and social movements are 
historically deeply rooted in Norwegian society and played an important role in the 
development of its civil society. Membership organizations are often modeled after or 
connected to the organization of social movements which were the first “schools of 
16 The symbiotic, collaborative relationship is most evident in Norway's development and aid policy where 
NGOs take the leading role. Aid policy is deeply integrated into foreign policy administratively and 
politically as the Norwegian Government initiates, contracts and supports NGOs in several (mainly 
developing) countries to carry out aid programs (Tvedt 1995:112).
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democracy” in Norway (Csaba 2007:220, de Tocqueville cited in Warren 2011:6). The 
strongest of them, the labour movement, was closely connected to the Labour Party and 
fought for social inclusion and interest representation; others fought against poverty, 
alcoholism or the promotion of rural culture and language (Bull 2007:70). Non-profit 
organizations, similarly to former social movements, are also characterized by hierarchical 
structures and democratic decision-making at all levels (Klausen and Selle cited in Csaba 
2007:211). The movements have consisted not of one but a whole network of organizations 
and as such, contributed to trust and social networks, in one word 'social capital' (Bull 
2007:70).
Norwegian civil organizations not only have their root and inspiration in social 
movements; the popular mass movements, most importantly, have also defined the 
corporatist characteristics in state-society relations. A broad system of interest 
representation was established after WWII by the state in alliance with civil society 
organizations and this is still a hallmark of Norway's governance. At the base of corporatism 
lies the popular belief that the state is a force of good intentions and good governance and 
represents general interest above any special interest (Bull 2007:70-72). Might this have 
been the ideal donors would like to see in Hungary? Such consensus between the sectors 
and a close cooperation and partnership with the state lack historical antecedence in 
Hungarian state-society relations and political culture (Móra interview:08.10.2012). 
Although there is historical evidence for cooperation as well as opposition between the state 
and civil sphere in Hungary, civil society has most often been defined as a counterforce to 
the state (Bruszt 2003, Kuti 2008:6-9).
Civil society organizations in Norway are also integral part of cultural traditions 
which is reflected in their extensive membership bases.17 It is a widely shared view among 
Norwegians that it is important to belong to an association since it is considered to be a 
personal manifestation of democratic attitude (Csaba 2007:229, Sivesind et al. 2002). 
Because of these factors it is no surprise that Norway is especially sensitive to and 
committed the well-being of Eastern European civil society. An active and virulent civil 
society is both a space of negotiation and collaboration between society and the state, and 
17 As much as half of the Norwegian population devotes its time to voluntary work. Norwegians have an 
even stronger penchant to join organizations as members: the total number of membership is 8.4 million 
which equals more than two per person (Sivesind et al. 2002:39). In Eastern Europe, as well as in 
Hungary, membership and participation in voluntary organizations is extremely low (Howard 2011:2).
39
ultimately, a dividend of democracy. It is an empirical fact that Nordic countries, including 
Norway, have come close to a well-functioning democratic corporatist system which is 
characterized precisely by the routinized institutions that connect state and society – be it 
organized interest of trade unions or voluntary organizations. It is a form of governance 
which is open to political input from society, which in turn safeguards the creation of a 
national community and social welfare (Trägårdh 2010:11). These routinized institutions of 
collaboration and high levels of trust in the state, however, are not prominent features of 
state-society relations in Hungary.18
Norway's own understanding of the role and importance of civil society most 
probably underscored the support offered Hungarian NGOs. Civil society organizations are 
desirable and 'appropriate' agents in tackling societal and policy challenges and they 
promote fundamental European values like democracy, the rule of law, human rights, social 
justice, tolerance and anti-discrimination. The recognition of civil society's role democratic 
role in creating civic engagement, participating in politics and raising people's awareness 
must have contributed to doubling the amount of assistance to Hungarian civil society from 
€6 million to €12.6 million in the next five-year phase between 2009 and 2014 (EEA and 
Norway Grants 17.04.2013).
In this sense the grants are essentially a humane and altruistic transfer of resources to 
governments, not because Norway wishes to see any kind of return on its money or because 
it wants to exert any kind of influence. This is also proved by the fact that there were no 
strings attached to the grants and they were provided on highly concessional terms. In this 
reading, the EEA and Norway Grants was not manipulated for strategic and commercial 
purposes as realist theories would argue.
2.3.3. Synthesis
The literature on Norway's development policy (especially in developing countries) is 
18 The closest we get to a collaborative relationship in Hungary is within the social service providing 
organizations, which take over public responsibilities from the state. Although cooperation is close, the 
relationship is characterized by civil society actors dependency on and conformity to the state (Kuti 
2008:34).
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ambiguous on Norway's motivation. Both Tvedt and Stokke argue that the political aim of 
Norway in development cooperation has been to further foreign policy interests but they 
also agree that Norwegian aid has only marginally been influenced by national or economic 
self-interest. Furthering Norway's interests has been just as important as long-term 
international common goods like peace, stability, improved health and environment (Stokke 
2005:451). Tvedt argues that while aid has traditionally been regarded as a non-political 
affair due to the neutrality paragraph, from the 1990s on this 'naïve' approach – meaning the 
pure moral obligation to help – increasingly came under attack as politicians started to argue 
that aid should also serve Norwegian business interests and help strengthen Norway's global 
image as a superpower in democracy promotion (Tvedt 1998:104). Stokke argues similarly: 
while in the 1970-80s 'own' Norwegian norms were dominant – altruism, primary concern 
to help poor people, no strategic or economic interests, untied grants, large share of aid 
going  through UN thus removing the flag of the donor – in the 1990s, many of these 
became less pronounced. Although altruism remained the most powerful incentive, 
instrumental justifications were also brought forward, like promoting good image abroad 
(Stokke 2005:485). Aid increasingly became a high-profile tool in the foreign policy of 
Norway. These double objectives are expressed in a recent conference on Norway's image 
abroad by the Norwegian foreign minister Espen Barth Eide, who said that foreign 
development assistance is just as much a “feel-good” factor as a contributor to Norway's 
strategies of being a long-term, reliable and serious partner of the EU. This might not not 
open all doors, but it opens some. (Barth Eide 29.11.2012)
Værnes also points out the double motives in the Norwegian government's 
communiqué in connection with the results of the negotiations between Norway and the EU 
on the final amount of the grants: first and foremost, it is politically and socially 
responsible, and morally right to contribute to the evening out of the disparities of a 
formerly divided Europe. On the other hand, Norway cannot oppose the EU's demands for 
higher financial contributions if it wants to continue to be a member of the internal market. 
This raises the question whether the heavy rhetoric on solidarity is only paying lip service to 
it in order to cover up for the fact that they were forced into a situation where they had to 
pay anyways? (Værnes 2006:2)
Foreign political doctrines aside, whether intentionally or unintentionally, the EEA 
and Norway Grants has definitely achieved two things: it contributed to the globalization of 
41
civil society and it made Norway more visible internationally. Norwegian NGOs have for a 
long time played an active role in humanitarian and development aid abroad, especially 
since the 1980s, when most Western states started to delegate functions and services thus 
power to NGOs (Tvedt 1998:48). The introduction of NGOs into the field of development 
and the subsequent growth of the non-profit sector was brought about by conscious 
government decisions in order to internationalize Norwegian civil society (Tvedt 1998:46). 
Through the EEA and Norway Grants Norway became the second biggest supporter of 
Hungarian civil society and this has several implications. The Norway grants are yet another 
manifestation of the globalizing tendencies of civil society: just as resources have been 
channeled through Norwegian NGOs working in developing countries, resources are now 
channeled to Hungarian NGOs. This shows that social relations which formerly used to be 
defined within Hungary and were confined to territorial borders are now stretching across 
borders. State boundaries are not a limit any more and social interactions stretch across vast 
geographical distances, creating a “society of interlocking societies” (Keane 2004:17). This 
is the first, geographical implication.
Secondly, the EEA and Norwegian Grants is unique in a sense that it makes 
Hungarian NGOs – within the context of the financed projects – accountable to the 
Norwegian Foreign Ministry and the government and in a wider sense to Norwegian tax 
payers whose tax contributions form the basis of the grants. This is unique, in the sense that 
NGOs are partly sustained by another nation than their own. This phenomena further blurs 
the line between national and global levels. Thirdly, through the partnership projects, 
cooperation between Norwegian and CEE civil society organizations is made possible.19 
Through bilateral relations among Hungarian and Norwegian NGOs, through study trips and 
internships in the donor countries, their experiences and opinions are exchanged, good 
practices are transferred and new ideas for solving problems are shared. This contributes to 
the homogenization process that is already on the way in civil societies. Through sharing 
technical and strategic information, coordinating activities and planning joint actions, civil 
society organizations adjust to each other, engage in organizational learning, start using the 
same rhetoric and gradually become more and more similar to each other (Tvedt 1998:213).
All nations are preoccupied (or should be) with their image abroad and in the rapidly 
19 Although there were no civil society partnership projects in Hungary in the first phase, in the next phase 
there is special emphasis on strengthening bilateral relations.
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globalizing world all nations want to stick out as special, authentic or best in certain areas.  
Development assistance policy has recently become a conscious tool in shaping Norway's 
international image, a country whose oil fortune and social democratic welfare system are 
well known. Norway's image is not as uncontroversial as one might think. Being one of the 
biggest oil exporters in the world, it is also a pioneer in green technologies (e.g. carbon 
capture and storage, osmotic power plant) and sustainable development has been a key 
feature of Norway's development strategy since the 1980s (Stokke 2005:461). While 
Norway is registered as a nation of peace (Nobel Peace Prize, peace brokers) it is the 
biggest per capita exporter of weapons and its role in Afghanistan and Libya has been 
controversial. We might speculate about the motivations behind the grants: does Norway 
have a bad conscience about something that this rich nation tries to compensate for? Or 
whether the grants are part of a healthy ambition to put Norway on the map? These 
questions will not be answered here, but Anne Kristin Sydnes's comment might be useful for 
orientation: “The development policy also counteracts a picture of Norway as a country 
where self-interest, materialism, and egoism rule the ground” (cited in Stokke 2005:452). 
What is safe to say is that keeping official development assistance at a fairly high level has 
been part of the image building strategies of changing governments – both for domestic (i.e. 
self-image) and international consumption (i.e. reputation) (Stokke 2005:481). Today, the 
grants mean by far the most important diplomatic relation between Hungary and Norway 
and the Norwegian embassy in Budapest deliberately uses the grants as a promotional tool 
in order to associate Norway with generosity, reliability and solidarity and turning the 
Norway Grants into Norway's face abroad (Polgár interview: 16.11.2012).
2.4. Foreign Assistance + Civil Society = Democracy?
When we talk about civil society in Eastern Europe, it is impossible to avoid comparisons 
with the period of transition when the concept of civil society raised domestic and 
international hopes about a new form of politics: democracy (Celichowski 2004:71). The 
role of external assistance is important to be mentioned here as it informs us how former 
foreign donors' efforts lived up to civil society actors' and their own expectations in 
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contributing to democratic practices. On the other hand, the fact that earlier foreign donors 
made similar claims about civil society's role in the democratization process as the EFTA 
countries do today, necessarily prompts a parallel between them.
The reason for the boom in the numbers of civil society organizations in the 1990s 
can only partly be put down to the fact that the first laws of political transition reinstituted 
the legality of foundations and associations, making free assembly and association possible 
(Cohen&Arato 1992:64, Móra 2012:159). The unprecedented amount of international 
financial support that streamed into the country in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, specifically targeted civil society and has been an important propelling force in its 
development. The 1980s was a global renaissance of civil society. The boom in the number 
of newly established organizations in Eastern Europe coincided with the 'associational 
revolution' in Western liberal democracies, where the crisis of the welfare states, the 
symptoms of a hollowed-out democracy and the dissolution of the politically bipolar world 
made the concept of civil society attractive (Tvedt 1998:1, Edwards 2011:11). In Eastern 
Europe the idea primarily expressed peoples' aspirations for economic and political 
freedom. After a 45-year hiatus, civil society held out the promise of free, democratic, open 
societies (Howell & Pearce 2001:15).
As CEE faced the double challenge of a simultaneous transition to market economy 
and pluralist democracy, the idea of civil society was propelled into Western political and 
foreign aid discourses. By far the biggest provider of civil society assistance was the USA, 
as it channeled resources through a number of government agencies (USAID via its partner 
organizations), NGOs (Amnesty International) and foundations (Mott Foundation, Ford 
Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, German Marshall Fund and Soros Open Society 
Foundation) (Kuti 2007:188). Donors saw civil society, especially non-profit organizations, 
as essential ingredients of democratization (Ertsey 2000:88). Donors were eager to import 
new practices, transfer knowledge, introduce new patterns of behavior and build new civil 
society institutions. There were many reasons why donors were so enthusiastic about 
Eastern European civil society. Firstly, donors believed, on a normative basis, that the 
existence of vigorous civil societies is a precondition for the fledging liberal democracies. 
They saw a strong civil society as a cornerstone of democracy, “good governance”, 
pluralism and the achievement of important social and economic goals (Edwards 3:2011). 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union many foreign donors decided to support democratic 
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transition in the region, supporting mainly advocacy activities, election monitoring, civic 
education, parliamentary transparency and human rights activities, protections of women's 
and minority's rights, and protection of the environment (Celichowski 2004:75, Císař 
2010:748). Most of the money was channeled through grant-making foundations (Kuti 
2007:197).20 Donors expected that social, political and behavioral impact of civil society 
assistance would be decisive and recognizable in the short run (Kuti 2007:188).
Secondly, the collapse of the Soviet Union coincided with a growing skepticism 
about the Western welfare states both as an agent of economic development and locus of 
justice (Howell & Pearce 2001:89). These political assaults on the welfare state took place 
within the ideological context of neo-liberalism which celebrated the allocative efficiency of 
the market and discredited the state as an agency for economic growth and management. 
The neoliberal ideology – represented by the Washington Consensus of the 1990s – 
legitimized the development of civil society as a substitute for the welfare state. (Howell & 
Pearce 2001:90) Multilateral lending institutions (e.g. WB, IMF) whose concern for issues 
of governance has increased have also made civil society engagement a requirement 
throughout much of their operations (Encarnación 2011:5). They launched a strategy of 
'rolling back the state' in their structural adjustment policies in crisis-wrecked developing 
countries and increasingly integrated NGOs into their development policies. NGOs were not 
looked upon as representatives of civil society but as alternative service delivery agents to 
the state. (Tvedt 1998:167, Paffenholz & Spurk 2006:9) For many donors, the concept of 
civil society was equated (and reduced) to NGOs (Howell & Spurk 2001:91, Encarnación 
2011:8). The role of the state as a provider of social justice and development was also 
challenged in the emerging Eastern European democracies. 
Thirdly, the “comparative advantages” of NGOs increasingly gained recognition 
(Fowler cited in Howell & Pearce 2001:91). NGOs were thought to deliver alternative social 
services and welfare, offer solutions to the incapacities of the weak state and mitigate the 
inequalities of capitalist development by embracing those who fell through the social net. In 
Hungary, the social cost of transition was enormous. Since the immediate concern of 
politicians was to make sure that the macroeconomic policy corresponded with market 
principles, social policy as a consequence was ad hoc and contradictory (Ringold cited in 
20 Government  support  is  more  involved  in  financing  nonprofit  cultural  activities,  development  and 
traditional charitable activities such as health and social care (Kuti 2007:197).
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Kuti 2007:200). Since the government was not able to provide vulnerable groups with the 
welfare services they would have needed, social service provision organizations threw a life 
belt to many such as homeless, disabled people (Kuti 2007:201). NGOs have also been 
considered to be relatively quick problem-solvers compared to the state: they are flexible 
and responsive due to their closeness to the people and their services are cheap, if not 
entirely free.21 (Tvedt 1998:129, Howell & Pearce 2001:89-91, Oriniaková 2009:10) In a 
nutshell, throughout the 1990s civil society was the “big idea” on everyone's lips, enjoying 
support across the political spectrum, in different parts on the world, among theorists, 
activists and policy makers alike (Edwards 2011:3). Have these ambitious aspirations met 
donor's and beneficiaries' expectations?
There are two aspects of foreign civil society support which has to be emphasized 
here. Firstly, contrary to popular perceptions, the development of civil societies in Hungary 
or in Eastern Europe was not a direct outcome of foreign assistance (Kuti 2007:210). 
Assistance might have been a dominant force driving the proliferation of non-profit 
organizations and it most certainly contributed to the institutionalization and 
professionalization of the sector, but the development of Eastern European civil societies 
was more of an organic evolution from within, than a process encouraged from the outside. 
Although the number of externally-supported organizations and the amount of foreign 
grants increased considerably from 1993 in Hungary, the proportion of externally-supported 
NGOs compared to all nonprofit organizations did not reach more than 4 % in 2000. In a 
similar vein, foreign revenues were only a tenth of the total revenues of the sector 1995. 
(Kuti 2007:191) The numbers suggest that the international aid system embraced only a 
minority of organizations and even less depended completely on foreign funding. This 
minority of organizations, however, attracted two-thirds of foreign support (Kuti 2007:192). 
Critics argue that instead of fostering grassroots activism in Eastern European countries 
(which donors originally intended to support), patronage by powerful international donors 
created a small group of professional grant-seeking NGOs, which became detached from 
their constituencies (Celichowski 2004:74, Císař 2010:737, Encarnación 2011:10).
Secondly, it is often claimed that civil society assistance backfired in a way 
21 Official statistic data supports the view that the non-profit sector delivers good value for money. In 1996, 
the Hungarian nonprofit sector produced three times more HUF than it had received through state 
support. This fact points to the importance of the value added to the services NGOs provide and the 
possible returns on 'investment' in NGOs (Bíró 2002:41).
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(Celichowski 2004:76). By the mid-1990s the political climate has changed – it was not so 
“cold” any more – and there was a visible shift in the priorities of international aid (Hopkins 
2000:331, Kuti 2007:209). As liberal democracy and capitalism set foot in former state 
socialist countries the ideological-political rationale behind aid began to lose its persuasive 
force (Tvedt 1998:224, Howell & Pearce 2001:94). After the end of the Cold War, civil 
society assistance and “democracy building” lost its relevance in donors' foreign policy. 
Donors reassessed their strategies and goals and turned to other countries. Their support 
phased out in Eastern Europe without addressing questions of civil societies' institutional or 
financial sustainability (Tvedt 1998:208). Although newly established CSOs were 
encouraged to manage alone and use local sources for sustaining themselves, many in the 
civil sphere felt that they we suddenly abandoned without having any survival techniques 
(Ertsey in Kuti 2007:210). Civil society actors increasingly felt frustrated over unmet 
promises of Western assistance. Many foundations which were established after the 
transition, built on American conceptions of civil society, which promoted reliance on 
volunteers and the support of the business sphere as a main survival strategy. In Hungary, a 
very different socio-economic and historical context made professional fundraising and 
recruitment difficult to implement (Bíró 2002:52).22 As a consequence of all these factors 
many organizations which were originally created by foreign donors ceased to exist soon 
after the transition. (Kuti 2007:210) These experiences – which were symptomatic over 
Eastern Europe – warn about the uncritical uses of the concept “civil society” and raise the 
question whether one understanding of civil society can be effectively exported into a 
different socio-economic and cultural context (Encarnación 2011:2).
To sum it up, in spite of the fact that foreign assistance was an important facilitator of 
civil society development, it fell short of the unrealistic expectations connected to it. Ditto 
civil society: while donors believed that their assistance would be decisive and recognizable 
in the short run, they underestimated the time needed for the consolidation of a robust, 
viable civil society. On the optimistic side, however, one cannot undervalue the importance 
of time and local initiatives:
22  As a legacy of communism Hungary also lacked a strong middle class which could have sustained the 
civil sphere financially. On the other, the values of solidarity, social responsibility and a strong sense of 
citizenship were not developed enough after the experiences with state socialism; a strong democratic 
culture was still missing. (Miszlivetz 2008:105)
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Unlike other countries, the emphasis on civil society in Hungary was not, as the 
saying goes, old wine in new bottles: all of the interactions and relationships were 
new. Hungarians, sipping tiny amounts of that wine of support, in turn got tipsy 
drinking wines from Washington, New York, London, Brussels, Ottawa, The Hague 
and Bonn. It was a bitter awakening when the cheerful days of the velvet revolution 
were over and those who had talked about civil society also started talking of 
shutting off the taps. The Hungarian hope is to learn to produce our own 'solution' 
ourselves. It is possible, if done with the same passion winemakers have for their 
work. But it must be understood as an investment and learning process, not as a short 
night of over indulgence followed by the inevitable hangover. (Ertsey 2000:81)
2.5. Modern Evolution of Hungarian Environmental Civil Society 
Organizations
2.5.1. The Hungarian Environmental Movement: Sea-Change
The Hungarian environmental movement has been deeply rooted in popular movements and 
local initiatives. The movement has had the broadest range of international contacts within 
the Hungarian civil sphere. International assistance before and after the transition has had an 
influential role in the professional development of several environmental civil society 
organizations. (Persányi 1992:91-92) To understand the condition of civil society in 
Hungary and its role in environmental protection, it is necessary to know something about 
its unique history (Szirmay cited in Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:140). Let us have a look in 
this section where the “greens” come from, what role they played in the democratization 
processes and how their focus has changed after the historical changes. 
By the late 1980s, a visible degradation of natural areas, smog, toxic accidents and 
decline in public health lead to a widespread awareness of the deterioration of 
environmental quality (Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:132, Harper 2004:8). Unregulated state 
control over a heavy industry-based economy, the absence of modern technology and capital 
investment in production, combined with censorship and the profound mistrust of the public 
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made environmental mobilization an arena for democratic change. Instances of open 
opposition began to emerge all over Central and Eastern Europe. The 1980s was the golden 
age of the Hungarian environmental movement as it offered a trenchant critique of Soviet-
era industrialization. (Harper 2004:8) 
Although the history of the Hungarian environmental organizations goes back to 
times well before the transition to 'traditional' conservationists, religious and pacifist groups, 
and university groups, it is generally accepted that it were the Danube demonstrations of 
1988 which gave environmentally concerned associations their biggest impetus and fused 
them into a unified movement (Móra 2008:199). The Danube movement became the 
founding epic for the environmental movement as it helped to build and solidify it. The 
Danube movement was widely publicized in Western media as well, covered in New 
Scientist and Mother Jones magazines. (Harper 2004:29) What was the Danube movement 
and what was its role in democratization?
In the center of the Danube demonstrations stood a controversial, $3 billion-plus 
hydroelectric mega-project on the Danube. The Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros dams were a joint 
Hungarian-Czechoslovak COMECON project, which envisioned a cross-border barrage 
system that would eliminate flooding, improve navigation and produce electricity in each 
country. The project was an energy security solution as well, an answer to the global oil 
crisis that resulted in a dramatic peak in world oil prices after the OAPEC members 
declared an oil embargo in 1973. Most of the construction was planned to take place on 
Slovak territory but the Hungarian government was obliged to participate in some of the 
construction to ensure equal investment. Electricity was planned to be shared equally by 
both countries. (Harper 2006:32) Apart from being a necessity, the Soviet leadership saw the 
project as a symbol of industrial progress and a manifestation of socialist-internationalist 
cooperation. Scientific assessments, on the other hand, expressed criticism about  the 
environmental consequences of the project: it involved drastic interference with nearly 200 
km of river, the flooding of 50 islands, 120 km² of forests and fields and the loss of valuable 
wildlife habitats. Environmentalists warned that the project had unforeseeable consequences 
for the underground water reserves of the region and the drinking water on which more than 
a million Hungarians depended. Not to mention the scenic Danube-bend at Visegrád, a 
beauty spot and popular hiking destination. (The Right Livelihood Award 1997, Harper 
2006:30)
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In 1984, a group of environmentally concerned people started to organize themselves, 
opposing the construction of the dam. This group comprised many prominent figures but 
mainly revolved around János Vargha. He was a biologist from the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences who wrote extensively about the dam in a scientific magazine. When the director 
of the state-run Water Management Agency, who was also on the editorial board of the 
magazine banned his investigative article, Vargha decided to organize like-minded people 
around himself and “act as if we were living in a democracy” (Vargha cited in Pearce 
2009:46). The Danube Circle, was they were called, wanted to put pressure on the 
Communist leadership to give up the project. They had to operate illegally since social 
association was banned that time. They objected that the government withheld public 
information on the project in order to avoid the debate on its environmental impact. The 
Danube Circle attracted supporters and gradually evolved into a protest movement. They 
networked informally, managed and directed the opposition to the project in scientific and 
professional circles by distributing samizdat leaflets and by speaking up in Radio Free 
Europe and in national TV programs. After the movement got The Right Livelihood Award 
– the environmental equivalent of the Nobel prize – it was catapulted to international 
spotlight. The movement got more confrontational and expanded its contacts internationally. 
(Harper 2006:31) In 1988, Vargha organized an international conference in cooperation with 
World Wildlife Fund and 150,000 people have signed a petition demanding a referendum on 
the dam issue. (The Right Livelihood Award 1997) The debates over the dam and the 
political changes electrified the whole nation.
The breakthrough came in 1989, when the democratic parliament gave way to public 
pressure and immediately abandoned the construction. In Czechoslovakia the Gabčíkovo 
dam was almost complete when the Communist government collapsed but the new 
government decided to continue its part of the project. It diverted the Danube into Slovak 
territory and kept the development entirely within its borders, which dramatically decreased 
the amount of water flowing into Hungary and had a significant impact on the water supply 
and the environment. Hungary subsequently sued Slovakia for appropriating the river, and 
Slovakia in turn charged Hungary of violating the agreement and took the case to the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1997. This was the first time that the court 
would rule over an environmental dispute. Although the court concluded that both countries 
breached their legal obligations and called on them to cooperate in achieving the original 
50
objectives of the agreement (by taking environmental issues into consideration), the dispute 
between the countries is still unresolved. (Harper 2006:32)
In retrospect, it is clear that the Danube movement was more than a story about a 
dam. (Lipschutz & Mayer1996:143) It was about shaking the foundations of the Communist 
regimes of Eastern Europe. To condemn the dam was to condemn the regime and 
environmentalism became a tool for “politics by other means” (Lipschutz & Mayer 
1996:129). Perhaps it is an exaggeration to say that the movement triggered the collapse of 
the Hungarian Communist regime, but it is certain that the prevention of the construction of 
the dam was an ecological as well as a political triumph for the movement, since it 
questioned Hungary's subordinate position in the Soviet geopolitical order and brought 
Hungarian hard liners to their knees (Harper 2004:8). The dam project became a symbol of 
the hated, old regime. Communist attempts to hold back the waters of the Danube became 
synonymous with holding back the free flow ideas and will of the people (Pearce 2009:46, 
Harper 2006:33). Similarly to the catastrophic nuclear disaster of Chernobyl, the dam 
represented the Soviet leadership's technological hubris and secrecy. The deformation of 
natural environment exemplified everything that was wrong with the state socialist system. 
(Fagan 2010:691). The Danube movement preceded and in many ways precipitated the 
political changes of 1989, and as such, it is a narrative of democratization (Harper 2004:8).
In general, environmental issues seemed to be Eastern European communism's soft 
underbelly in its last years (Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:140, Fagan 2010:692). Under the 
auspices of the Young Communist Leagues, several environmental groups were established 
during the 1970s, which party officials considered as harmless outlets of youthful idealism 
(Móra 2008:120). But this green idealism soon became a rallying point against political 
oppression. In the former Czechoslovakia human rights organization Chapter 77 took up 
environmentalism; Polish and Estonian greens joined Friends of the Earth International to 
protest against air pollution; Bulgarian greens formed Ecoglastnost which held huge rallies 
in 1989; but nowhere did green politics catch on more as in Hungary (Pearce 2009:46-47).23 
23  There are dissident voices in this narrative as well. Persányi does not attribute such importance to the 
environmental movement in catalyzing the great changes. He notes that environmentalists misunderstood 
of the role of the environmental challenges in the politic-economic development of Central Europe: 
although environmental factors played a unique role in the political changes of 1989, the societal 
influence of the movement remained relatively limited. ENGOs derived their apparent strength from their 
relationship with the democratic political opposition, not by their own merits. (Persányi 1992:75)
51
2.5.2. From Environmental Dissidents to Grassroots Globalization
The Danube movement's main organizations and the groups that sprang from it, had the 
broadest range of international contacts in Hungarian civil sphere and this way they had 
access to American and Western European projects, publishing opportunities and training 
trips abroad. Extensive organizational support began in the 1980s, when foreign assistance 
streamed in with the aim of facilitating environmental legislation and cleaning up 
environmental “hot spots”. The establishment of research and monitoring facilities was 
essential for activists to have access to, and be able to produce accurate, independent, 
scientific information about certain environmental problems.24 (Persányi1992:91-92) The 
importance of Western donors went beyond financial transfers: they helped to advocate and 
implement institutional and managerial models, know-how and strategies, and assisted 
Hungarian activists build up civil society infrastructures. International assistance had an 
influential role in the professional development of several environmental civil society 
organizations. But while the newer and more visible organizations were adept at gaining 
access to funds – often by adopting professional norms, operational strategies and 
administrative approaches prevalent in the West – traditional environmental conservation 
and membership organizations fell through and did not manage to reach out for these funds. 
After Western donors left the region and Hungary joined the EU, NGOs' professionalization 
further intensified as they aligned their actions with Brussels. (Fagan 2010: 697, 
Celichowski 2004:75)
The project of building a new, autonomous civil society rapidly succumbed to a fever 
of party-building during the late 1980s and an overwhelming majority of former activists 
became members of the new political elite (Miszlivetz 2000:75). The new democratic 
political system had a high absorbing capacity and the anti-dam campaign was a passport to 
political power for many activists. The Danube movement slowly began to fade from the 
political scene and dependence on state and external funding gradually moderated, 
24  ISTER (East European Environmental Research, where Vargha worked), and the Independent Ecological 
Center was partly funded by the Soros Foundation and the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 
The Regional Environmental Center for Central and Eastern Europe was proposed by Bush and was set 
up in 1990 by the United States, the European Commission and the Hungarian government. 
(Persányi1992:92)
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professionalized and demobilized the originally contentious green organizations (Císař 
2010:738). This did not necessarily mean a low tide for environmental issues, since activists 
newly catapulted to political fame, kept environmental concerns on the political agenda 
(Pickvance 1997:40, Miszlivetz 2000:75). On the other hand, the rapid establishment of the 
new institutions of representative democracy radically changed the dynamics of civil 
society. The leaders of the new political elite claimed that the time of social movements was 
over: they were afraid that grassroots mobilization might endanger the stability of the new 
democracy. Politicians were convinced that parties provided the most effective arena for the 
competition of ideas. (Miszlivetz 2008:105) Many ex-activists who joined party politics 
tended to engage in dirty political games or promoted 'uncivil' values (Celichowsky 
2004:76). Environmentalists were disappointed by those activist-turned-politicians' 
performance who did not live up to the movement's expectations and did represent the 
'green cause' any more (Móra  2008:119, Fisher & Davis 1992:10).25
After the political changes, the environmental movement diversified its focus and the 
multitude of newly established NGOs were geared towards a new political system. The 
single issue of the dam was taken over by newly emerging topics, such as nuclear and GMO 
issues, eco-colonization, and consumer protection. NGOs scope of action and thinking 
widened and they realized that environmental issues cannot be considered in isolation form 
wider issues of modern societies, such as environmental justice, human rights, consumerist 
lifestyle, etc. (Móra 2008:120). The new foci within the environmental movement have 
reflected an increasingly globalizing outlook and emphasis on the drawbacks of market 
forces. Environmental organizations have understood their shifting political role: activists 
have moved away from the “society vs. state” model of 1980s to a more recent model of 
watchdog citizens protecting public goods from laissez-faire market exploitation which is 
facilitated by a weak state (Harper 2006:16). 
Over the course of the 1990s, greens continued to frame their actions in terms of 
'civil society' but their concept of civil society underwent a subtle shift to a more Gramscian 
notion of civil society: forming a wedge between the state and market institutions (Harper 
2006:15). This also meant a shift in Hungarian activist's understanding of their own political 
25 A likely explanation for this is that environmentally committed civil society activists had an easier time 
identifying a cause from without the political structure. Once they themselves became insiders to the 
political system, they realized the trade-off involved in this: access to and responsibility for resources 
which they had to manage and distribute weakened their capacities to criticize and oppose certain policies 
(Warren 2011:10).
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role. After the 'environmental transition' and entry into market capitalism, activists put the 
blame on 'wild capitalist' forces as a reason for environmental degradation. Although 
Western experts and Eastern elites promised that the market would provide a strong 
medicine to cure socialism's many ills; privatization, marketization and 'consumerism' were 
not an environmental success story (Fisher & Davis 1992:10, Harper 2006:10). Greens in 
Hungary believe that without the constant vigilance of citizens, multinational capital and 
short-sighted entrepreneurs will override the common good, appropriate land and resources 
for their own profit. Today, activists question the “naturalness” of market economies and 
challenge the underlying assumption that there is no political alternative to global capitalism 
(Harper 2006:11).
There has also been a shift in the framing of the issues and strategies. Today 
environmental organizations participate in transnational networks and campaigns and they 
increasingly think about and experience local conditions within a global frame of reference. 
The greens identify themselves with an environmentalism that is global in scope and 
grassroots in practice. However, concern with democratic processes and public access of 
information continue to characterize contemporary Hungarian environmental movement 
even today. (Harper 2006:14) Their strategies changed as well: while at the time of regime 
change mass demonstrations were a frequent method to put pressure on authorities, there 
has been a gradual shift to public education, awareness-raising (especially among the 
young), interest representation and advocacy (Pickvance 1997:43). Mobilizing individuals 
and organizing demonstrations has also gradually been replaced with professional methods 
of public relations, activist 'marketing' and media-attractive events to catch people's 
attention (Císař 2010:740).
2.5.3. Present Situation of the Environmental NGO Sector
The initial boom in the number of ENGOs and the diversification of the movement lasted 
until the mid-nineties. By this time, the structures of networking and cooperation had 
already been established and several organizations trained their own experts, lobbyists and 
campaign managers. The annual National Assembly of Environmental NGOs is the most 
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important forum for the greens. The assembly is based on written rules and serves the 
purpose of electing and delegating members to specialized state committees. Such a high 
level of organization is unique in the Hungarian civil sector. (Móra 2008:119, Oriniaková 
and Dönsz 2009:27) This has caused resentment among other civil society actors who think 
that the relative strength of the environmental sector has led to an uneven development 
within the CSO community. ENGOs not only form their own “exclusive clubs” and isolate 
themselves from others, they attract funds more easily as well (Ertsey 2000:95). They 
suspect that the reason why environmental issues have attracted so much Western funding 
was due to the fact that these issues are usually very visible, burning problems so projects 
which aim tackling them are popular with donors who use ENGOs as safe bets to deliver 
successful results. 
According to a rough estimate, there are approximately 500-600 active ENGOs in 
Hungary today (Móra 2008:120).26  They can be classified in three main categories: 
organizations with a national reach (e.g. Energiaklub) which work mainly independently 
form each other but in some particular issues they form networks. There are 8-10 of these 
umbrella organizations nationally, with several member organizations. The second category 
comprises regional organizations which operate in bigger provincial cities and whose scope 
of action covers one or more counties. There are 10-12 of these and they mostly deal with 
local problems, have a more general profile and they often participate in national 
movements and programs. Many of them form alliances and embrace smaller, local 
organizations. Besides the nation-wide thematic alliances, these regionally operating, long-
standing NGOs form the basis and face of the environmental movement. Finally, there are  
smaller local organizations e.g. environmental education groups, university groups and other 
diverse associations but their participation in national events is not typical. (Móra 2008:121)
2.5.3.1. Scope of Cooperation Among ENGOs
By now the structure and modus operandi of the environmental movement has consolidated; 
26 There are 65.000 organizations in the Hungarian non-profit sector according to the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office. However, many of these are “phantom” organizations: they are legally registered but 
effectively inactive. (Kákai & Sebestény 2012:117)
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it become routinized and stabilized by written and unwritten rules. The movement's yearly 
assembly and the national alliances between its organizations facilitate a relatively quick 
and unified representation of interests – e.g. by issuing common statements – which is the 
main strength of the movement. There is a high level of trust between the organizations and 
a common ideological basis makes the general acceptance of common standpoints possible. 
During debates at the assembly, members are usually willing to make compromises and the 
common lowest denominator is usually found, for example between energy and 
conservationist organizations regarding issues of biomass. (Móra 2008:123)
The most important development in cooperation lately has been the creation of the 
Z8 group, the union of the biggest national organizations (Móra 2008:123). It was created as 
a Hungarian version of Green 10, an EU-large green lobbyist platform which is based in 
Brussels. The Z8 is a similar pressure group which aims to amplify the voice of ENGOs vis-
á-vis the state. Since most Z8 organizations are located in Budapest, however, there is a 
danger that they might cover the activities of smaller regional organizations and make the 
movement even more centralized (Móra 2008:124).
There are already misgivings about a general tendency of polarization among 
ENGOs in Eastern Europe (Miszlivetz 2008:110). It is widely described that two clusters of 
organizations have emerged since the transition: the first cluster consists of well-capacitated 
organizations run by a small group of highly professionalized staff which generally engages 
in policy-making on the national and the international levels (Oiniaková 2009:12, Carmin 
2010:183-202, Fagan 2010:697). These NGOs often have relatively high incomes and rely 
on foreign governments, EU and domestic sources, service fees, sales and rentals. This 
NGO elite is better positioned to reach out for funds since they possess the necessary skills 
of application-writing and are able to “talk civil society” fluently using the most fashionable 
buzzwords (Miszlivetz 2008:106). The second cluster of NGOs tends to sponsor local 
activities and take action on behalf of its constituencies and marginalized groups and 
provide environmental services on the local level. These civil society organizations usually 
have lower incomes and rely on domestic sources of funding, particularly membership fees. 
This cluster is often overlooked by governments, agencies and foundations despite the fact 
that they make important contributions to environmental governance (Carmin 2010:200). As 
the first case study demonstrates, grassroots organizations despite their limited capacity are 
able to provide critical input to environmental governance by advancing societal interests. A 
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negative consequence of polarization is that “the same few NGOs [are] able to benefit from 
available funding schemes at a time when there are few accessible NGO funding schemes in 
the beneficiary state” (Pitija 2010:67).
The solidifying and stiffening tendencies of the movement are accompanied by an 
even more worrying process, namely, that ENGOs are weakly embedded in society. Few 
new people join the movement, membership numbers are dwindling and there is a lack in 
supportive constituencies (Móra 2008:124). There are various explanations to this tendency: 
one of them is that after the transition, newly established environmental organizations 
concentrated much more on contributing to the creation of a strict environmental law. Since 
they took people's support for granted, they neglected their constituency-relations. The lack 
of large, mobilized constituencies means that there is no pressure on governments to 
respond to environmental issues (Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:134). On the other hand, as 
Csaba Kiss points out, one of biggest drawbacks of the non-profit sector is that “it offers no 
future prospect whatsoever for the engaged and those who would sacrifice their lives to 
work in the civil sphere” (Kiss interview:05.11.2012).27 A final explanation is that as 
organizations are trying to 'stay alive' and scrape together what they can from slumping 
financial sources, they do not focus on attracting and recruiting a second generation of 
activists. As result, many of the environmental groups are dominated by the same 
individuals who have been on the field for more than 15-20 years and the very same people 
keep on rotating between different positions (Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:147, Móra 
2008:124). This raises definitional issues about the movement: although in theory it covers 
all environmental organizations in practice it is the same 100-120 main figures who 
constitute the movement. It still remains to be seen how the movement can be made more 
inclusive and how more participants can be mobilized (Móra 2008:124).
2.5.3.2. Relations with the State – Participation in Policy-Making
After the regime-change, Hungary witnessed an 'environmental clean-up' due to the socialist 
27 Kiss's statement is reflected in the statistical data as well: while continuous growth of the number of employees in 
the QUANGO sub-sector in the last two decades is obvious, foundations and associations were unable to create jobs 
in the same period (Kákai & Sebestény 2012:125).
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legacy of forced and intensive industrialization which created a significant number of 
environmental hotspots. However, with economic growth picking up in the late 1990s, 
Hungary started to experience similar environmental problems as older EU member states 
did decades ago (Börzel & Buzogány 2010:165). It was expected that the new democracies 
in the region address these environmental problems and that they create and implement 
environmental policies by including the public and NGOs in environmental decision-
making processes. One of the first steps in this direction was to replace existing protocols 
with Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedures, in affect at that time in the EU. 
This included provisions for public comment and participation in public meetings. Hungary 
was among the first ones to adopt EIA procedures and this was important step in promoting 
the environmental agenda. (Fagan 2010:694-695)  
Apart from EIA procedures other opportunities of participation came to the forefront 
as well. As in other CEE countries, the newly elected Hungarian government contacted 
ENGOs which commanded appropriate expertise to assist in policy-development, 
remediation projects and research (Carmin 2010:184). The biggest success of the movement 
was the creation of the environmental law in 1995 which granted civil society organizations 
the right to participate in environmental decision-making (Móra 2008:121). The law also 
established the National Council on the Environment, an independent tripartite advisory 
body to the government, which incorporates an equal number of representatives of science, 
civil society and business. The council deals with concrete fields of action, such as 
agriculture, nature protection, energy policy, transportation policy, etc. Delegation to the 
council and other expert committees within the state administration which required the 
participation of the greens, necessitated a legitimate mechanism to choose their own 
representatives. This led to the establishment of the annual National Assembly of ENGOs 
(referred to above), which facilitated a democratic and convenient cooperation with the 
state. The assembly is organized by an elected NGO each year and is attended by 300-500 
environmentalists. Other important forums of contact with the government are those regular 
daily conferences where they invite – and grill – members of the environmental and other 
ministries. (Móra 2008:122)
In 1998, however, the newly elected government, Fidesz, and the reorganized 
leadership of the Environmental Ministry tripped the process of cooperation between the 
state and the greens (Móra 2008:122). The chances of cooperation evaporated and the 
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formerly transparent funding scheme of the Environmental Ministry was replaced by 
centralized financial administration which became the hotbed of corruption. ENGOs turned 
inwards and everyday survival issues eclipsed common environmental concern. Although 
the situation got back to normal after the replacement of the environmental minister, 
successive ministers were indifferent to the environment and devaluated the importance of 
environmental issues on the political agenda (Móra 2008:122). Economic growth and post-
materialist, environmental claims have always been in conflict with each other but the 
situation worsened as recession-ridden and cash-stripped Hungarian governments preferred 
job creation and economic development over environmental concerns.
Since the beginnings, the movement has been an opponent and shaper of Hungarian 
environmental policy regardless of governments' colors (Móra 2008b:1). The relationship 
between environmental organizations and state administration have been defined to a large 
extent by the Environmental Ministry and its minister. The relationship was especially 
conflict-laden in the mid-2000s, since the minister did not stand up for environmental 
interests and all the green projects he launched withered away. He drastically weakened the 
system of environmental authorities as well due to austerity measures. There was only one 
field where he opened towards the movement and this was in such cross-border issues as the 
cyanide-pollution of River Verespatak, the German garbage import or the pollution of River 
Rába.28 (Móra 2008:125) However, apart form temporary hiccups, the Environmental 
Ministry has been one of those few ministries which efficiently included and invited civil 
organizations in the consultations of legal drafts and kept up a good flow of information 
through its partnership website (Móra 2008:125).
Apart from legislation, the second National Development Plan was a central topic 
that defined greens' relationship with other ministries (e.g. Agrarian, Economic, Transport 
Ministry). The Development Plan is a strategic document which defines Hungarian 
development policy objectives and outlines to the use of the EU's Structural Funds (National 
Development Agency 2013). ENGOs have taken an active part in the elaboration of 
documents which can be connected to the National Development Plan such as the National 
Sustainability Strategy and the Rural Development Plan (Móra 2008:125). Another 
important forum for the greens to influence policy-making is the National Council for 
28 These are all manifestations of the classic “race to the bottom”: open borders within the Schengen area provide an 
opportunity and incentive for multinational companies to move eastward to find the least regulated countries under 
environmental law (Toth 2010:309).
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Sustainable Development, which was founded in 2008 as a “conciliatory, consultative and 
advisory organ” to the Parliament in the field of sustainable development (Parliamentary 
Resolution 57/2008). Usually there are no big confrontations between the delegates who 
have various interests “because, to be honest, we know what greens' word is worth” 
comments Kiss ironically (Kiss interview: 05.11.2012).
Although governmental attitude – both on central and local governmental levels – 
developed towards cooperation with CSOs such benevolent attitude cannot be taken for 
granted (Kuti 2008:32). High-ranking civil servants' commitment to the development of the 
civil sector has been just as much responsible for the positive developments since the 
transition as the strong interest-representing powers of NGOs (Kuti 2008:33). Things are 
changing now: the department responsible for social relations has been sinking lower in the 
governmental structure. While in 1998 the non-governmental relations department was 
under the auspices of the Prime Minister's Office, today it exists jointly with other issues 
within the Deputy State Secretariat of Church, Minority and Non-Governmental Relations 
(Kuti 2008:33, Móra interview:08.11.2012, Hungarian Government 2013). Furthermore, the 
government has planned to eliminate the post of the Parliamentary Ombudsman for Future 
Generations, a post created in 2008 in response to a civil society initiative. The ombudsman, 
a guardian of the environment and sustainability, was the first post of its kind in Europe 
(USAID CSOSI 2011:88). Eventually, the ombudsman himself resigned in 2012 because 
Fidesz's draft constitution ham-stringed him by cutting his powers and did not guarantee 
environmental sustainability substantially enough (MTI 14.03.2012).
2.5.3.3. Relations with the State – Financial Support
The Hungarian state fundamentally shapes the development of the civil society sector since 
it provides a predominant share of its revenues.29 Different governments have been, 
however, divided over the importance of supporting the non-profit sector. While for some 
governments tax advantages and central budget support have sufficed, others considered 
NGOs as partners and delegated services to them. The difference between the two attitudes 
29 According to the data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office, state support has consistently exceeded 
40% of the non-profit sector's revenues since 2003 (Kákai & Sebestény 2012:119).
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is considerable. While in the first case the state only supports the civil sector through social 
redistribution, in the second case it buys services which help carry out the state's public 
duties (Kuti 2008:34).30 There are at least two reasons why governments may begin to 
embrace civil society as a partner: decentralized service provision would lessen the state's 
bureaucratic burdens and contracting out public services to NGOs would be considerably 
cheaper as well. While supportive partnerships between the state and the civil sector already 
exist within basic health, social and cultural services, they are not so prevalent in 
environmental services.
It is a open secret that the distribution of state support is not entirely based on CSOs' 
merit and performance. Miszlivetz points out that reliance on informal social relations – 
which used to be an important survival strategy for most people during communism – have 
not vanished completely after the political transition (Miszlivetz 2000:109, Bíró 2000:83). 
Consultations only with “VIP civil society organizations” during the first National 
Development Plan is an evidence that such habits and reflexes have survived state socialism 
and that the distribution of state funds is still based on informal networks, personal 
connections and political affiliations (Oriniaková and Dönsz 2009:26). “All governments, 
independently of their affiliations, have considered civil society as their own extended hands 
or as a backup resource to fall back on. The best thing about the Norway Grants was that as 
an independent source it could develop Hungarian civil sector regardless of domestic 
politics” (Móra interview:08.10.2012).
State support for the development of civil society became a major aim in Eastern 
Europe after the political changes. However, strengthening civil society and helping its 
institutionalization without gaining control over it remained an unsolved issue until the late 
1990s (Kuti 2006:352). In the early 1990s, civil society actors resented the fact that the 
government favored to share its service-providing obligations by contracting NGOs 
specialized in this field, but neglected strengthening other CSOs (Kuti 2006:352). Efforts to 
meet the challenge of financing CSOs other than service providing NGOs resulted in two 
innovative schemes.31 The first one was the so called “1% system” which allowed for the 
30 The law on non-profit organizations reflects the same paternalistic mentality: it accurately and strictly 
regulates the technical and financial obligations of organizations but it fails to set up the conditions under 
which CSOs can be better integrated into the system of public service provision (Bíró 2002:75).
31 The distribution of state funds is disproportionate: QUANGOs constitute only a fraction of the non-profit 
sector but they receive almost two-thirds of the state funds (Miszlivetz 2000:77). These “artificial” civil 
society organizations  were established by public authorities from 1994 on in order to provide formerly 
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annual transfer of 1% of personal income tax to one CSOs (Kuti 2006:357). This was a 
popular scheme as it made it possible for the government to support CSOs from the central 
budget without having to meddle in the process and decide who gets the money. At the same 
time the 1% system has brought choice closer to people since they can decide whom they 
would like to support. The 1% system does not mean the redistribution of much money but 
grassroots organizations have a good potential of earning money through this scheme since 
it is not related to projects. 
The second “innovation” – the National Civil Fund (NCF) – was introduced in 2004. 
This state financing system has been a primary source of revenues for many civil society 
organizations (Kuti 2006:353, USAID CSOSI 2011:90). Organizations can apply for funds 
to the NCF to cover their overhead costs or to finance projects. On the NCF's evaluation 
committees CSO representatives have been a majority who have been elected through an 
open process. Civic control of the redistribution is thought to be more effective than state 
administered grants since civil society actors are more familiar with the needs of the sector 
and are more likely to make better judgements (Kuti 2006:360). The NCF has benefitted 
smaller grassroots organizations and improved regional distribution by alleviating fund-
concentration in the capital. The NCF has especially been beneficial for environmental 
NGOs whose share from central governmental support is negligible (Kuti 2006:362). 
The recent reorganization of the NCF, however, has resulted in a widespread 
indignation among civil society actors. The amount of the funds has not only been 
drastically reduced, the money has been distributed by new council members, two-thirds of 
whom are delegated by the state (USAID CSOSI 2011:90, Móra 2012:165).32 Many fear that 
the centralizing tendencies of the Fidesz government will result in a non-transparent system 
and that the lacking control-mechanisms will have unforeseeable consequences (Vári 2011). 
Indirect state support e.g. tax credit on private and corporate donations has also been 
narrowed down recently, providing little incentive for charitable transfers (USAID NGOSI 
2009:112).
The aggravation of the relationship between CSOs and the state is reflected in the 
drastically shrinking sectoral (environmental) financial support available for ENGOs as 
government-provided services (Miszlivetz 2000:77, Kákai & Sebestény 2012:123). Private foundations 
and voluntary associations have much less access to state funding (Kuti 2006:356).
32  From formerly available 7.6 billion HUF (€25,8 million) to 2.8 billion HUF (€9,5 million) in 2011 (Vári 
2011).
62
well. A decreasing tendency can be observed: while in earlier years 450 million HUF (in 
2004), 120 million HUF (in 2010), 116 million HUF (in 2011) support was available, the 
ministry's Green Fund in 2012 amounted only to 85 million HUF (Móra 2008:126, 
Hungarian Government 2013). This tendency sent the message to environmental activists 
that the state is not responsible for supporting civil society organizations and that they have 
to secure their own financial basis by collecting donations from society. Green NGOs' 
financial capacity was not boosted by the Structural Funds either. Although the main target 
of the Structural and Cohesion Funds was environmental protection, during the first 
National Development Plan only major infrastructural investments were financed – e.g. 
sewage and regional waste deposit sites – and civil organizations did not receive any money. 
The Energy and Environment Operative Program (2007-2013) opened up some funds for 
civil society organizations but the tendency is not expected to improve much in the future 
(Móra 2008:125-127). NGOs that were awarded EU funds experienced a number of 
problems, including the arbitrary modification of the terms of their contracts and delay in 
grants payments (USAID NGOSI 2009:113). These delays caused serious cash-flow 
problems for those NGOs which had taken up loans to finance their projects. Because of the 
EU's ex-post financing system (i.e. money is transferred after the project is completed) 
many of them faced serious liquidity problems (Oriniaková 2009:26, USAID NGOSI 
2011:91).
The relationship between organizations' financial resources and their power is not 
always causal: with enthusiastic volunteers and wide societal support many CSOs should be 
able to do the trick. Kuti and others argue, however, that civil society actors' capacity to 
represent their interests and have a say in policy-making does depend on their financial 
viability after all. In order to be considered as serious partners by the state and business 
spheres it is essential that CSOs acquire a solid and predictable economic base (Kuti 
2008:19, Oriniaková 2009:26).33 Considering the recent financial bleeding of the civil sector 
which resulted in a general atmosphere of impotence and “extreme apathy” among civil 
society actors, resuscitating Hungarian civil society again and giving back faith to civil 
33 Small administrative capacity (including financial capacity) was the biggest challenge for non-profit 
organizations in the development of operational program documentations of the EU's Structural Funds in 
programming period between 2007 and 2013. While the EU encourages that member states develop their 
strategic development documents in partnership with social partners e.g. representatives of the non-profit 
sector, their activity is fully dependent on the organization's financial situation, contrary to public 
administration delegates (Oriniaková 2009:26).
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society actors is the biggest challenge for the intermediary grant-making foundations (Móra 
interview 08.11.2012).
2.5.3.4. ENGOs' Relations with the Business Sector 
ENGOs' relations with the business sector are also controversial. Since many ENGOs 
consider themselves watchdogs of the excesses of the state and big business, they often 
clash with big companies in connection with bigger investments, such as in the case of the 
Holcim cement factory and the Strabag limestone quarry (Móra 2008:127). ENGOs general 
belief in the need of decreasing our ecological footprint and changing our wasteful lifestyles 
is in stark contrast with the consumption-encouraging world of advertisement and 
marketing. As a consequence, many of the green activists oppose the profit-oriented 
corporate philosophy and do not seek or accept corporate support. However, attitudes are 
changing. As the practice of corporate social responsibility (CCS) has become increasingly 
fashionable, companies started to appear among the sponsors of the wealthiest organizations 
(e.g. WWF) (Kuti 2008:24, Kákai & Sebestény 2012:128-129).34 Attracting corporate 
resources is no longer morally problematic for smaller organizations either (Móra 
2008:127). For many businesses, however, supporting environmental issues is less attractive 
than other, more visible and emotionally moving societal challenges – stray dogs, hungry 
children or homeless people raise more popular attention.
Corporate donations might be hindered by the controversial reputation of some 
environmental activists who might be perceived as “self-appointed fighters of a Good Green 
World” or “existential protesters” or “media-clowns paid by parties” (Persányi 2006). Since 
ENGOs often carry out visible activities in order to check corporate conduct – e.g. acting as 
watchdogs by organizing demonstrations or exposing unethical behavior – they might give 
the impression that they are enemies of big business. Relations with the business sphere 
cannot of course be simplified to the dichotomy of supporter (i.e. friend) or non-supporter 
(i.e. enemy) but in the case of the green movement this is often how the problem is framed. 
34 The practice of CSR typically comes from foreign and multinational companies rather than Hungarian 
enterprises. Corporate support in non-profit revenues, however, has shrunk to a third due to the impacts of 
the economic crisis (Kákai & Sebestény 2012:128-129).
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Legislation and politics on environmental matters are usually a three sector game, where the 
public administration has to reach a compromise between business and environmental 
lobbies. This does not mean that the latter two do not speak with each other, only that their 
interests are usually diametrically the opposite. (Móra 2008:128)
2.5.3.5. Hungarian ENGOs and European Relations 
The vision of building environmentally proactive and participatory democracies in Eastern 
Europe was a cardinal objective for bilateral and multilateral donors and various 
foundations on both sides of the Atlantic (Fagan 2010:695). As I mentioned earlier, while a 
variety of other types of activities were supported after the transition, the environment 
received particular attention. This can be put down to the alarming levels of environmental 
degradation in the region and the visibility of environmental movements across Eastern 
Europe. In these countries, the green issue was politically prominent as well and 
transcended party divisions in domestic politics (Fagan 2010:695). Alongside the new 
political opportunities that emerged – participation in decision-making, EIA, and the 
creation of the National Environmental Assembly – the presence of international donors 
raised the question of how external funding helped the development and mobilization of 
civil society. One of the answers is that foreign funding created opportunities for 
transnational interaction for ENGOs and facilitated the diffusion of knowledge and norms. 
Such instances of internationalization effected national activism as well (Fagan 2010:695, 
Dunn 2010:173).
Later on, as Eastern European countries became members of the EU, Brussels 
became the primary force shaping the vision of environmental governance practices and the 
European Commission became a major funder of environmental NGOs (Carmin 2010:184). 
The EU has placed the emphasis on promoting participation in decision-making and created 
opportunities for civil society actors to engage in various functions which support decision-
making. Thus, ENGOs have conducted research, drafted legislation and served as 
representatives of the broader public in policy processes and the EU has also provided 
compensation for this work. Fagan points out that although these highly visible, vocal and 
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professional organizations seem ubiquitous and might dominate the general understanding 
of NGOs, they are actually only a small percentage of the total population of environmental 
NGOs active in the region. (Fagan 2010:697) 
In the background of the efforts to embrace NGOs stands the EU's attempt to address 
its oft-maligned democratic deficit and its fear of the widening abyss gaping between 
decision-makers in Brussels and citizens in the members states (Kuti 2008:24, Dunn 
2010:170). Through the advisory bodies of the Committee of Regions (COR) and the 
European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), the EU provides 'social partners' direct 
channels into policy and regulatory processes. The benefits for civil society organizations 
are clear: they can influence supranational laws and policies and they can monitor various 
processes. For the EU stronger partnership with NGOs and civic dialogue means more 
credibility, transparency and legitimacy of its policies. ENGOs also act as an “early warning 
system” and can give new directions to the policy debate (Dunn 2010:170). However, such 
attempts to ensure civil participation are far from perfect (Dunn 2010:173). Despite attempts 
to regulate the relationship between the EU's institutions and NGOs, procedural difficulties 
in participation and establishing a formal relationship remain. Dunn argues that the practical 
reality is that it is easier for NGOs to act at the level of member states and press national 
governments than to contribute substantially to EU policy issues (Dunn 2010).
EU membership, as former foreign assistance, delivered positive benefits for ENGOs 
in terms of a wide range of opportunities and resources (Börzel and Buzogány 2010:159). 
The incorporation of EU-compliant environmental regulations and processes into national 
law proved administratively costly for accession states and challenging due to 
incompatibilities with national environmental policy style.35 These high implementation 
costs offered NGOs an opportunity to become more involved in the (politically less 
glamorous) aspects of service provision and monitoring (Fagan 2010:698). The incentives 
for cooperation were mutual: financial and bureaucratic costs of employing NGOs were 
minimal and NGOs welcomed any form of engagement after having been marginalized 
politically during the 1990s. Even if the post-socialist governments initially did not seek the 
involvement of ENGOs in drafting EU-compliant laws, once these frameworks were on the 
statute books ENGOs were effectively guaranteed a degree of future involvement and 
35  The implementation of some 200 environmental directives imposed heavy costs on CEE states and 
swallowed up 2-3% of their GDP (Börzel & Buzogány 2010:166).
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access within processes such as EIA or within directives such as the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control (IPPCD) and Fauna-Flora-Habitats Directive (FFHD). (Börzel & 
Buzogány 2010:162)
An additional benefit for ENGOs was the availability of financial assistance through 
programs such as PHARE (Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their 
Economies), CARDS (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stability in the Balkans) and IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance). Although sums 
allocated specifically for environmental projects were modest and relatively few, civil 
society organizations gradually became savvy in accessing EU funds for other non-green 
projects. The flip side of EU funding was that projects were constantly short-term and non-
renewable, thus organizations had difficulty in using EU project funds to improve their 
internal capacities. (Fagan 2010:698) Although the EU's funding strategy differed from 
earlier – mainly American – funding in the sense that it emphasized the long-term 
sustainability of NGOs as a main goal, it nevertheless continued the old pattern of 
distributing assistance through project-based mechanisms (Císař 2010:739). One of my 
informants, Csaba Kiss notes that a major setback of project-based functioning is that it 
forces many NGOs to hire a large staff as soon as they are granted the funding and then 
immediately lay them off when the project is over. This does not help the development of 
organizational capacity on the long run (Kiss interview: 05.11.2012).
Not all analyses paint a positive picture of the accession processes and outcomes. 
While a positive change was evident in the adaptation of environmental laws and state 
capacities, cooperation between state and non-state actors were weak and the opportunities 
of accession could not be fully exploited (Börzel & Buzogány 2010). A particular problem 
in Hungary was that both state and non-state actors were often too weak and this prevented 
them from cooperation. While NGOs lacked sufficient personnel, information, expertise, 
money and organizational resources to make strategic decisions and act as reliable 
negotiation partners; the government did not appear to be a credible partner for NGOs due 
to the historically lacking institutionalization of state-society relations. In post-socialist 
states, many civil society organizations still consider themselves as watchdogs rather than 
partners of the state. (Börzel & Buzogány 2010:158-182) For good historical reasons, 
citizens and official authorities are still mutually suspicious of each other (Miszlivetz 
2008:105). This special relationship between the state and most CSOs is potentially a reason 
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why the state does not delegate more public functions to civil society actors.
Despite financial assistance, access to transnational networks and additional 
opportunities granted by the law, the anticipated shift from state dominated decision-making 
has not occurred (Fagan 2010:699). Nevertheless, accession indisputably made ENGOs far 
more professional, skilled and better-connected, even if it has not given them as high a 
profile and centrality in policy decision-making as activists had expected (Fagan 2010:700). 
Diffusion of organizational know-how, strategies and technical expertise among ENGOs 
took place through media, culture, and through the interactions activists have with one 
another through networks, commissions, panels, partnership projects, workshops and 
conferences and professional associations (Fagan 2010:696). Although the international 
connections of the Hungarian ENGOs have been traditionally strong (the establishment of 
these contacts started with the Danube movement), the EU offered additional opportunities 
and contributed to the globalization tendencies of civil society. The biggest Hungarian 
NGOs are members of corresponding international networks (e.g. Energiaklub is a member 
of Climate Network Europe) and similarly, the biggest transnational organizations set up 
shop in Hungary, such as WWF and Greenpeace. Thanks to their international connections, 
Hungarian organizations became active agents in European and global (UN) processes, 
conferences, and interest representation. (Móra 2008:129) On the other hand, newly forged 
ties with international NGOs and participation in international conferences contributed to 
shaping the activities and agendas of domestic NGOs.
In 2004 a new chapter began in the relationship of Hungary and Norway. As Hungary 
joined the EU, it gained access to funds provided by the EFTA states. Similarly to donors 
who were active in Hungary in the 1990s, and later on the EU, one of Norway's central 
concern as well has been to help strengthen Hungarian civil society. Today Norway is the 
second biggest sponsor of Hungarian civil society, which inevitably raises questions about 
the role the EEA and Norway Grants play in the environmental work of civil society 
organizations. The case studies in the following two chapters will attempt to answer this 
question.
68
3. Budapest Airport vs. Rákoshegy
This case study concentrates on the 'tug of war' between a grass-roots NGO, the 
management of  Budapest Airport and several state authorities between 2008 and 2010. Due 
to a blunder in the 1980s, one of the airport's two runways was built too close to the 
residential areas of Rákoshegy and with the continuous growth of passenger traffic noise 
became unbearable. The main question the case focuses on are the following: how did the 
organization use the foreign resources to achieve maximum effect? What strategies did it 
employ and what functions did it fulfill through its activities? What implications does this 
have for prospects of democracy? It will be shown that the EEA and Norway Grants played 
an important facilitating role in the organizations' partial but meaningful success. Keane's 
theory, which focuses on the monitory functions of civil society, highlights how the 
activities of the CSO contributed to an improvement in the quality of democracy.
3.1. Introduction
Residents of Rákoshegy, a neighborhood in a peripheral district of Budapest, say their life is 
increasingly sullied by the noise of aircraft flying overhead. In 2006, a local NGO 
representing 800 affected households, filed a lawsuit against Budapest Airport arguing that 
the airport did not conform to the regulations and as a consequence posed serious health and 
safety threats to the neighboring community. Neither continuous complaints against the 
noise, nor lawsuits have so far persuaded the airport or the authorities to heed calls for the 
revision of present regulations. The airport refutes the claims of the residents, arguing that 
noise levels do not exceed threshold limits and that the noise affects only a few thousand 
people compared to millions of others who enjoy the benefits of the airport – either as 
employees or customers. The residents of Rákoshegy are skeptical about the airport's 
reported data on noise impact and suspect a powerful lobby that puts the authorities into a 
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straightjacket and prevents them from executing their duties. None of the residents doubt the 
social and economic need for the airport; all they wish for is straightforward regulation, 
equitable restrictions on flights and a responsible airport management.
My conversations with the protagonists of this story revealed how complex the 
conflict was. The interests of the actors involved are diverse and hard to reconcile – this 
much was clear from the interviews I made with Péter Szili, István Deák and Domokos 
Szollár. Their input was a valuable source and put flesh on the raw data I retrieved from 
various primary and secondary sources. I relied on a wide range of documents in order to 
reconstruct the details of the conflict. My main sources were the following documents: the 
judgement of the 18th and 19th district court on whether Budapest Airport exceeded the legal 
noise limits (the judgement was delivered on 11th October 2010); the expert opinion of the 
judicial expert, who was called on by the court to investigate and technically evaluate the 
situation in order to provide the court with more complete knowledge on the environmental 
issue; the noise monitoring results prepared by the noise-monitoring expert Rákoshegy 
Airspace Association hired; documents on the individual damages lawsuit of the 
association's director; extended correspondence between the association and various state 
institutions, such as the Ministry of Transport, the Ministry of Environment, the National 
Transport Agency, the regional and national environmental authorities and Budapest 
Airport; and relevant legal regulations of noise management and noise mapping. With the 
exception of the legal regulations, all of the documents are publicly accessible through the 
association's homepage. All factual data on the aviation laws, monitoring data, airplanes, 
etc. can be found in these written documents and the specific sources will not be referred to 
in the following account, only information obtained from the informants whom I briefly 
introduce in the following paragraphs. 
Péter Szili is a lawyer and a member of Rákoshegy Airspace Association, the CSO, 
which prepared a good deal of the litigation material which was used as evidence in the 
court case against the airport in 2010. Although the lawsuit had already been in progress 
since 2006, the project the Norway Grants financed helped the association achieve three of 
its main goals: to make procedures concerning noise management more public; to include 
noise experts in the work of the organization; and to strengthen civil participation in 
decision-making. Without the financial support, the NGO would not have been able to hire a 
noise expert and, in turn, the litigation evidence might not have been as conclusive as it was. 
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István Deák is one of the most active locals who lives in the very near vicinity of the 
airport. The locals consider him to be a calm, levelheaded man whose knowledge about the 
odds and ends of legal and technical regulations is all the more surprising given he is not a 
lawyer by education. Establishing an association (Association for Orderly Aviation) came 
natural: when he lost an individual trespass lawsuit after his walls had cracked due to 
vibration caused by an aircraft, he became convinced that law does not protect those who 
need it most. He is currently pushing for the revision of the legislation on aviation.
Domokos Szollár was the spokesman and head of communications at Budapest 
Airport until April 2009. Together with his team, he held several stakeholder meetings at 
Rákoshegy, where they met the locals and informed them about the nature of noise and what 
the airport's noise management strategies were. He is well aware of the problems the 
community faces but he also declares that any restriction on the runways is impossible if 
aviation safety regulations are to be met. He emphasizes that the airport management did 
everything within its power to mitigate the negative consequences of being the second 
biggest airport among the newest EU countries. The airport's noise relief program was 
especially designed to protect those residents who live in the vicinity of the airport.
3.1.2. The Expansion of the Airport and the Problems it Created
In order to understand the woes of the locals and the reason of high levels of noise exposure, 
it is useful to graphically illustrate the closeness of the community and the runways. Figure 
1. shows the airport which is located sixteen kilometers from the city centre in a peripheral 
district of Budapest, in the boundary of three settlements: Pestszentlőrinc, Rákoshegy and 
Vecsés. The position of the runways is designed according to the dominant wind direction 
since airplanes land and take off against the wind for the sake of safety. In Budapest the 
wind is predominantly north-westernly, hence the north-west and south-east axis of the 
runways. Runway one is the left diagonal white line and runway two lies next to it to the 
right. The most noise-affected parts of Rákoshegy are signaled by the turquoise contour. The 
yellow line represents the “air bridges” which planes have to follow at landing and taking 
off. The individual red line shows where planes are not supposed to fly, however, in practice 
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many do. 
Figure 1. Areal picture showing the airport, its two parallel runways and the affected 
neighborhood at Rákoshegy. (By courtesy of István Deák, 11.01.2013)
 
The root of the present day struggles can be dated back to 1983, when the second 
runway was built. In order to see the events unfold we briefly have to review the recent 
history of the airport. Ever since the airport was opened in the early 1940s it saw a 
continuous increase in passenger traffic, which in turn called for increased capacity, 
expansion and infrastructural developments. In the 1970s passenger traffic reached one 
million and runway one soon reached its highest limit of capacity: the construction of a new 
runway was necessary. (Budapest Airport 2013) The new runway, runway two, was 
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completed in 1983 and originally its purpose was to take over runway one's traffic load 
temporarily while it was reconstructed. Between 1983 and 1987 runway two serviced the 
one million-volume passenger traffic all alone. However, when the second runway was 
planned, a serious mistake was committed: the designers ignored the construction safety 
regulations, which prescribed that runways must be five kilometers away from any 
inhabited area. Runway two was built only 1,6 kilometers away from the residential 
premises of Rákoshegy, an area which has been inhabited from the early 1900s and which 
used to be popular for its suburban calm, detached houses and big gardens. The designers 
thought that since runway two will only serve as a temporary relief for runway one – and 
later as a technical base for the maintenance of  Hungarian flag-carrier aircraft – there was 
no need to observe the rules.
Due to the increased traffic on runway two in the 1980s and the closeness of the 
residential areas of Rákoshegy, serious accidents happened soon after the runway was 
opened. István enumerates the tragic events: once the turbulence of a descending plane flew 
too close to the rooftops, lifted the roof-tiles and smashed them to the ground. Another time, 
a man walking on the street was thrown off balance and crashed to a bin that caused internal 
bleeding and the man died in the complications afterwards. Thus, a ministerial decree in 
1984 restricted the use of the Rákoshegy-end of runway two: landing was totally banned 
and flying over the neighborhood after take-off was forbidden. The decree furthermore 
earmarked so called “noise relief zones” and defined the sound pressure levels within them. 
This regulation is still valid today, landing, however, was allowed in 1997 and in 2004 a 
modification of the ministerial decree restored the 1984 noise levels despite a six-fold 
increase in the airport's passenger traffic since the 1980s. This was a real blow to the 
residents as it will be shown later. But first let us see what noise relief zones are, why 
airports need to have them and how they are designated.
3.1.3. The Environmental Licensing Process and the Role of the 
Environmental Authority
In order to operate an airport in a safe and orderly way there are several safety requirements 
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which have to be fulfilled. These are general international regulations which are codified in 
Hungarian aviation and environmental law as well. According to these laws the airport 
operator has to prepare an environmental impact assessment which defines how land can be 
managed around the airport and what safety and health measures have to be executed. This 
assessment takes stock of all possible environmental stresses that air traffic causes, such as 
noise, vibration, air pollution, even altered property use habits. Noise is one of the most 
important factors that has to be taken into consideration and as a consequence noise is the 
most regulated aspect of environmental licensing. (Deák interview:12.12.2012.) As part of 
the environmental impact assessment, a noise impact assessment has to be conducted which 
includes the intensity of noise impact in the vicinity of the airport and an assessment of the 
adverse health effects of noise. On the basis of this assessment a “noise map” is prepared by 
noise-modeling experts which indicates different noise exposure levels in the area. In 1983, 
several noise relief zones were set up around Budapest Airport which were classified 
according to the noise exposure levels within them. 
Certain noise control measures have to be observed within these zones in order to 
protect people from the harmful effects of noise. In zone one, for example, where the noise 
impact exceeds average 75dB, noise is so harmful for human health that it makes it 
unsuitable for residence. If it turns out that aircraft noise exceeds the limit in a certain noise 
relief zone, the state has to relocate inhabitants and pay a compensation for their property. In 
other zones other actions have to be taken, such as isolating the windows or insulating the 
walls. In order to obtain an environmental license, the airport has to send the environmental 
impact assessment (including the noise assessment) to the regional environmental authority, 
which, if approves of it, issues a license to the airport for a certain period. However, if the 
data on health and environmental impacts is not adequate, the license cannot be granted. 
Thus, the regional environmental authority has a key role in enforcing the law and shoulders 
much of the responsibility for environmental protection. 
3.1.4. Legal Harmonization
Since the ministerial degree restricted the use of the Rákoshegy end of runway two, it was 
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hardly ever used. The late 1990s was a period of legal harmonization, which was a 
prerequisite for Hungary to become a member of the EU. Like regulation of most matters, 
rules of aviation had to be brought in line with those of the EU. Hungarian air traffic 
regulations had to be streamlined as well in order to be consistent with the legal standards of 
other member states. According to the new EU-compliant legislation, air traffic regulations 
could not be defined by ministerial decrees any more and the designation of the noise relief 
zones and air traffic routes fell into the competence of the Directorate for Aviation, a 
supervising authority under the auspices of the Ministry of Transport. (Deák interview: 
12.12.2012) Moreover, the directives were not always compatible with Hungarian 
legislation and resulted in a number of mismatches in responsibilities, terminology and 
noise assessment methods. (Szili interview:20.11.2012) 
In the course of the harmonization process a new governmental decree was passed, 
which for some reason lifted the ban on landing on the Rákoshegy-end.36 A temporary 
provision was inserted which allowed 15% of the planes to take off from the originally 
banned end of the runway and 5% to land on it. (Deák interview: 12.12.2012) Nominally the 
figures do not seem much but considering the airport's yearly 125.000 operations (in 2006), 
it does amount to considerable traffic over Rákoshegy. Despite a ban on heavy turbulence 
aircraft – which weigh more than 100 tons e.g. Antonov Ruslan and Cargolux cargo aircrafts 
– these planes also began using this runway end since their weight and maneuvering 
capacity makes them unsuitable to take off safely from runway one. The same decree set 
1998 as the deadline for earmarking the noise relief zones. However, the designation of the 
zones has not happened to the present day. This resulted in the unique situation that 
Budapest Airport is the only airport in Hungary which has no valid safety and nose relief 
zones around it since 1998. (Szili interview: 20.11.2012) Why were the zones not earmarked 
on time?
36  Péter offers a reason for this, which is difficult to discredit. The Ministry of Transport has always 
strongly backed the interests of the airport in the debates on noise. Since legislation on aviation is created 
by the ministry, it is perhaps not a coincidence that legislation is adjusted to the needs of the airport or 
that state authorities have never found any evidence that the airport violated the law. The established 
modus operandi is that the tune the Ministry of Transport calls, considerably limits the environmental 
authority's scope of action. This makes the environmental authority less autonomous when it comes to 
decision-making. Since the ministry represents bigger economic and political interests, the environmental 
authority has difficulty withstanding the powerful transport lobby. (Szili interview:20.11.2012) According 
to the airport's own estimates, Budapest Airport contributed 1.24% to the GDP in 2009. (Budapest Airport 
2013b) It also provides jobs for thousands in the relatively poor, neighboring districts. Such overall 
benefits might also contribute to downplaying the social and environmental costs of noise pollution.
75
Continuous delays, bureaucratic inertia and appeals against the airport's 
environmental impact assessment has so far set back the Aviation Directorate from 
designating the zones. Although in 2002 the directorate accepted the airport's noise 
assessment and decided on the nose relief zones the National Transport Authority appealed 
against it and the plans about the designation were dropped. The directorate then initiated a 
new procedure, but since the impact assessment was not sent to the local governments 
concerned, the case got stalled again. When the directorate finally approved of the airport's 
assessment, this time the local governments of the 17th and 18th districts appealed, due to 
formal shortcomings and because they doubted the airport's predicted volume of air traffic. 
Later on, the airport itself requested the revision of its own traffic estimate for 2002-2012, 
because they already reached the maximum traffic volume in 2005. (Deák 
interview:12.12.2012) There are many examples of such “documentation ping-pong” which 
still goes on between the airport, the environmental and aviation authorities and the local 
governments. These endless struggles resulted in the present situation that the airport still 
has not got an up-to-date environmental impact assessment, as a consequence, it has no 
license since 1998 and the noise relief zones do not correspond to present volumes of noise 
impact. (Szili interview:20.11.2012)
3.1.5. The Latest Creative Legislation
When it became obvious that the airport would not be able to keep its latest deadline to 
deliver its impact assessment and as a consequence was on the brink of losing its permission 
to operate the airport; a modification of the 1997 decree in 2004 restored the noise levels of 
1984. (Deák interview:12.12.2012) A new clause was smuggled in again, which permitted 
the airport to obtain an operation permit as long as it has initiated the earmarking process 
and submitted a noise control program to the aviation directorate, regardless of the fact that 
the environmental authority had not evaluated the documentation. The passing of the decree 
was a nasty hit, for many reasons. First, the decree was accepted on 26th December, 
Christmas day, when it met the least resistance. Second, according to the 1984 decree 
Rákoshegy belonged to a much lower noise classification than the present noise levels 
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would necessitate. Third and worst, the decree allowed the airport to operate and obtain an 
operation permit despite having an environmental license. In theory, this also allows 
authorities to prolong the licensing process as long as they want to provided the airport has 
initiated the process. Since the airport did initiate the licensing process in 2005 at the 
environmental authority, the Aviation Directorate granted it a license to operate. (Deák 
interview:12.12.2012) This is the most annoying aspect of the affair for people living in 
Rákoshegy, since without regulations on the noise relief zones they are not entitled to any 
protective measures and have to suffer unnecessarily high levels of noise.
Although the airport did start a noise control program – insulated some houses, 
installed a noise monitoring system and built a noise absorbing wall – it still had no valid 
license. According to István, the program was only a side-activity which is weightless 
without the environmental impact assessment which includes more than noise protection 
measures e.g. safety, pollution.37 He points out the dilemma that as long as independent 
experts do not prepare the necessary impact assessment, there is no reliable set of data 
which would predicate further action. While locals claim that the vibration caused by 
passing aircraft can be so strong to crack the walls, the airport management denies that 
airplanes can cause such damage. A reliable environmental procedure would be the solution 
to sort out what environmental effects air traffic really has and what measures are necessary 
to prevent any damage. In fact, the main responsibility lies more in the hands of the regional 
environmental authority than the airport since its duty would be to enforce the law and 
compel the airport to prepare the impact assessment. (Szili interview:20.11.2012)38
The situation is further aggravated by the fact that a considerable amount of the ever-
increasing traffic is conducted only a few hundred meters over the residential areas of 
Rákoshegy, since most of the case pilots do not follow the air bridge prescribed to them by 
the air traffic control tower (Deák interview:12.12.2012). According to the law, pilots have 
to avoid the neighborhood by taking a sharp turn towards runway one (yellow curved line 
37 The noise control program has a bad reputation in Rákoshegy. Rumors say that the insulation program 
was a scam: apart from superficial tinkering, nothing much happened. The owners, in exchange, were 
asked to sign a document declaring that the noise relief measures were adequate and that they renounce 
their right to complain afterwards. This relieves the airport form executing a thorough noise management 
program in case it will be obliged to do it (Deák interview:12.12.2012).
38  The way the airport so far got around the problem was that it obtained a different type of environmental 
license from the authority, a so called “environmental operational license”. This type of license does not 
require an environmental impact assessment, the airport's own voluntary evaluation which declares that it 
does not pollute the environment is enough. According to the environmental law, however, this license 
does not empower them to operate the airport (Deák interview: 12.12.2012).
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on Figure 1). They, however, often fly right above the neighborhood, claiming safety 
reasons even when digression from the prescribed path is not justified. Air traffic controllers 
have no say in pilots' decisions since pilots can set the route on their own discretion. The 
data on digression is controversial: according to the airport's data, the volume of digression 
has continuously decreased over the years and in 2009 it amounted to be only 0.1 % of the 
total traffic, an insignificant amount, argues the management (Hardy 2010). A study, 
however, carried out by the local government of the 17th district shows that 72% of the pilots 
digress and simply buzz off over Rákoshegy.39
3.2. A Local Association Swings into Action
Grievances about the noise run deep. At a community meeting at Rákoshegy I heard many 
complain: “When I pointed out to the airport's lawyer that the noise was intolerable, she 
asked me why on earth I moved there. I told her that I cannot help it, I was born there even 
before the airport was built! She then asked me why I did not sell my house. I replied: no 
one will buy it, will you buy it?!” Another man tells me about a another incident: “Once the 
turbulence of a passing airplane was so strong that it took up the rocking-chair from my 
friend's garden and crashed it to a car. Imagine if his kid was playing out on the terrace!” 
These complaints are well known to the locals and could be endlessly continued: they 
cannot sleep at night, they have to take sleeping pills, and in the summer they cannot open 
the bedroom windows or go out to their gardens because of the noise. Since planes pass 
only a few hundred meters above the rooftops, the turbulence of the aircraft is strong 
enough to sweep tiles off the roofs and crack the walls. Locals find it difficult to sell their 
houses, since the noise considerably devaluates the value of their properties (IngatlanMax 
2007). The locals and the association believe that there are more planes flying over 
Rákoshegy than is allowed and they claim that even the valid regulations are breached in 
several ways.
39  Another problem is that the procedural order of the airport allows much more airplanes to land 
and take off at night than the law would allow. Since the number of night flights is strictly 
limited, pilots register their request to take off at 23:59, which still belongs to the day-period 
although the plane will not take off until one hour later (Deák interview: 12.12.2012).
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Some have given up the fight due to 'combat fatigue' but some of them will not rest 
until they have been proved right. A local organization called Rákoshegy Airspace 
Association was among the first ones to take up the issue. It was established in 2007 by a 
lawyer, Krisztina, who bought her property when Rákoshegy was still a calm, livable 
neighborhood but she soon became irritated about the gradually increasing aircraft noise. As 
a result of a boom of discount airlines in the early 2000s, noise became so unbearable that 
she could neither relax nor work at home any more. By 2006, the number of flight 
operations increased by 160% compared to 2003. She was not alone since many other 
residents felt that their living conditions turned to the worse due to the gradual expansion of 
the traffic. She established contact with others locals who felt that the situation was 
untenable and closely cooperated with another local NGO, which originally filed the lawsuit 
against the airport in 2006.40 The announcement of the NGO Fund in 2008 offered a perfect 
opportunity for the organization to break through since resources were desperately needed 
for the newly established CSO to finance its activities.
The local government was one of the associations main partners as it was very 
supportive of the local problems. The mayor even handed in a petition to the constitutional 
court in 2008, claiming that the 1997 decree and the current noise levels were 
unconstitutional as they denied locals' right to lead a healthy life. He even financially 
supported the individual damages lawsuit of István, which, as of late 2012, has not been 
concluded yet (Deák interview:12.12.2012).41 The fact that the NGO was cooperating with 
the local government increased the association's authoritative powers and scaled up the 
conflict to higher political levels as well. Since the mayor was also a member of parliament, 
the local issue of noise had the potential to be propelled to the national political agenda.42 
40 The lawsuit was originally initiated by an older, more established civil society organization in 2006 but 
the court was unable to deliver a well-founded judgement then on the highly technical issue of noise 
impact since it lacked sufficient expertise. In 2010 the case was reopened and the court called upon a 
judicial expert to investigate whether the airport observed the noise limits or not.
41 While the dispute between the airport and the locals is often portrayed as a gross injustice done to the 
locals, Szollár points out that the mayor purposefully whipped up locals' emotions against the airport in 
order to capitalize politically on the conflict. The decree modification and the boom in budget flights 
overlapped with the 2004 elections, and the mayor with a strategic move made the conflict a center-piece 
of his election campaign. Embracing István's case was no coincidence, since it served the sole purpose of 
gaining popular support in order to win the elections. He also notes that interestingly after the next round 
of elections in 2010, the anti-airport propaganda completely disappeared from the mayor's agenda, most 
likely because he was unable to offer a solution to the local problem (Szollár interview:15.12.2012).
42 István expresses his resentments over the fact that the mayor is less and less responsive to the local's 
needs and that he fails to put pressure on the government. István holds it against the mayor that he was 
more critical of the airport when he was in opposition to the ruling socialist party and that his priorities 
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The fact that the mayor embraced the local's issue most probably contributed to the wide 
media attention the conflict enjoyed.
Domokos Szollár, the spokesman of the airport, sees the situation from another 
perspective. He asserts that the airport management was responsive to the locals' grievances 
and did not shy away from communication. The PR team organized several community 
meetings where he and his communications team explained the sources and general 
properties of airport noise and informed the locals about the noise relief program which the 
airport conducted. Szollár emphasizes that the first steps to engage in a real dialogue with 
neighboring communities were taken by the British management (British Airways operated 
the airport at the time). They tried to make a genuine effort to help locals understand all 
aspects of noise and its regulation “in order to help them see the whole picture” (Szollár 
interview:15.12.2012). Unlike the former state-owned company which ran the airport, the 
management tried its best to be more responsive to the needs of the community and to get 
into contact with them (Szollár interview: 15.12.2012). As part of its noise mitigation 
program, the airport set up a specialized team to deal with noise issues, it insulated the 
bedroom windows of several houses and raised a wall between the terminals to decrease the 
noise impact. 
The situation, however, did not turn out to improve much. Communication with the 
authorities and the airport turned more and more fiery and after years of pleading, promises 
were still unfulfilled (Szili interview:20.11.2012). The conflict reached its apogee when 
runway one was closed down for maintenance works and the whole traffic was diverted to 
runway two for 42 days in the spring of 2009. The block on runway one significantly 
increased the traffic on the Rákoshegy-end and aircraft turbulence ruined several properties 
during this period. Even the airport's own monitoring showed that the airport exceeded the 
45dB night noise limit several times. The association found it outrageous that the Aviation 
Directorate relieved the airport from any legal consequences although it violated the 
regulations. The authority argued that closing down the runway was an “extraordinary 
circumstance” and that in situations like this it is impossible to observe the noise threshold. 
Rákoshegy Airspace Association joined the lawsuit against the airport and Krisztina stepped 
up as the legal representative of the community during the trial. Since her relatively newly 
suddenly changed after Fidesz (the mayor's party) won the elections in 2010 (Association for Orderly 
Aviation's open letter to Levente Riz).
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founded organization did not have such a broad civil support and membership base as the 
older and more general-purpose NGO, they decided that at the court trial Krisztina would 
represent the larger organization. This way, the smaller NGO's legal expertise was combined 
with the constituent base of the larger NGO, thus achieving higher legitimacy in 
representing local interest in the court case (Szili interview:20.11.2012).
3.3. Discussion
3.3.1. Monitoring Power
Before jumping to the results of the court case, let us see what the organization actually did 
preceding the court case and what strategies it chose in order to make decision-makers and 
the airport more responsive to noise pollution. The association had two main overarching 
objectives which constituted the basis of their EEA and Norway Grants project (Rákoshegy 
Airspace Association). The first one was to achieve wider participation in the decision-
making processes on legislative and economic issues connected to the airport. In the CSO's 
view, such decisions cannot be made without informing and consulting those individuals 
who live in the vicinity of the airport and they have to be granted the right to be involved in 
decision-making which potentially affects their lives. In order to achieve wider 
participation, they wanted to transform the current regulations about “procedural 
guarantees” which safeguard that the process of decision-making is fair (Rákoshegy 
Airspace Association 2010). Procedural guarantees include a range of obligations during 
decision-making: affected individuals have to be given sufficient information, they have to 
be adequately involved in decision-making and they have to be given a chance to contribute 
and protect their interests. Their second objective was to include a noise-mapping expert in 
the work of the organization and to train the organization members in noise issues. This was 
a necessary step in order to understand the highly-technical aspects of noise measurement 
and to be able to produce reliable data themselves. Correspondingly to these main 
objectives, the association engaged in a wide array of activities. 
Firstly, they requested various types of data from the environmental and aviation 
authorities and the airport in order to make documents of public concern available. They 
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obtained data on noise monitoring from the airport which the organization's own expert used 
later in his assessment. They obtained information on plane routes from the air traffic 
controllers in order to see whether there were digressions from the prescribed routes and 
whether they were justified. They also made public the airport's privatization contract with 
the state and requested information on what the airport used the “noise fees” for. This 
money is collected from airways and it is supposed to be spent on noise mitigation programs 
according to the regulations. They also requested the former environmental licenses of the 
airport in order to see what kind of environmental impact assessment these were based on. 
The CSO's main aim was to get hold of this information and if the impact assessment was 
missing, force them to make it. The association was arguing at a stakeholder conference that 
data like these should be publicized online in an environmental information system which is 
available for everyone.
Secondly, in order to enforce the interests of the locals, the association repeatedly 
called upon the authorities – both personally and through correspondence – and requested 
them to come to a conclusion regarding the impact assessment: if it is unacceptable it has to 
be refused and the airport has to shoulder the responsibilities (e.g. being sanctioned) or else, 
if it is acceptable then the zones have to be earmarked but then the state has to shoulder the 
responsibilities (e.g. relocate people). The problem seems to be that as long as the law does 
not define explicitly what each authority's responsibility is, they can hide behind the law and 
shirk their duties. The trend seems to be that whenever the airport hands in its 
documentation, the authorities drag out the process for years without accepting or refusing 
it, and if it has not already lapsed, then refuse the documentation owing to legal-technical 
shortcomings (Deák interview:12.12.2012).43
Thirdly, the members of the association took part in various stakeholder consultation 
forums which aimed to bring together affected people in order to guarantee diverse interests 
to come to the surface, for example when drafting a modification to a law.44 The 
43  When the airport was privatized, the state and the new management agreed in the privatization contract 
that in case the government changes the legal environment in a way which would significantly increase 
the expenses of the airport, then the airport' management can consider it a “state intervention” which 
automatically triggers a compensation clause in the privatization agreement for the financial loss. This 
contract ties the hands of the state to enact laws which would confer expensive measures on the airport 
(Szili interview: 20.10.2012).
44 The 1995 environmental law provides environmental organizations with a special status – “client” status 
– which allows them to participate in administrative decision-making related to the environment. This 
also entitles ENGOs to take part in certain procedures, such as environmental impact assessment. 
Organizations have the right to express their opinion, raise awareness to neglected problems and influence 
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association's aim was, on the one hand, to nail the authorities and make them force the 
airport to prepare an environmental assessment and to take part in these assessments and on 
the other hand, to restore the former ban on the Rákoshegy-end of the runway. At these 
forums they repeatedly expressed their objection to the conduct of the regional 
environmental authority and they pushed for the creation of orderly procedures where the 
responsibilities of the parties is clear-cut. Although successive managements all handed in 
revised documentations of impact assessment, the responsible authorities either threw them 
back or delayed the process until it eventually lapsed. A likely explanation for the delays 
according to István is that the authorities protract the earmarking procedures in order to 
avoid the consequences: as soon as the zones are set up, it becomes the state's responsibility 
to relocate inhabitants living in the innermost relief zones, which would cost a fortune to the 
state. (Deák interview:12.12.2012) By postponing earmarking, the authorities are saving 
money but at the same time they avoid their duties. In order to remedy this problem, the 
CSO proposed changes to the ambiguities of existing regulations: there should be more 
legislative control over the authorities or sanctions which deter them from delaying the 
designation of the noise relief zones. The CSO argued that according to the law, the boom in 
traffic and the increased use of the Rákoshegy-end in itself necessitated that the authorities 
crack down upon the airport and review its environmental impact. The authorities, however, 
did not consider traffic to have increased so much to trigger renewed control. Often the 
disagreements were caused by differing readings of the laws (Szili interview: 20.10.2012).
In practice, however, they had to face the fact that the opportunities for participation 
was more limited than they had imagined. At a stakeholder conference on a major 
developmental project which aimed to increase the airports' passenger capacity significantly, 
not even the representatives of the local government were granted participation, although 
increased passenger traffic affected the whole vicinity of the airport. The airport argued that 
since the development project is located on land rented only from of the 18th district, the 
extension has no effect on the 17th district and as a consequence it has no right to be present 
at the stakeholder conference (Szili interview: 20.10.2012).45 On the other hand, 
decision-making. The client status also entitles them to appeal against decisions of environmental 
licensing procedures and as a last resort to file lawsuits (USAID CSOSI 2011:93).
45  It is interesting to compare the advocacy activities of the two districts. While civil society organizations 
and the local government of the 17th district has been quite active in kicking up a fuss over the noise 
problems, the 18th district was much more silent in scolding the airport. Péter suspects the 18th district has 
good reasons why not to meddle in the airport's affairs: the airport pays a hefty local business tax to the 
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participation does not guarantee that civil society organizations' opinion in these matters 
will be payed due heed to. Krisztina laments in an official letter written to the Ministry of 
Transport that during the stakeholder consultations on a draft legislation the associations 
remarks were not taken into consideration at all.
The fourth strategy, and perhaps the most prominent one was to employ an 
independent noise-mapping expert and measure the noise levels at Rákoshegy. This was a 
crucial step, since the association had doubts about the airport's own monitoring results and 
Krisztina an Péter wanted to find it out themselves whether the results were reliable.46 This 
element of their project was not only the most prominent but the most expensive as well. 
Without the funds they would never have been able to finance the noise expert's knowledge 
and the rental fee for the monitoring equipment (Szili interview: 20.10.2012). By 
cooperating with a noise expert they managed to take part in the predominantly technical 
debate which formed the basis of the issues concerning noise measurement. With the help of 
the expert they measured noise levels on a few, randomly chosen days and then compared 
the data to the airport's on results. Although the measurements did not show significant 
difference between the two sets of data during the monitored days, it became clear that the 
present method of calculating noise impact is distorted. The established practice is to 
differentiate between a 16-hour daytime average sound level and an 8-hour average night 
level. The problem with this calculation is that it expresses average sound levels and does 
not take into consideration distinct events of noise, such as the explosion-like noise aircrafts 
produce. This “sonic boom” typically happens when the engines of taking off airplanes are 
geared to maximum performance (WHO 1999:49). For example, enduring a continuous 
average noise level of 45 dB is much easier than tolerating the same noise level under a very 
short period of time. That is why in a 45 dB noise pressure limitation which is averaged 
over a 8-hour night period, a threshold-breaching 60-120 dB momentary noise event simply 
“disappears”. This is especially disturbing for the neighborhood at night when unpredictable 
aircraft noise takes them unawares. The analysis also pointed out that the threshold value for 
district since the airport buildings administratively belong there (Szili interview:20.10.2012). The airport 
also signed “agreements of cooperation” with the 18th district which has the whiff of a bribe: as long as 
the 18th district is willing to cooperate with the airport, it financially supports the local government. 
(Budapest Airport 2013) 
46 According to the 2004 decree, a noise monitoring system has to be operated by the airport. The fact that 
monitoring data is produced by the same institution which emits the noise makes the reliability of the data 
slightly doubtful.
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the airport's monitoring machine is unnecessarily high to register noise as a flight event, 
which means that an unrealistically high number of planes have to pass by in order to breach 
noise pressure limits.
Since the organization did not have enough resources to conduct a larger-scale 
monitoring test, they decided to focus on the individual perceptions of noise exposure 
instead (Szili interview: 20.10.2012). The association argued that the assessment of the 
health impacts of the noise was necessary as well since the established method of noise 
measurement did not take into consideration the disturbing, health-impairing effects of noise 
pollution. Most endangered are those 2500 people who live in the innermost noise relief 
zone and who suffer noise at all levels from 65 dB to an excruciating 75 dB. (Rákoshegy 
Airspace Association 2010b) Night-time noise, due to its unpredictability, can be related to 
several negative heath affects. According to WHO if negative affects on sleep are to be 
avoided, the equivalent sound pressure level should not exceed 30 dBA indoors for 
continuous noise (WHO 1999:46). Disturbed sleep can be associated with a number of 
short-term and long-term health problems: from primarily sleep disturbances such as 
awakenings, alternations in sleep depth and increased blood pressure to after-effects such as 
fatigue, depressed mood, irritability and decreased performance (WHO 1999:44). It has also 
been documented, mainly in shift workers and children, that noise can adversely affect the 
performance of cognitive tasks, such as reading, problem solving and memorization (WHO 
1999:49). Excessive daytime sleepiness and cognitive deficit caused by chronic sleep debt is 
thus a major public health problem since it interferes with with daily activities.  
To sum it up, the activities of the organization can be understood as a series of 
interrelated activities of monitoring. The monitory activities on a technical level comprised 
the actual noise monitoring of aircraft noise and on a political level it meant monitoring the 
activities of public authorities. By pointing out the anomalies of legislation and reminding 
authorities of their duties the association functioned both as a “signaling platform” and a 
potential check upon the institutions of the state (Keane 2004:15). My next questions are the 
following: in what ways was the EEA and Norway Grants a decisive factor for the 
organization to fulfill its role as a watchdog? How did the organization mobilize financial 
resources to reach a maximum effect?
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3.3.2. The Role of the Grants – Contribution to Monitory Democracy
The role of the grants in the association's activities can be best contextualized and 
understood from the perspective of Keane's theoretical framework of monitory democracy. 
Civil society and democratization theories have increasingly pointed out that conventional, 
representative forms of democracy are stagnating because they are unable to activate, 
channel and aggregate the diverse voices of citizens in modern democracies (Törnquist 
2009, Edwards 2011:5). Keane finds the antidote to conventional democracy in the monitory 
functions of civil society, which provide extra-parliamentary avenues to check and balance 
power. He draws on a rich theoretical tradition of contemporary democratic thinking by 
putting forward the thesis: we are entering the age of monitory democracy when “bossy 
power can no longer hide comfortably behind private masks” because power relations are 
increasingly subjected to various watchdogs which constantly press for greater 
accountability (Keane 2013:47). The nature of democracy and decision-making recently 
went through a twofold transformation: while the grip of elections, political parties and 
parliaments on citizens' lives is weakening, 'independent' and 'neutral' monitors of power 
begin to carve a space out for themselves. The institutions of representative democracy are 
gradually losing their pivotal position in politics as new forms of monitory mechanisms 
“protect the rules of the democratic game” (Keane 2013:24).
This change has been taking place in liberal democracies from the mid-twentieth 
century when the form of representative democracy went through a transition into a new 
historical form of “post-representative democracy” (Keane 2013:22). It all started with the 
birth of hundreds of new power-scrutinizing institutions unknown to previous democratic 
systems. These encompass a wide array of inventions: from electoral commissions through 
consumer protection agencies to global watchdog organizations and think tanks (Keane 
2013:24). These monitors, which often claim to be independent by acting “in the name of 
the people” paradoxically often operate without any elected representatives. They put 
decision-makers and other power holders to task, complicate their lives, question their 
authority and force them to change their agendas using various strategies (Keane 2013:23). 
In Keane's view, monitory democracy is the newest, most advanced form of democracy yet 
where power-exercising people and institutions are increasingly subjected to public 
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monitoring. These new monitory organizations guarantee that citizens can give voice to 
their concerns, problems and opinions through new channels. These scrutinizing 
mechanisms play various roles: they provide citizens with better information about the 
performance of various governmental and non-governmental bodies, they promote public 
standards and ethical rules and most importantly, they enfranchise and strengthen the 
diversity of citizens' voices (Keane 2013:26). These monitory mechanisms concentrate on 
different dimensions on different levels: from the dimensions of citizens' inputs to policy 
outputs; from the local level to global networks (Keane 2013:25). This new form of 
democracy has new contours and new dynamics which fundamentally change the nature of 
self-governing because for the first time in history democracy means more than free and fair 
elections (Keane 2013:23). How does Keane's conception of these new power-scrutinizing 
mechanisms illuminate the present case? How does it inform the role of foreign assistance 
in the monitory functions of civil society? 
This case demonstrates that the association is one of those many power-scrutinizing 
organizations which keep power on hold. By sponsoring them the EEA and Norway Grants 
indirectly contributed to the development of monitory democracy by facilitating pressure 
“from below”. The association's functioning as a watchdog is a perfect manifestation of the 
process monitory democracy comes about. By keeping a close eye on state institutions and 
keeping a tab on policy outputs and big business, the organization brought greater public 
accountability and transparency about. The year-long research of archives to track legal 
changes and historical data on the airport; requesting, in the name of the public, the 
disclosure of official records and documents which would otherwise have remained hidden; 
taking part in various forums of stakeholder consultation; and monitoring the noise levels 
per se are all examples of their monitoring activities. The association through these 
activities disputed and checked power by keeping a critical eye on new legislation, revealed 
controversies in the current regulation and gave voice to the concern of those 8.000 affected 
people who felt left out of decision-making which touched upon their lives. With the help of 
the grants the organization could independently represent those who alone stood slim 
chances of receiving legal remedy or financial compensation. While almost all individual 
trespass lawsuits failed before, the organization due to its local support had the potential to 
step up more forcefully against the airport (Deák interview:12.12.2012).
The relevance of the association's activities can be grasped better if we consider that 
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this was the first time in the airport's history when affected citizens took the initiative to take 
matters in their own hands and challenged the airport and the authorities in order to achieve 
democratic improvements of the system, such as enforcing greater participation in decision-
making and nudging the authorities to tend to their duties at last (Szili interview: 
20.10.2012). They contested policy outputs produced by the state which had local footprints 
and they tried to enforce public standards and ethical rules. The high conflict potential of 
civil society was manifest in this case: threatening the authorities with a lawsuit in order to 
obtain public information and scuffles and skirmishes over who decides on what, when and 
how were equally part of civil society-state relations as attempts to achieve “forms of 
cooperation” (Rákoshegy Airspace Association 2010). The grants first and foremost helped 
multiply the pinching effect of civil society since the CSO made decision-makers aware of 
the fact that nobody is entitled to rule without the consent of the governed (Keane 2013:32).
Another aspect of the association's scrutinizing activity was to put pressure on 
different levels of state institutions and call on them to observe the law which sets a limit on 
air traffic over Rákoshegy. They did this by going through all steps of the public 
institutional hierarchy: form the Aviation Directorate through the National Transport 
Authority and finally to the Ministry of Transport, pushing their case until they found the 
responsible and competent person to responded to their problems. The importance of the 
grants lies in the fact that if the organization did not strive to achieve changes in the present 
malpractice, then the anomalies in the regulations might never have surfaced otherwise and 
the status quo would most likely have remained. In a well-functioning democracy it would 
be automatic that authorities regulate an airport without anyone having to sue them for 
malpractice (Deák interview:12.12.2012). It was an explicit aim of the grants to support “an 
active civil society, which is the mouthpiece of democratic standards, correctives of the 
parliamentary democracy and an arena for wider popular participation in political 
processes” (UD 2010:11). The grants gave the organization a muscle to demand such 
participation in decision-making, since often there is no political will to involve 
environmental organizations in the preparation of decisions or to deal with the local problem 
of noise.47 Participation in decision-making is practically always a grassroots initiative and it 
requires a firm representation of interests and a commanding presence from civil society 
47 On a civil society forum the under-secretary of the Ministry of Rural Development declared that there is no point in 
dealing with the noise issue and he doubted the situation in the airport's vicinity would change in the near-future. At 
the same time he acknowledged the fact that the airport violates the regulations and it should be closed (Association 
for Orderly Aviation's open letter to Levente Riz).
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members (Móra interview 08.10.2012). As a consequence, it has to be clear on a community 
level what people expect of the state, otherwise the state will not be able to respond to those 
needs (Szili interview:20.10.2012). In other words: 
Institutions are unable to create and produce that popular will which decision-makers in 
theory represent during their work. It is only the community of citizens, the public 
opinion that is able to produce that will. And public opinion only comes into existence if 
people share their opinion with each other, and especially if public life becomes visible 
for political decision-makers. (Hammer cited in Bíró 2002:75)
This is why external support proved so important, since it made civil society visible for 
decision-makers and empowered them to put pressure on state institutions to be more 
responsive to public needs. 
On the other hand, there is no doubt the grants meant a lifeline for the organization. 
Although grassroots organizations make important contributions to policy activities at the 
local level and take action on behalf of their members, these organizations are often 
overlooked by governments, agencies and foundations. Their modest resources mainly 
consist of membership fees and individual donations. (Carmin 2010:202) The fact that the 
grant sizes were diversified according to Hungarian civil society needs “broke down the 
barriers” for smaller, less experienced organizations for whom accessing international 
funding is usually rather challenging (Pitija 2010:ix).48 Furthermore, the government often 
prefers to support and contract service-providing NGOs rather than strengthening those 
CSOs engaged in “change work” and which are likely to be critical towards the state (Kuti 
2006:352, Pitija 2010:7). The reason for this is that “…often – especially in environmental 
issues – greens get into conflicts with the central political power or development plans, and 
it is a deep-rooted fixation of politicians that criticism is an offense” (Móra 
interview:08.10.2012). Why would the state feed watchdogs which might bite its hand in the 
future? In this context the funds, which amounted to €10.800 (Szili interview:20.10.2012) 
were essential for the association which – according to an official letter – did not even have 
enough resources to cover the expenses of a court case in 2009 which was a mere 15.000 
48 Two sets of funding was available for civil society organizations according to the volume of the project and the 
organization's capacity: for smaller projects €5-25.000 and for bigger ones €25-80.000 was available. In Hungary 
the grants sizes were relatively small in order to increase the number of projects (Pitija 2010:17).
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HUF (€50).  
External funding also solved the dilemma many civil society organizations face 
today: while it is a key aspect of their independence to distance themselves from the state, 
financial realities nevertheless force them to turn to the state for support (Kuti 2008:352). 
Insufficient resources make it very difficult for CSOs to carry out monitory and advocacy 
jobs while it is of crucial importance that CSOs stand out for the interest of their 
constituencies, advocate environmental justice and improve the quality of democracy. It is 
especially important in this context that the allocative system of the NGO Fund is controlled 
by civil society members who can make funds available for projects which otherwise might 
not be financed by the government. This system also made it possible to support 
organizations whose work is considered important by other civil society actors.
The grants were also very important from the point of view of helping the ENGO to 
produce independent scientific data. Similarly to environmentalists of the Danube 
movement, knowing the scientific truth about their environment was crucial for the 
association. Similarly to the role of foreign funding in the early 1990s, the grant played an 
important role in facilitating civil control over data on noise exposure. Monitoring actual 
noise levels, however, had a serious financial cost and without the grants the CSO would not 
have been able to draw the conclusions about the shortcomings of the current method of 
noise measurement. The grants were essential for the association members to comprehend 
the intricate technical aspects of the prevailing quality-of-life problems and to establish their 
own 'truth'. Their scientific savvy also gave them a lever over the airport and the 
environmental authority, which had been the sole possessors of monitoring technology 
hitherto. 
With a Foucauldian twist we may say that by being able to control a technology 
(monitoring technology), the CSO also assumed power through it (Eichelberger 2012:149, 
Lipschutz & Mayer1996:139). Krisztina and Péter understood that despite its perceived 
concreteness and preciseness, the present method of noise measurement – on which noise 
management policy was built – is a mere construction, a representational form which relies 
on a purposely selected set of features of noise impact and as such does not necessarily 
represent 'reality' (Agrawal 2005:37).49 The grants empowered the organization to have 
49  According to this conception the present noise measurement method gives only a limited representation 
of reality because noise is measured over a considerably long period (16-hour average during the day), 
which “conceals” the momentary spikes in noise levels. On the other hand, the method ignores subjective, 
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monitoring technology themselves and relieved them from being dependent on outside 
entities for technical information on the environment. Thus the possession of independent 
knowledge altered the power relationship between the association, the authorities and the 
airport. The CSO itself had the tool, which made it similarly strong – they understood the 
reasons behind noise impact calculation and they could take part in the technical debate as 
equal partners. By having access to technology themselves, the association could 
problematize the airport's “proof” on grounds of methodology. They questioned the choices 
on which noise measurement was based and raised questions which no one else did before: 
is it justified to average noise impact? Is it justified to ignore its psychological and physical 
effects? Perhaps there is a mistake in the way noise is measured, that is why the airport's 
own data never shows any digression from the legal threshold? As they doubted whether 
existing rules are faithful representations of an underlying uncontested reality, the CSO re-
politicized the method of calculation (Agrawal 2005:37).
3.3.3. The Court Case – NGO Proved Right
The public interest litigation which was launched in 2006 became a high profile and 
expensive district court case by 2010. In this second round, a psychologist and a neurologist 
were called on by the court to examine the physiological and the psychological aspects of 
noise impact on the locals. A judicial expert was also commissioned to investigate the topic 
from a technical point of view and to come to a conclusion relying on all existing 
knowledge on the issue. The conclusions of the court case proved the association right in 
many respects.50
In concert with the organization's noise-mapping expert the judicial expert also 
ascertained that the present method of measuring average noise levels is distorted since it 
does not express the disturbing, health-impairing effects of individual aircraft noise. He also 
psychological effect of noise. It was a crucial step to address the issues of measurement, since 
measurement methods are followed up by noise management policies, which as a consequence might not 
respond to all aspects of noise exposure. Methodology is only an interpretation of reality and if the 
interpretation is selective, corresponding policy will be as well.
50 In this section I relied on the sources I enumerated in the introduction of the chapter, especially the 
verdict of the court and the opinion of the judicial expert.
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pointed out other distorting aspect of the airport's noise monitoring method, such as the high 
threshold value for registering noise as a flight event. He also refuted the airport's argument 
about the runway block as a situation of exigency and concluded that the regulations had to 
be observed no matter whether the airport management closes down any of the runways. 
The medical examinations carried out on the residents of Rákoshegy all tallied with the 
general facts of the WHO's Night Noise Guidelines for Europe. The neurologist found 
sufficient evidence between night noise levels and the fact that affected residents had 
sleeping problems, took sleeping pills and sedative medicine and had insomnia-like 
symptoms.51 The psychological analysis reported that it is a positive fact that noise has 
harmful psychological effects since it generally causes a feeling of vexation, urge and 
pressure and a lasting sense of irritation. At the same time noise is very difficult to cope 
with since it does not cause direct damage which would urge people to do something about 
it. The judicial expert suggested that the current noise exposure levels should be revised 
since noise effected locals' actions and being on every level: from the physiological level to 
the psychological levels of motivation, behavior, emotions and social interaction.
After years of unsuccessful attempts to reason with the authorities to force Budapest 
Airport observe the rules, in 2010 the community finally won the court case against the 
company which operated the airport. After numerous failed individual damages lawsuits, 
this was the first lawsuit which offered a remedy for the whole community. The court took 
mostly the health impairing effects of night time noise into consideration and ruled that it 
found sufficient and convincing evidence between night noise levels and the fact that 
residents had sleeping problems. The court lowered former sound pressure thresholds by 10 
dB to 55dB between 23:00-06:00 in the innermost noise relief zone. It also accepted that a 
42 day limitation on any of the runways does not give a ground for ignoring the noise 
exposure rules. Although the court case did not solve the controversies of the present 
regulation, nor did it declare that the airport breached the law, it was a considerable success 
for the community and “can be considered a milestone in the domestic struggles against 
airports' environmental pollution” (Clean Air Actin Group).52 It proved that with 
51 When the neurologist doctor diagnosed the sleeping patterns of three residents, he found that their sleep 
efficiency score was only 61% which can be put down to their inability to fall asleep and frequent 
awakenings. They also had higher pulse rates, alterations of sleep depth and increased body movements.
52 The court argued that the subject of the court case was not the environmental licensing procedure but 
whether the airport was endangering the environment or not. It also argued that compelling the airport to 
prepare an environmental impact assessment was the responsibility of the environmental authority 
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competence and persistence a small community could step up against such a powerful entity 
as a multinational company and could bring issues to the surface. It also proved that without 
external resources their case might not have been as conclusive as it eventually was. 
The case of Rákoshegy had long-term implications for the authorities as well. It sent 
them the message that there exist pockets of society which keep them under surveillance 
and have the competence to spot the deficiencies of their executive capacities, what's more, 
to use their right to name them and shame them. The association, by standing out for the 
interests of the community, definitely made the issue more public, promoted the 
development of a more fair legislation and their case triggered further developments 
considering noise management as well. Although the court ruling only made regulation of 
the airport's noise management stricter, there was an implicit imperative between the lines 
for the authorities to be more responsible in the future. The fact that the authorities avoided 
their responsibility to crack down on the airport were laid bare and the court case sent a 
warning signal to the authorities that next time it might be them standing in front of the 
judge.53 Even if they forget this, the case demonstrated that one way or an other, civil 
society will remind them of their duties by bringing issues out to the open.
If we use the generic definition of democracy most theorists converge on – 
“democracy comes about when all those potentially affected by collective decisions have 
opportunities to affect these decisions in ways proportional to the potential effects” (Warren 
2011:2) – then it is safe to say that the association deepened democracy since it grabbed 
available opportunities to influence those decisions which did affect the neighborhood. 
Through constant vigilance, the watchdog of Rákoshegy has held public and private power 
accountable for their actions, pushed for fundamental changes in legal regulations and broke 
through the logjam of embedded power relations. No matter how little satisfied the CSO 
members might be with the final result of their efforts, the fact that they managed to force 
through long-term shifts in the regulations highlights the transformative powers of civil 
society. The grants were instrumental in achieving these democratic changes, since the 
anyways.
53  Péter notes that a lawsuit against the environmental authority would have been more effective since they 
are the ones who failed to crack down on the airport and thus failed to execute their administrative tasks. 
Since legal regulations are not enforced by the state, it becomes complicit in sustaining the status quo 
(Szili interview: 20.10.2012). However, for many former state socialist countries it is still a novelty to 
bring a suit against the government (Toth 2010:328). Society's self-protective mechanisms is still 
underdeveloped and vindicating one's rights against the state is a stigmatized attitude (Bíró 2002:79).
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financial assistance increased members' means and capacities to exert an influence through 
multiple strategies and to pursue their agenda on behalf on the neighborhood.
3.3.4. Inspiring Others
Although the court case did not fully live up to the association's expectations, it did not 
mean the end of the noise conflict by far. It seems that after the EEA and Norway Grants 
project was over, the CSO lost its former momentum. It is not exactly clear why but an 
attentive observer might come up with some educated guesses. One scenario might be that 
as soon as the project was over, the organization's money ran out and the members had no 
available resources to continue their litigation activities. Litigation is expensive, especially 
if one loses the case. As funds dried up, perhaps so did the will to advocate as well.54 
Secondly, as it has been widely documented, many civil society organizations are dominated 
by a charismatic leader, who keeps the organization together. Once this strong individual 
leader leaves the organization, decay sets in and the survival of the organization is 
endangered unless another strong individual takes over (Lipschutz & Mayer 1996:147, 
Keane 2013:24, Törnquist et al. 2009:214). This “one man show” syndrome unfortunately 
poses sustainability issues not only for the organization but for the 'cause' as well (USAID 
2011:234). A third possible scenario is when simply “success” causes the death of a civil 
society organization, or even a whole movement such as the Danube movement was 
(Pickvance 1997:43). In the case of the Danube movement what happened was that as soon 
as it achieved its goal and the newly elected government gave up the dam project, the 
movement's raison d'être disappeared as well. Might success have been the cause of the 
organization's languishing activities? Or perhaps a mere sense of combat fatigue, a feeling 
that all the effort is not worth it? Or did the CSO decide to weather out the difficult financial 
times and wait for the next round of NGO Fund tenders?
54  After the project ended Péter ceased to be active in the work of the organization because he had to make 
both ends meet and he could not dedicate his time to representing the interests of the community any 
more (Szili interview:20.11.2012). Project-based grants did not seem to be enough to sustain the long-
term objectives of the association. The EEA and Norway Grants was essential in helping the NGO take 
the first steps against the airport but it is uncertain how their activity will be sustained after the project is 
over, especially in the dire funding circumstances today.
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This remains to be a question but what is certain is that the cause of handling the 
noise did not fall victim to any of these. The court cases are still going on today and since 
the airport appealed against the court's judgement, as of late 2012, the case went from 
second instance to first instance for the third time. The conflict is far from being over: in 
order to examine other aspects of the airport's environmental impact, the court appointed 
more experts to examine air pollution besides noise impact (Deák interview:12.12.2012). 
This is a sign that as long as the locals keep the 'cause' alive legislation does respond to their 
needs. While some might have suffered combat fatigue and gave up hope; others, such as 
István will not stop until he is proven right. Similarly to Krisztina, he also founded an 
organization in 2011 together with others whose property had been damaged. They already 
have several cases at the court for various noise-related reasons (Deák 
interview:12.12.2012). There are already reassuring signs which can be put down to the 
active involvement of Rákoshegy Airspace Association: after the numerous litigations, 
continuous conflicts and haggling, the voice of the community has become stronger by now 
and they can hardly be left out of any dialogue on noise issues. Today they have an easier 
time to vindicate their rights and be considered partners than before (Deák 
interview:12.12.2012). It seems that association's strategy to monitor the airport also 
inspired István, who plans to apply for funds in order to buy a noise monitoring equipment 
himself. Perhaps one day he will be able to scale up the issue by proving that the airport did 
under-report on its noise impact.
3.4. Conclusion – Taking Stock
Was the project a success? Was the NGO Fund a contributing factor to this success? The 
answer depends on how we define “success”. On the short term, the project might not seem 
successful, since it did not live up to the expectations of the association members: they 
could not prove any significant difference between the airport's data and their own 
monitoring measures, there was no change in the legislation, the ban on the Rákoshegy-end 
of runway two was not reinstituted, neither was the regional environmental authority or the 
airport charged with defaulting on its duties. On the other hand, if we consider this case 
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from another perspective, the organization set a process into motion which might have 
significant consequences on the long run. The conclusions the judicial expert drew on the 
method of noise measurement remain an “objective” result and his analysis can be used later 
and referred to any time (Szili interview:20.10.2012). Secondly, a judgement was made 
which limited night time noise, which is perhaps only the first one in a series of successive 
judgements. If the grassroots pressure is kept up, more favorable results might be achieved. 
This pressure is there in the form of István's organization, which is continuing in the 
footsteps of Rákoshegy Airspace Association. István continues to keep a tab on the airport 
and the authorities and makes sure they are kept on their toes. Both organizations achieved 
considerable results in making data more accessible, putting the airport under civil control 
and contributing to a greater degree of monitory democracy. 
To what extent have the Norway Grants contributed to the relative success of the 
organization? As we have seen in the case of other foreign funding, financial support is not 
a 'magic bullet' in itself. Neither is civil society a panacea. It cannot be expected – as it often 
expected of civil society (Van Rooy 2000:1) – that a grassroots organization will solve 
problems caused by failures of governments or the market. Success is contingent on the 
organization's ability to strategically exploit the opportunities offered by external assistance 
and use it for well-planned objectives in order to achieve maximum effect. Under the 
present circumstances the money seems to have been just as welcome as it was well-spent. 
The grants have definitely contributed to “change work” by sponsoring agents of 
democratic ideas, who keep power in check and give voice to the marginalized (Van Rooy 
2000:15). It is highly unlikely that the airport will be closed down due to a lacking 
environmental license. But perhaps the organization's efforts contributed to a change in 
attitudes and to the development of legal regulations which evolve according to local needs 
and which clarify certain authorities' responsibilities, set deadlines or sanctions and updates 
noise measurement methodologies. This remains to be seen but as long as the pressure is 
kept up from below, there is reason to be optimistic.
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4. Game Changers
This case study focuses on another environmental NGO, Energiaklub, which promotes 
sustainable energy solutions, which – once incorporated into public policy – would help 
Hungary to decrease its fuel imports, save energy and use public money in a sustainable 
way. Drawing on Habermas's theoretical framework on the public sphere and discourse, the 
analysis shows how the NGO has created a forum in the public sphere where norms on 
progress and the validity of present energy policies are renegotiated. I argue that with the 
help of the grants Energiaklub has been able to channel expert opinion into decision-making 
by initiating a critical and rational discourse on energy policies. In this part of the case I rely 
on multiple sources to reconstruct the strategies and the development of the NGO. I leaned 
mainly on the organization's final project report and homepage, several policy papers they 
prepared and an interview with one of the NGO members.
4.1. Introducing Energiaklub
Energiaklub is a very different organization from Rákoshegy Airsapce Association, in terms 
of its size, thematic focus and sources of funding. Energiaklub is the largest Hungarian 
NGO that has specialized in sustainable energy issues and focuses on climate protection, 
energy efficiency, traditional energy sources, energy policy and nuclear energy. The NGO, 
which was founded in 1990, operates on a national level and it is dedicated to the advocacy 
of sustainable energy solutions both for energy producers and for energy consumers.55 
According to the NGO's manifesto:
Energiaklub is  dedicated to  the rational  and clean production and use of energy, 
55 Enegiaklub has a very similar profile to the Norway-based Bellona Foundation, which is an international 
NGO, whose main activities include the “fight against global climate change, the environmental impact of 
the oil and gas industry in Europe and Russia and the cleanup after the legacy of the Cold War in Russia” 
(Bellona 2008). The reduction of GHG is the highest priority of the organization.
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together with the search for practical answers to the pressing problems posed by 
climate change. (...) We undertake our work independently from political parties or 
business interests with credibility and professionalism. We take a broad perspective 
and draw on our extensive connections amongst experts and partner organizations. 
(...) Our guiding principles are clarity and transparency, as well as the search for 
solutions and constructive criticism. (Energiaklub 2013)
Being primarily an advocacy organization which targets policy-makers, local 
government representatives and other decision-makers, they are less responsible to a root 
constituency and only a marginal amount of their revenues come from membership fees or 
1% tax donations. Energiaklub is internationally well-connected and it cooperates with 
various international experts, partners, advisers and institutions, such as Climate Alliance, 
the European Climate Foundation, Greenpeace, Open Society Institute, CEE Trust, WWF, 
and Energy Cities. Energiaklub has around fifteen salaried members who are highly-
educated and many of them are experts in a specific field. The staff has diverse educational 
backgrounds but a great majority of them are economists, engineers, lawyers or teachers. 
Since their operation is project-based and they often have to hire external experts or use 
volunteers and interns to help their work, the number of their employees fluctuates. 
Energiaklub is also unique in the sense that their HR policy is mother-friendly and the 
organization encourages its members to return after maternity leave (Csikai interview: 
26.10.212 ). In 2009 Energiaklub derived its revenues from state funds (29%), EU funds 
(24%), services (24%)56 and private donations (21%) (Energiaklub 2013). Unlike many 
other organizations, Energiaklub does not depend only on state funds since they managed to 
diversify their sources to recover their revenues (USAID NGOSI 2009:113). In order to 
promote cleaner energy production and frugal energy use, the NGO prepares public policy 
recommendations for decision-makers, carries out research and advocacy and organizes 
communication and awareness-raising campaigns. The organization became a widely cited 
source of reference in national media in energy issues, especially on controversial topics 
such as gas subsidies and nuclear energy.57
56  The relatively high proportion of revenues coming from commercial services is an evidence that the 
NGO has successfully opened up to the market. Energiaklub offers a range of services: they carry out 
research and consultation, hold training seminars and organize conferences (Enegiaklub 2013). 
Commodifying knowledge is a key factor for the NGO to sustain itself. 
57 Energiaklub has long been following nuclear developments in Hungary. They participated in the 
environmental licensing procedure in the lifetime extension of Paks nuclear power plant. They appealed 
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4.2. Hungarian Energy Challenges
As focus on renewable energy and energy efficiency programs is getting more and more 
pronounced in Europe, sustainable energy production and use is relatively low on the 
political agenda in Hungary. While the EU gears its 'Europe 2020' growth strategy towards 
reaching ambitious sustainability goals by making resource efficiency its flagship 
initiative,58 95% of Hungary's energy supply is still provided by traditional energy sources 
like natural gas and crude oil according to the European Commission. Hungary is strongly 
dependent on energy imports – mainly Russian gas – and the share of renewable energy 
sources (RES) is under the EU average. Although the use of renewable energy sources has 
increased recently (especially in 2004), it still accounts for only a very small share of the 
total generated electricity. Despite the fact that energy consumption per capita is low, energy 
intensity is much higher than the EU average due to low-efficiency technologies such as 
nuclear and coal-fired power plants. (European Commission 2007:1) Energy dependency 
brings about a number of problems, argues Energiaklub: it limits the room of action in 
foreign policy, jeopardizes energy security, decreases competitiveness on the energy markets 
and makes energy prices inflexible as well. Oil and gas unnecessarily increase GHG 
emissions and contribute to climate change.
This need not be so – argues Energiaklub. In its Norway Grants-financed project,  
Energiaklub promoted alternative solutions and urged the state to get its act together. Their 
project, whose title was “How to build a more (energy) efficient state?”, aimed to influence 
the state with reliable, well-founded and reflected information and recommendations in 
order to contribute to the sensible spending of public moneys and to a long-term strategy on 
sustainable energy systems. During the course of 2009 and 2010, the NGO organized a 
against the environmental license and subsequently sued the power plant because it denied access to 
public information, primarily concerning the cost of the extension (Enegiaklub 2012). The litigation was a 
civil attempt to increase transparency around the future operation of the nuclear power plan.
58 Europe's growth strategy 'Europe 2020' sets five main objectives: employment, innovation, education, 
social inclusion and energy/climate. The energy and climate objectives translate into 20% savings by 
2020: a 20% reduction in EU GHG emissions from 1990 levels; raising the share of EU energy 
consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%; and a 20% improvement in the EU's energy 
efficiency (European Commission 2013).
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series of round-table discussions with the main stakeholders of the energy industry: energy 
experts, potential investors, representatives of public authorities and other key players in the 
energy field. Their aim was to bring together representatives of the state and market in order 
to spark up a discussion on the issues blocking the way of clean energy in Hungary. 
Energiaklub hosted six thematic discussions on Hungary's most  burning energy challenges, 
which were moderated by the NGO's own experts. Based on the outcome of the discussions, 
the NGO compiled six comprehensive analyses on the most pressing energy issues. The 
final analyses contained policy recommendations, which were designed to serve as strategic 
documents for the government for future decision-making. On the other hand, Energiaklub 
used these documents for its lobby activities in various domestic (parliamentary committees, 
ministries, agencies) and international institutions (EU Parliament, EU agencies, and the EU 
Commission). In many cases, these studies were the first ones of their kind, filling niches of 
knowledge on sustainable energy use and production. Energiaklub's wider aim was to 
influence two internationally important government papers: Hungary's position on climate 
change at the Copenhagen Climate Conference and the Hungarian Renewable Energy 
Action Plan.59 (Energiaklub Final Project Report 2009)
What all the final analyses emphasized was that there is a vast amount of potential 
when it comes to saving energy, especially on the household level. A more conscious energy 
policy would be enormously beneficial to the state as it would contribute to job creation, 
“green” growth, and better quality of life. Let us have a look at the inter-related energy 
issues which Energiaklub researched and initiated a debate on. The following two 
subsections review Hungarian energy challenges and potential solutions based on the six 
analyses carried out by Energiaklub.
4.2.1. The Affordability Challenge: Fuel Poverty and Energy Subsidies
One of the research priorities of Energiaklub has been “fuel poverty” which is a complex 
problem of both poverty and energy efficiency and has climate change implications as well. 
Considering the breadth and depth of this social phenomenon, the subject oddly has not 
59 This document is prepared for the EU and contains Hungary's target figures for renewable energy 
production and steps of its implementation (European Commission 2013).
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been researched before. Energiaklub was among the first ones to initiate a debate on the 
issue. 
Although there is no clear-cut definition for fuel poverty, its two main indicators are 
when people cannot heat their homes to an acceptable level or if they spend more than a 
certain percentage of their income on energy services. The generally accepted international 
threshold for fuel poverty is when households spend more than 10% of their income on 
energy services. According to Energiaklub's research, Hungarian households spend an 
average of 20% of their total income on energy services, and the poorest families pay even 
more than this. At least 15% of Hungarians have declared that they suffer from fuel poverty, 
which puts Hungarians on the 6th place on the European fuel poverty list. Hungary also has 
the highest proportion of customers in Europe chronically in arrears with their utility bills. 
(Fellegi 2010, Fülöp 2009)
Fuel poverty is an enormous challenge for Hungary since it is estimated that 
approximately 1500-2500 deaths are caused by fuel poverty, especially during winter. As the 
price of natural gas has escalated faster than inflation in recent years, paying energy bills 
became a severe additional hardship for a great majority of households (70-85%), which are 
heated with gas (Ürge-Vorsatz & Herrero 2010). In response, the government has spent 
substantial amounts of money on gas price and district heating subsidies. Keeping energy 
prices artificially low is not a new phenomenon in Hungary, since the former Soviet Union 
had long provided its satellite countries with heavily subsidized energy carriers through the 
COMECOM price mechanism (Felkay 1997:25). After transition to market capitalism 
however, welfare services – including the gas markets – have changed the least. Gas subsidy 
has been a standard element of political campaigning since increases in gas prices are not 
popular with the Hungarian electorate. The energy prices of 2009 were also results of 
political deals but the continuous increase in subsidies has been stretched to the maximum. 
According to the agreement between the government and the IMF in 2010, energy subsidies 
will gradually have to be eliminated, which makes the review of the energy subsidy system 
even more relevant since it directly affects fuel-poor people. (Fellegi 2010) 
Increasing subsidies has been justified by ruling governments as a social and societal 
need i.e. essentially a political need. Since 2007 fuel subsidy policy has been based on 
social needs: the subsidy applies to those low-income households where income per person 
is less than 3.5 times the minimum pension. Approximately half of the households qualified 
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for benefits in 2008. The operation of the subsidy system was the Ministry of Social and 
Public Employment, which reflects the essentially social character of the subsidies. Taxes 
on mining activities and energy supply companies form the revenue basis of the subsidies, 
in order to re-distribute surpluses made by energy companies from high fuel prices to low 
income families. (Fülöp 2009)
However, these direct state-financed policy responses have offered only symptomatic 
solutions which had no positive side effects, argues Energiaklub. On the one hand, the 
significant amount of direct support (€327 million) could have been spent on improving 
energy efficiency instead, which would have improved the weak quality and low energy 
efficiency of buildings and would have offered a solution to fuel poverty. According to 
Energiaklub's calculations, a third of the total energy consumption could be spared through 
energy efficiency investments. On the other hand, fuel subsidies have sent the wrong 
message to consumers and did not motivate people to spare energy at all. On the contrary, 
subsidies have encouraged energy consumption since people lose sense of the real market 
price of energy and thus use energy more liberally. Consequently, they are less willing to 
invest in energy efficiency. And finally, the current subsidies have not even reached the 
poorest social groups who heat with other fuels which are less subsidized or not subsidized 
at all. (Fülöp 2009, Fellegi 2010)
Energiaklub is convinced that the state's utility expenses reduction program is not the 
way forward. A much bigger emphasis should be put on improving the present poor quality 
of living conditions (wet, moldy walls, leakages due to outdated infrastructure and 
engineering) and building's energy efficiency. In order to pull out the country from energy 
poverty – and reduce energy dependence and GHG emissions – the state has to encourage 
more energy efficiency programs; energy subsidies have to be reduced and made more 
target-oriented (the subsidy system is not fair: 30% has received subsidies without being 
entitled to it since the entitlement criteria has been too broadly defined); and the outdated 
district heating system has to be modernized. There would be multiple benefits from having 
warmer homes, including improved health, greater energy efficiency, carbon reduction and 
economic growth. These would be beneficial investments from the point of view of social, 
economic60, energy security and climate change policy. (Fülöp 2009, Fellegi 2010)
60  These investments would give a boost to the economy as it would create jobs, provide significant tax 
revenues to the state budget (e.g. income tax and other contributions payed on labour, and partly through 
the VAT payed on the products purchased), which would help the state recoup its investments within a 
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Energiaklub does not outright refuse subsidies, neither does it argue for the total 
liberalization of the energy market. The NGO has argued for a financially and 
environmentally more sustainable energy policy – while taking social needs into 
consideration. They do not want the state to leave behind the most needy, only emphasize 
that the energetic redistribution policy should be fine-tuned better with energy policies. The 
need for subsidies could be alleviated by extending the network of other social services. 
Once these networks are strengthened and are accompanied by comprehensive energy 
efficiency programs the political rationale for lowering energy prices would disappear as 
well as consumers (electors) would not be in such a difficult position any more as they are 
today. (Fülöp 2009) The main aim of Energiaklub has been to initiate a constructive debate 
among experts and the relevant decision-makers in this field, in order to demarcate the 
problem of fuel poverty and to offer practical solutions to decision-makers on how best 
taxpayer's money is put to use in energy issues. (Fellegi 2010, 2012)
4.2.2. Smarter Use of Energy: Renewables and Energy Efficiency
Alternative energy is a topic which Energiaklub had extensively written about before. Their 
analyses, studies (e.g. on the solar energy market) and policy papers are aimed at various 
audiences and they run other projects building on the promotion of renewables. The also 
hold training seminars, for example, on how to carry out a successful biomass projects. The 
analysis on renewable energy was the most successful and resonated most with the 
government. The NGO invited several leading figures within renewable energy (RE) for the 
discussions: representatives of professional organizations, system operators, potential 
investors, tradesmen, Ministry of Development, Hungarian Energy Authority, MAVIR 
(Hungarian electricity transmission operator), and other stakeholders. The round-table 
discussions shed light on the legal and financial obstacles which set back the development 
of RE projects. (Varga 2009)
As an EU member state, Hungary is subject to a binding target of 13% of energy 
from RES in its total energy mix and this corresponds to the EU's overall attempt to produce 
relatively short period.
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20% of its total energy consumption from renewable energy sources by 2020. Despite this 
grand plan, renewable energy has made only modest progress and in order to reach this 
target within a pressing timescale Hungary has to triple it RE output. However, one of the 
biggest financial challenges is that compared to the capital intensity of RE projects, EU 
tenders are not generous enough and even the relatively small amount of available EU 
resources are not taken advantage of. What makes the situation worse it that EU grants are 
low-intensity grants, the process to obtain building permissions is extremely bureaucratic 
and applicants are often not prepared enough to write high quality applications. The ex-post 
financing structure makes it even more difficult for potential investors to summon the 
money upfront. (Varga 2009)
Secondly, there are several problems with the Hungarian feed-in-tariff (FIT) scheme, 
which the state introduced as an attempt to give an incentive to ongoing RES development 
by purchasing green electricity for a rate slightly higher than market prices. But the volume 
of renewable electricity (which FIT rate is payed for) is capped by the Hungarian Energy 
Office, while it does not put such limitations on fossil fuel-based electricity. Low FIT levels 
further hinder RE market expansion as prices do not offer an attractive incentive for 
investors. The cross-subsidization of local heating prices further impede RE to compete with 
conventional electricity prices, since the latter get 70% of FIT funding through a 
malpractice of subsidies. Only the remaining 30% of subsidies go to biomass and wind 
power plants. Energiaklub argues that the burden on renewable electricity prices has to be 
eased and a better design of financial support of RE is necessary. (Varga 2009)
Apart from lacking incentives, investors are also scared away by the unpredictable 
and complex legal regulation of RE technologies. The process to get investments approved 
is unnecessarily long, difficult and expensive, partly because it involves an unrealistic 
number of authorities: forty in average, compared to five in the EU. Bureaucratic overhaul 
is another significant barrier, which is often the outcome of the fact that there is no 
constructive communication between the sector's main actors – departments, authorities, 
interest organizations, budgetary bodies and NGOs. Furthermore, there is no comprehensive 
RES law, neither a corresponding political post for it, and the modifications of the present 
regulations are not transparent enough. Worst of all, the state seems to be lacking a long-
term strategical thinking on RES on which any future action could be built. (Varga 2009)
Another round-table discussion reviewed the main national energetic modernization 
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programs directly available to people through state grants. The study points out that 
programs targeting the energetic modernization of residential buildings has been negligible 
compared to energy subsidies: in 2008, the state spent eight times more on energy subsidies 
than energy efficiency programs. One of the programs Energiaklub reviewed was the 
National Energy Reduction Program, a national program which is designed to encourage the 
energy efficiency and renewable energy investments of the population. The Hungarian 
Development Bank offered loans with reduced interest rates for these investments. Although 
energy efficiency in the residential sector has the most potential in reducing energy 
consumption, providing comfort and protecting the climate, the program did not live up to 
these expectations. (Nagy 2009) Why? Energiaklub pointed out several weaknesses of the 
program. 
Firstly, the amount dedicated to household energy efficiency investments was 
negligible, in absolute and comparative terms – state support for energy efficiency 
investments was only 3.6% of the amount of gas subsidies. This is worrying because 40% of 
total energy consumption is domestic consumption and such a low level of state support will 
not help Hungary to reach its international obligation to reduce CO2 emissions by 20% by 
2020. Secondly, the financial conditions discouraged many since only 15% of the 
investment costs were covered by the program. This is problematic because 15% is less than 
the VAT payed for the investments and might discourage many to go through the 
complicated, bureaucratic application process when employing a builder black pays off 
better (it is very common in the Hungarian building sector not to give a receipt). 
Energiaklub argues that financial support should be minimum 10% higher than VAT, at least 
35%. Such a change would help 'whiten out' the building sector as well. Similarly to the EU 
funds for renewable energy, ex-post financing also makes it difficult for potential investors 
to summon the money upfront. Thirdly, the program has not become popular since 
opportunities of state support were badly broadcasted: government communication 
consisted of one ministerial press conference and neither banks nor the state agency 
responsible for distributing the funds were proactive in public communication. (Nagy 2009)
Another study evaluates the EU's Directive on Building's Energy Performance which 
is the EU's main legislative instrument to reduce energy consumption in buildings 
(European Commission 2013). The EU introduced the directive in order to reach the energy 
consumption target it set itself by 2020. Under the directive member states must apply 
105
minimum energy performance requirements for new and existing buildings, ensure the 
certification of building energy performance and regularly inspect boilers and conditioning 
systems (European Commission 2013). The EU expects a leading role of the public sector: 
public buildings must be nearly 'zero-energy buildings' already by 2018, while all other new 
buildings by 2021. (Király 2010) Energiaklub, however, is skeptical of how well the 
directive has been implemented into domestic law. Hungarian law on energy efficiency 
certification is not obligatory for buildings owned by the local government, although most 
schools, hospitals, offices are public buildings. On the other hand, none of the state 
buildings have visible, informative energy certificates themselves, although they would be 
obliged to display these. Energiaklub urges the state and local governments to play a more 
intensive role because private and public buildings are responsible for a whacking 33% of 
total energy use. Making buildings more efficient would not only decrease public and 
private utility expenses, GHG emissions and energy dependency, but it would create sorely 
needed jobs as well. (Király 2010)
4.3. Discussion
4.3.1.Theoretical Framework
The relevance of the Norway Grants and the activities of Energiaklub can be put in 
perspective if we consider them within the theoretical framework developed by Habermas. 
Recent discussions generated by continental philosophers have focused on the necessary 
conditions for an inclusive and rational-critical debate on public issues to take place. The 
debate has been stimulated by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the most influential 
and widely cited social theorist of his generation (Howell & Pearce 2001:56) and an “icon 
of the civil society pantheon” (Edwards 2011:13). His historical study, The Structural 
Transformation of the Public Space – which has long been influential in German since it 
was first published in 1962 but oddly had not been translated into English until 1989 – has 
important bearings on the problems of the relationship of state and civil society, and 
prospects for democracy (Calhoun 1992:vii). His ideas on the public sphere and rational-
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critical debate are well-known concepts and are especially illuminating in the case to be 
presented.
 The Structural Transformation of the Public Space hinges on the following central 
question: when and under what conditions could the arguments of various societal groups 
become authoritative bases of political action? This question, as Habermas shows, is a 
crucial one for democratic theory. Although the book focuses on the bourgeois political life 
of the seventeenth through the mid-twentieth centuries, it aims to reach beyond the eventual 
decay of the bourgeois public space in order to recover something important for today. 
(Calhoun 1992:1) 
Habermas traces the historical emergence of the bourgeois public sphere in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The significance of this public was that people who 
previously confined their activities to the household, for the first time “came together as a 
public” and through the use of reason, engaged public authorities in a debate over the 
general rules governing relations of commodity exchange and social labor (Habermas cited 
in Howell & Pearce 2001:21). This public sphere – like civil society in general – could 
emerge once the modern state was constituted of an impersonal locus of authority, i.e. 
distinct from the interests of the prince or the monarch (Howell & Pearce 2001:21) In the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, unlike in earlier feudal societies, the dominant 
aristocracy did not have direct control over all aspects of social life any more, including the 
economy (Edgar 2006:124). The rise of capitalism, the commercialization of agriculture and 
the  advent of industrialization developed hand in hand with chambers of commerce, learned 
societies and later political parties and trade unions. This new sphere of private associations 
gave birth to the idea that civil society was essential for securing liberty by creating a buffer 
zone between the state and the citizenry, which kept the state's authoritarian tendencies in 
check (Encarnación 2011:6). The emergence of Öffentlichkeit, this new domain of public 
sphere, was a corollary of the maturation of capitalism (in England, France and Germany) 
because this was the critical moment when economic life became a matter of common, 
publicly relevant concern (Edgar 2006:124). 
Transformations in the economy brought about transformations in the public life as 
well: society could be observed in the relationships and organizations created for economic 
purposes and these had public relevance since they represented interests in public 
discussions and in the action of the state (Calhoun 1992:9). The limited group responsible 
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for turning economic life into a publicly relevant issue was the male bourgeoisie which 
began to think of itself as constituting the public. Its members started to use their reason 
publicly to claim the right to debate and challenge the principles on which 'ruling' of 
commodity exchange and social labour took place, and aimed to make government policy 
accountable to standards of 'reason' and 'law' (Howell & Pearce 2001: 21).61 Members of the 
bourgeoisie began to see themselves as opponents of the state and engaged in a debate with 
it on various economical issues. The transformation of the public sphere was less about 
democracy initially and more about making the state responsive to the needs and interests of 
the bourgeoisie (Edgar 2006:124).
For practicing a rational-critical discourse, the establishment of certain social and 
economic institutional preconditions were necessary. Apart form the codification of civil 
law (which guaranteed basic private freedoms) and free trade between nations (which 
further emancipated the private sphere), liberal democratic institutions such as a free and 
critical press were the main tools in the problematization of public matters. The free 
communication of ideas between citizens entered an extraordinary range of publications, 
newspapers and journals that sprung up this time. News were supplemented with critical 
articles and journals shaped public opinion. Essays, typically published in periodicals, 
stimulated the discussion of a range of practical, scientific and social topics. (Edgar 
2006:125) These were complemented by institutions such as the salon in France, learned 
societies in Germany, and clubs and coffee houses in Britain, where businessmen and the 
professional elite came together to discuss matters of trade, the 'news' and other domains of 
common concern. The public sphere in Europe did not only institutionalize along interests 
against the state; the critical-rational conversations of these companies gradually widened to 
include affairs of state administration and politics. The political public sphere thus came into 
existence through this amalgam of diverse media and social institutions. (Calhoun 1992:12)
These hubs were necessary preconditions for sparking a face-to-face debate where 
ideas could be exchanged, challenged and defended. Such and ideal of public 
communication was identified by Habermas as a potential form in which the general or 
public interest could be rationally and critically discussed. The critical nature of public 
communication is one of its essential characteristics. In contrast to de Tocqueville, for 
61 Feminists have pointed out how gendered this process was: women were not expected to play a role in 
these debates (Howell & Pearce 2001:21).
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whom public opinion was a means to reach mass consensus – or “mobocracy” as Keane 
slightly pejoratively calls it (Keane 2013:40) – public opinion was rather a critical force for 
Habermas (Howell & Pearce 2001:56). The rational-critical dimension of the public sphere 
constitutes the second key element of Habermas's theory, since communicative reason was 
the means for the public sphere to form a general will and to inform and control the 
activities of the state. The public space was characterized by a dialogue as individuals either 
met in conversation or exchanged views via various media. Communication in this context 
does not only mean sharing what people already know, but a process of potential 
transformation of “truth” which is taken for granted in everyday information sharing and in 
which reason is advanced by debate itself (Edgar 2006:42).
Communicative reason is characterized by a free and open discussion by all relevant 
persons where final decisions depend on the strength of the better argument and not on any 
form of coercion (Edgar 2006:23). Public discussions also have an important role in 
legitimizing decisions made by political bodies (Edgar 2006:24). Habermas presents the 
progress of democratic politics in terms of the increasing involvement of ever broader 
sections of society in the debate and criticism of government policies. Although the capacity 
to engage each other in critical-rational argument might be constrained in real world 
societies – for example due to political inequalities – it still provides a critical ideal, which 
all communication should attempt to live up to.62 Apart from legitimizing decision-making, 
public discourse – where citizens engage in communicative action – is a third possible mode 
of coordination of human life besides state power and market economies. Unlike the latter 
two, however, discursive modes of coordination do not try to dominate, and this aspect 
makes  democratic public sphere a rival of money and power (Calhoun 1992:6).63
Communicative action is also a process of rationalization, since participants in a 
debate are required to justify what they are saying or doing. Ideally, if challenged, a speaker 
should be able to give evidence and reasons to support her beliefs and her right to perform 
what she is currently involved in (Edgar 2006:23-25). In the progressive rationalization of 
62  Critics point to the fact that the process of democratization of the public sphere has remained incomplete 
from a global perspective, since various groups have been excluded on grounds of gender, class, race, or 
ethnicity. The principle of inclusion and equality of civil and political rights is high on the agenda of 
donor agencies (Howell & Pearce 2001:21). On of the main objectives of the Hungarian NGO Grants for 
example is to tackle inequalities address the fundamental human rights violations of the Roma (EEA and 
Norway Grants 2010).
63 Influenced by Habermas, this tripartite conceptualization of civil society-state-business is in the heart of 
Cohen and Arato's theory.
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communication through these validity claims, Habermas later finds another, transhistorical 
basis of democratic will formation which is not as historically specific as the social 
institutions of the bourgeois public sphere. The public sphere remains an ideal for Habermas 
but it becomes a potential product of communicative action rather than its basis. In the 
human communicative capacity he finds a less historically anchored and more 
transcendental basis for democracy. This way he can revitalize the Kantian ideal of public 
communication and – more generally – democratic ideals in a world dominated by 
capitalism and bureaucratic power.64 (Calhoun 1992:31-32)
Although Habermas saw a potential model in the ideal of the bourgeois public 
sphere, his aim was to trace its flourishing and subsequent failure to fulfill that potential 
(Howell & Pearce  2001:56). The bourgeois public sphere eventually disintegrated and 
transformed by the very forces that established it (Edgar 2006:126). In late capitalism the 
consumeristic drive penetrated the whole society and citizens became more interested in 
consumption than in political action. The growth of commercial mass media turned the 
critical public into passive consumers. Since consumerist products of mass culture catered 
for individual tastes, it contributed to a segmentation of audiences and shared issues which 
had wide audiences before, lost their currency. (Calhoun 1992:25) Secondly, the emergence 
of the welfare state in the twentieth century interlocked society and state so thoroughly (e.g. 
through extensive state intervention) that public space gradually eroded. Thirdly, as the 
public sphere was extended to formerly excluded layers of society, the notion of a common 
interest was lost and the members of the public sphere lost their common ground. (Howell 
& Pearce 2001:56-57)
As a consequence of these trends, a division emerged between minorities of 
specialists who “put their reason to use non-publicly and the great mass of consumers whose 
receptiveness in public but uncritical.” (Habermas cited in Howell & Pearce 2001:56) With 
the emergence of the welfare state, the shared, critical activity of public discourse was 
replaced by a negotiated compromise among interests.
64 Kant's conception of the public opinion was that it is a reasoned form of access to truth and that the 
pleasures and virtues of arguments should be central to public life (Calhoun 1992:18). Procedural 
rationality replaces notions of public opinion as “mere opinions” and arbitrary views of isolated 
individuals taken in the aggregate and comes to refer to the views held by those who join in rational-
critical debate on a certain issue (Calhoun 1992:17). Habermas argues that the notion of procedural 
rationality is crucial for the Kantian view of modernity, since procedural rationality is fundamentally a 
matter of basing our judgement on reason (Calhoun 1992:2).
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The process of politically relevant exercise and equilibration of power now takes place 
directly between the private bureaucracies, special-interest associations, parties and 
public administration. The public as such is only included sporadically in this circuit 
of power, and even then it is brought in only to contribute its acclamation. (Habermas 
cited in Calhoun 1992:22)65 
The outcome of the structural transformation of the bourgeois public sphere is negotiations 
between elites rather than a rational-critical public debate which encompasses a wide 
spectrum of society. With the disappearance of critical discourse which once characterized 
the public sphere, it gradually became impoverished, depoliticized and disintegrated.
4.3.2. Energiaklub in the Public Sphere
Habermas in his later work went on to search for emancipatory possibilities within 
modernity and through his search he triggered an important debate about civil society, 
democracy and conceptions of public space (Howell & Pearce 2001:57). This debate is 
particularly important for the purposes of the present case as it feeds well into the discussion 
of Energiaklub. A closer look on the NGO's activities puts the importance of the grants in 
high relief.
Contemporary Hungarian civil society is obviously very different from the bourgeois 
public sphere of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: since there is no bourgeoisie, 
there is no unifying general interest either that makes it possible for any layer of the society 
to come together as a public. Furthermore, there is no institutional basis – e.g. coffee houses 
– in advanced capitalist societies where an effective political public sphere could emerge 
which corresponds to that of early capitalism.66 At the same time, Habermas's core ideas do 
have a purchase under the present circumstances. Two core elements of Habermas's thinking 
are especially useful in this case: the public sphere, which is Energiaklub's playing field – as 
65  Acclamation in this sense is a response to political parties by psychological identification or voting, or 
response to advertisement by buying the advertised product. Acclamation is the infusion of motivations 
into people which conforms to political and corporate needs (Calhoun 1992:26).
66 Habermas himself reached an impasse when he failed to find a way to ground his hopes for the effective 
realization of a critical public sphere in neo-capitalist social institutions (Calhoun 1992:29).
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it is for the whole Hungarian environmental movement; and critical-rational discourse 
which the NGO initiated on energy issues. Habermas's core ideas dovetail well with the 
organization's main functions: public communication and advocacy. These functions 
highlight the NGO's agency in promoting sustainable solutions, while the theory helps grasp 
the importance of this function from the perspective of democracy. The main questions 
therefore the following: how did the NGO engage in a public communication? How did it 
influence policy-making? What role did the Norway Grants have in this process? What are 
the implications for democracy? I argue that the Norway Grants contributed to the 
revitalization of the Hungarian public space by providing support to a project which 
initiated a rational-critical discourse on sustainable energy solutions. 
Emphasizing the spaces in which citizens engage with one another is critical to the 
utility of civil society as a conceptual frame, particularly because it puts the spotlight on the 
processes of citizen participation and the structural conditions which frame the outcomes of 
these processes (Edwards 2011:9). Wedged between economy and state, Energiaklub 
operates in a public sphere where representatives of all three spheres can come together and 
discuss public issues. Energiaklub is one of the few professional associations of the 
Hungarian environmental movement which is specialized on energy issues. The fact that 
this single-interest NGO has a cadre of highly educated members – who are similar to the 
educated elite of the 'learned societies' of the eighteen century – gives the organization the 
power to punch above its weight and credibility to stimulate discussions in the public 
sphere. Through the use of reason, they engage their target audiences – public authorities, 
decision-makers and local governments – in a debate about the general rules governing 
energy policy. 
Energiaklub is part of a contemporary public sphere that is political in character, 
since it does not only check and supervise the state but also tries to influence energy policies 
which are outcomes of political decisions and always feature in political campaigns and 
party agendas. Their aim is to influence those decision-makers who are responsible for these 
policies and to raise their and the public's awareness to the benefits of smarter energy use. 
Energiaklub represents one of those civil organizations in the public sphere which on the 
one hand acts as a check on the state and thereby balances it, on the other hand tries to help 
the state with advice by critically evaluating government policies and by offering alternative 
policy solutions. The face-to-face practice of discourse that Energiaklub initiated did not 
